TRUST :Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technologies

1. TRUST:Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technologies Shankar Sastry (Berkeley), Mike Reiter (CMU), Steve Wicker (Cornell), John Mitchell (Stanford), Janos Sztipanovits (Vanderbilt) Minister F. C. Lin visit

2. Attacks are growing in sophistication Serious hackers NSF STC Center Site Visit

3. Access Control & Physical Security Cryptography Multiple Levels of Security Trusted Computing Base Intrusions will Occur 2nd Generation (Detect Intrusions, Limit Damage) PKI VPNs Intrusion Detection Systems Firewalls Boundary Controllers Some Attacks will Succeed Performance 3rd Generation (Operate Through Attacks) Functionality Security Big Board View of Attacks Real-Time Situation Awareness & Response Graceful Degradation Hardened Core Intrusion Tolerance Technology Generations of Information Assurance 1st Generation (Prevent Intrusions) NSF STC Center Site Visit

4. TRUSTed Systems and Software TRUST is more than resistance to information attack: • Today’s systems and networks are fragile, difficult-to- compose and maintain: • Non-robust • Non-adaptive • Untrustworthy • Point failures bring down systems • Difficult, costly-to-compose useful systems from multiple components • Poor or nonexistent means for building reliable systems from necessarily unreliable components • Poor understanding of vulnerabilities of networks, performance under – and uncharacterized attacks • No clear history, pedigree on data, code NSF STC Center Site Visit

5. TRUST worthy Systems • More than an Information Technology issue • Complicated interdependencies and composition issues • Spans security, systems, and social, legal and economic sciences • Cyber security for computer networks • Critical infrastructure protection • Economic policy, privacy • TRUST: “holistic” interdisciplinary systems view of security, software technology, analysis of complex interacting systems, economic, legal, and public policy issues • Goals: • Composition and computer security for component technologies • Integrate and evaluate on testbeds • Address societal objectives for stakeholders in real systems NSF STC Center Site Visit

6. Research Agenda • Security Science (Schneider) • Software Security (Mitchell) • Trusted Platforms (Boneh) • Applied Cryptography Protocols (Wagner) • Network Security (Joseph) • Systems Science (Schmidt) • Interdependency Modeling and Analysis (Anantharam) • Secure Network Embedded Systems (Wicker) • Model Based Integration of Trusted Components (Sztipanovits) • Secure Information Management Tools (Birman) • Social, Economic and Legal Considerations (Samuelson) • Economics, Public Policy and Societal Challenges (Varian) • Digital Forensics and Privacy (Tygar) • Human computer Interfaces and Security (Reiter) NSF STC Center Site Visit

7. Integration of Research Agenda • Four testbeds chosen to be responsive to national needs: Computer and network security, Critical infrastructure protection, Privacy • Power Grid (Sztipanovits) • Secure Network Embedded Systems (Wicker) • Planet Lab (Culler) • Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research testbed (DETER) (Joseph/Sastry) • Technical Management Plan through time sensitive internal deliverables of software, systems among team members • Exchange of scientific personnel among team members NSF STC Center Site Visit

8. Econ., Public Pol. Soc. Chall. Software Complex Inter - Security Dependency mod. Trusted Secure Network Platforms Embedded Sys Applied Crypto - Forensic Model - based and Privacy Security Integration. graphic Protocols HCI and Secure Compo - Network Security nent platforms Security Broad Security and Privacy Vision Societal Challenges Privacy TRUST will address social, economic and legal challenges Critical Computer and Infrastructure Network Security Integrative Testbeds Network Security Specific systems that Testbed represent these social Secure Networked Power Grid challenges. Embedded Systems Testbed Testbed Component Technologies Secure Info Mgt. Software Tools Component technologies that will provide solutions NSF STC Center Site Visit

9. Education Development • Security must be consciously engineered into new and legacy critical infrastructure systems • Every component level needs rethinking and education: need to build in TRUST: security science, systems science and social, legal, economic considerations into every course in undergrad and grad curricula (“liberal” technologically literate education) NSF STC Center Site Visit

10. Human Resource Development: leveraging our experience • Cornell has had partnerships with the Information Assurance Institute at AFRL, Rome • CMU students have extensive access to Software Engineering Institute and CERT. • Stanford has extensive interactions with USPS, Secret Service, and brings the Center for Strategic and International Studies for policy matters • Vanderbilt runs the Institute for Software Integrated Systems and Institute for Public Policy Studies • At Berkeley, we have the Center for Information Technology Research in the Interest of Society (CITRIS), aimed at bringing innovative technologies to societal scale systems NSF STC Center Site Visit

