Mental Functioning and the Ontology of Language

1. Mental Functioning and the Ontology of Language Barry Smith Buffalo, September 24, 2012

2. Shimon Edelman’sRiddle of Representation two humans, a monkey, and a robot are looking at a piece of cheese what is common to the representational processes in their visual systems?

3. Answer: The cheese, of course

4. http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/

5. Brentano and his students Brentano Meinong Husserl Twardowski Ehrenfels

7. Meinong Alley, Graz

8. Investigations in Ontology and Psychologywith support from the Imperial-Royal Minister of Culture and Education in Vienna, 1904

9. Bertrand Russell It is argued, e.g., by Meinong, that we can speak about "the golden mountain," "the round square," and so on .... In such theories, it seems to me, there is a failure of that feeling for reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies. Logic, I should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can”

10. from 1874 to 1914 Brentano controls Austrian philosophy Brentano Vienna Ehrenfels Prague Meinong Graz Husserl Proßnitz Twardowski Lemberg

11. from 1874 to 1914 Brentano controls Austrian philosophy Brentano Vienna Ehrenfels Prague Meinong Graz Husserl Proßnitz Twardowski Lemberg Franz Kafka

12. Brentano revolutionizes psychology Brentano published Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 1874 Wundt first laboratory of experimental psychology, 1879 Meinong Ehrenfels founder of Gestalt psychology, 1890 Husserl Twardowski

14. Brentanists revolutionize ontology Brentano Meinong On the Theory of Objects, 1904 Husserl first formal mereology, 1902 ______ first use of ‘formal ontology’ ~1905; Twardowski Ehrenfels Leśniewski logical formalization of mereology, 1916

15. Brentanists revolutionize our understanding of the relations between psychology and ontology Brentano introduces in 1874 the idea of intentional directedness (aboutness) Meinong Husserl Twardowski Ehrenfels how can we think about what does not exist?

16. Brentanists revolutionize our understanding of the relations between psychology and ontology Brentano introduces in 1874 the idea of intentional directedness (aboutness) Meinong Husserl Twardowski Ehrenfels Stefan Schulz famous contributor to zoology of unicorns

17. the arrow of intentionality

18. Brentanists introduce the problem of understanding the relation between intentionality and language Brentano Meinong Ehrenfels Twardowski Husserl categorial grammar, 1901 Leśniewski founder of formal mereology Tarskiinvents formal semantics

19. “From Intentionality to Formal Semantics” Brentano Husserl Twardowski Leśniewski formal mereology Joseph WoodgerAxiomatic Method in Biology Patrick Hayes “Ontology of Liquids” … Description Logics, OWL … Tarski formal semantics

20. The Logicians: Leśniewski, Tarski, Łukasiewicz, TwardowskiMain Library of the University of Warsaw

21. Brentanists revolutionize our understanding of the relations between psychology and language Brentano Meinong Ehrenfels Husserl two kinds of aboutness:  relational Twardowski

22. 3 Levels of Reality Level L1: the level of reality e.g. in wounds, bacteria, on the side of the patient Level L2: the level of cognitive representations of this reality, e.g. in beliefs, desires and other mental acts and states Level L3: the level of publicly accessible concretizations of L2 cognitive representations in information artifacts of various sorts, e.g. texts, databases, ontologies

23. Relations that a good theory of mind and language needs to deal with • between uses of language and external objects • among uses of language themselves • among mental phenomena • between uses of language and mental phenomena

24. Relations that a good theory of mind and language needs to deal with • between uses of language and external objects (a) between a referring use of an expression and its object (assuming that it has an object), (b) between the use of a (true) sentence and that in the world which makes it true, (c) between a used predicate and the object or objects of which it is predicated, and also, at least in certain cases, between this object and those of its parts and aspects in virtue of which the predicate holds, • among uses of language themselves, for example: • anaphoric relations, • relations between those acts (act parts) which are referring and those which are predicating uses of expressions, • relations between successive uses of sentences in higher-order structures such as narratives, arguments, conversations, and so on.

25. Relations that a good theory of mind and language needs to deal with • among mental phenomena • between mental acts and underlying mental states (attitudes, beliefs) (b) between one mental act and another, e.g. an act of thought is fulfilled by an act of perception • between uses of language and mental phenomena (a) between my acts and states and those associated uses of language which are overt actions on my part, for example actions of promising or commanding, (b) between my mental acts and states and the overt actions (including utterances) of other subjects with whom I come into contact (relations of understanding, of communication)