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Availability

Availability. Dan Fleck CS 469: Security Engineering. 1. These slides are modified with permission from Bill Young ( Univ of Texas). Aspects of Computer Security. Recall that historically computer security has been defined to encompass :

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Availability

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  1. Availability Dan Fleck CS 469: Security Engineering 1 Coming up: Aspects of Computer Security These slides are modified with permission from Bill Young (Univ of Texas)

  2. Aspects of Computer Security Recall that historically computer security has been defined to encompass: • Confidentiality: (also called secrecy/privacy) who can read information; • Integrity: who can write or modify information; • Availability: are resources available when needed. 2 Coming up: Availability Attacks

  3. Availability Attacks • Attacks on availability are called denial of service or DoS attacks. An attacker prevents a user from accessing or utilizing available system resources. • A particular class of DoS attacks are labeled Distributed Denial of Serviceor DDoS attacks. These typically involve co-opting the services of many other machines to participate in the attack, a botnet. 3 Coming up: Gresty’s Framework

  4. Gresty’sFramework David Gresty at Liverpool John Moore’s University classifies DoS attacks into two groups: • the consumer problem: (also called “man-in-the-middle” attack) the attacker gets logically between the client and service and somehow disrupts the communication. • the producer problem: the attacker produces, offers or requests so many services that the server is overwhelmed. 4 Coming up: Typical Scenarios

  5. Typical Scenarios In a typical producer attack: • the volume of requests may overwhelm the server. • the transaction may involve some handshake (protocol); the attacker does not respond and the server ties up resources waiting for a response. A classic example of the second is so-called syn flooding 5 Coming up: TCP Handshake

  6. TCP Handshake Via this three-way handshake a client establishes a TCP connection with a server. Server receives the SYN packet, allocates space in an internal table and sends SYN/ACK back to the caller. The connection remains “half-open” until the ACK is received by the server or the connection times out. 6 Coming up: SYN Flooding Attack

  7. SYN Flooding Attack A SYN Flooding attack happens when an attacker forges the return address on a number of SYN packets. The server fills its table with these half-open connections. All legitimate accesses are denied until the connections time-out. 7 Coming up: SYN Flooding Solutions

  8. SYN Flooding Solutions Is the SYN flooding problem inherent in the way TCP connections are established? How could you close the vulnerability? • Increase the server’s queue size: typically only 8 connections are allowed; could consume considerable resources. • Shorten the time-out period: might disallow connections by slower clients. • Filter suspicious packets: if the return address does not match the apparent source, discard the packet. May be hard to determine. • Change the algorithm: instead of storing the record in the queue, send the information encrypted along with the SYN/ACK. A legitimate client will send it back with the ACK. 8 Coming up: Lessons

  9. Lessons • Availability attacks are called “denial of service” attacks. • An attacker can either block traffic from clients (the consumer problem) or flood the server (the producer problem). • Synflooding is a classic DoS attack. 9 Coming up: Blocking Flooding Attacks

  10. Blocking Flooding Attacks A filter or packet sniffer can detect patterns of identifiers in the request stream and block messages in that pattern. Ingress filteringmeans sniffing incoming packets and discarding those with source IP addresses outside a given range (e.g., those known to be reachable via that interface). It is a very hard problem to be able to discriminate patterns of attack from patterns of standard usage. An overly aggressive filter also gives a type of denial of service by discarding too many legitimate requests. 10 Coming up: Protection from DoS Attacks

  11. Protection from DoSAttacks A good firewall can help by filtering out illegal requests. However, a typical DoS flooding attack may comprise only legal requests. An intrusion detection system (IDS) can analyze traffic patterns and react to anomalous patterns. However, often there is nothing apparently wrong but the volume of requests. An IDS reacts after the attack has begun. An intrusion prevention system (IPS) attempts to prevent intrusions by more aggressively blocking attempted attacks. This assumes that the attacking traffic can be identified. IDS/IPS are useful for confidentiality and integrity attacks, not just DoS attacks. 11 Coming up: Potential DDoS Solutions

  12. Potential DDoSSolutions A DDos attack comes when an attacker takes over a number of nodes in a network and uses them as bots to launch a coordinated producer attack. How might you counter them? • over-provisioning the network—have too many servers to be overwhelmed (expensive and unworkable); • filtering attack packets—somehow distinguish the attack packets from regular packets (may not be possible); • slow down processing—disadvantages all requestors, but perhaps disproportionately disadvantages attackers; • “Speak-up” solution (Mike Walfish)—request additional traffic from all requestors. Walfish’ssolution assumes that the attacker’s bots are already maxed out. So this solution raises the proportion of valid to invalid requests. 12 Coming up: Lessons

  13. Lessons • Availability attacks are difficult to counter because it is very hard to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate traffic. • Various solutions attempt to block incoming traffic or to detect anomalous activity. 13 End of presentation

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