11. Course Work Development • Course work to haveTRUST built in at all levels--undergrad, grad, advanced seminars. Repositories will be maintained professionally by the Vanderbilt System CAPE/ELM. • Security Science: operating systems, programming languages, cryptography, secure networking, … • Social Sciences: Bringing policy, social, economic issues to student community: economics of information technology, information management, privacy and security • Systems Science: “systems integration using software” curriculum needs to be developed from scratch, capstone design course for undergrads (or 5th year MS) • NSA-NSF Cybersecurity Center of Excellence in Information Assurance Education to be developed at San Jose State, on going certification efforts for other Centers of Excellence at CMU NSF STC Center Site Visit

12. Workforce Training • Undergrad and Grad Student mentorship and development features • Exchanging students and postdocs • REU activities at partner campuses • Student Entrepreneurship clubs (Vertex, Bases) • Partnership with Cornell Information Assurance Institute • US workforce in research challenge areas with infrastructure holders, industry partners • Summer and Winter Educational Institutes and Retreats for TRUST • In-depth discussion of research challenge areas • Testbed and integrative activities NSF STC Center Site Visit

13. Diversity Plans • K-12 Outreach: Berkeley Foundation for Opportunities in IT (BFOIT) for Oakland/Bay Area secondary schools • Summer Research in Information Assurance for HBCU faculty: CMU as a Center of Academic Excellence in Information Assurance education has worked with Howard, Morgan State, UTEP, Hampton, Texas A&M, Corpus Christi, Cal State Fullerton: emphasizes both teaching and research at CyLab • Curriculum Development for Hispanic Serving Institutions: NSA/NSF Center at SJSU in Information Assurance education • Summer Internship for HBCU faculty in Systems Science (SIPHER): California Community Colleges, Fisk, Tennessee State, UAB, Morehouse, Spelman, Tuskegee, … NSF STC Center Site Visit

14. Diversity Plans • Summer Undergraduate Program in Engineering Research at Berkeley (SUPERB). Undergrad research for students from institutions serving under-represented groups. Overwhelming demand for TRUST. • Women’s Colleges: Summer Immersion Institute for students from Colleges like Mills, Smith, Ithaca College with sponsorship of CRA-W • Community Outreach: public “town hall” style forums about privacy and security, economic and legislative issues for secure systems. Engagement with local and state authorities, media and first responders. NSF STC Center Site Visit

15. Knowledge Transfer Plans: TRUST as a Public Private Partnership • TRUST as a DMZ (trusted intermediary!) between industry, government, non-profit and academia for answering hard questions: • Who will pay for security • Should the Feds play the role of market maker • Roadmaps for guiding investment • The role of regulation/insurance • Open dissemination of research: • Publications and software • Short courses at ACM/IEEE/Infrastructure Protection meetings • Public lectures and forums • Curriculum development and courses NSF STC Center Site Visit

16. Technology Transfer to Start Ups, Industry and Infrastructure Stakeholders Strategies for improving tech transfer • Economic, Legal and Social Implications of TRUST technology built into technology • Testbeds to demonstrate robustness and scalability • Developing an eco-system with different constituencies by • Focused Workshops • Strategic Investment Sessions between stakeholders, industry, government • Internships for students in industry and infrastructure sectors • Internships for post docs and faculty as entrepreneur incubators at venture partners NSF STC Center Site Visit

17. Leadership and Outreach to other groups • EU-IST and US partnerships in dependability and TRUST • OSTP/DHS workshops • Workshops for venture partners • Special issues of ACM/IEEE/… • ESCHER, a non-profit for repositorying TRUST software • ACM-SIGBED • Partnerships with Singapore (Nanyang) and Taiwan (National Chiao Tong and National Taiwan University) NSF STC Center Site Visit

18. Management • Exec Committee made up of PIs + Ruzena Bajcsy (Diversity Outreach Coordinator) • Project Manager and Executive Director for Education and Outreach (TBD) • Each team (Security Technology, Systems Science, Social Science) has its coordinator • Each technical challenge area has its lead faculty, responsible for meeting deliverables/re-negotiating deliverables • Technical Management Plan through deliverables, which can be renegotiated at the bi-annual retreats NSF STC Center Site Visit

19. Management • Interdependency among elements built in by interleaving deliverables and using testbeds for integrating and evaluating research products • External Advisory Committee consists of representatives from academia, stakeholders in the government, industry, and utility stakeholders NSF STC Center Site Visit

20. Why an NSF-STC TRUST? • Interdisciplinary problems with issues of law, privacy, economics, and public policy • Problem is too large and complex for any one team. Need to simultaneously work on Security Science, Systems Science (of complex systems), and Social Science issues • Large leverage with education, industrial transition, diversity efforts with large team • No single silver bullet, but a number of novel and promising approaches NSF STC Center Site Visit