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Hobbes’ Leviathan

Hobbes’ Leviathan. Overview. Biographical/Historical Background Science vs . Prudence Goods, Power, and Felicity Natural Condition of Mankind Prisoner’s Dilemma The Bronze Rule A Hobbesian Sovereign Autonomy and Authority. The “Proof” so far….

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Hobbes’ Leviathan

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  1. Hobbes’ Leviathan

  2. Overview • Biographical/Historical Background • Science vs. Prudence • Goods, Power, and Felicity • Natural Condition of Mankind • Prisoner’s Dilemma • The Bronze Rule • A Hobbesian Sovereign • Autonomy and Authority

  3. The “Proof” so far… • The world is in flux; i.e., things change and move; two types of movement • Some reason exists to explain voluntary motion; something motivates us to move • Some reason exists to prompt the imagination: DESIRE • If we have desires, then that which allows us to reach those desires is what we call Power.

  4. The “Proof” so far… • Power is a universal drive • People live near each other such that each of our activities influence those of our neighbors • People are by nature equal • We all regard continual preservation as a good thing

  5. The “Proof” so far… • What inferences, then, can we make from the preceding? • Let’s take individuals constituted the way we have described and imagine what sort of social relations they would have if left to their own devices (that is, in the absence of political authority).

  6. IV. The State of Nature • First condition of the state of nature is scarcity • Not enough of the good things to go around • Combine that with points 5, 6, 7 above, then we get: “From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends…” (p. 286)

  7. IV. The State of Nature “And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another” (p. 286).

  8. IV. The State of Nature • In other words, the scarcity creates competition since • If we recognize the equality between two people then • A necessary condition of either “A” or “B” getting good “X” is preventing the other party from getting that good • Creates feelings of diffidence (p. 274) • Rise of pre-emptive strikes • Leads to a “war of each against all”

  9. IV. The State of Nature • Where “war” consists: “not in battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of time, is to be considered in the nature of war… so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary” (p. 287). • Consequences?

  10. IV. The State of Nature • In the state of nature, then: “In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death…

  11. IV. The State of Nature “and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

  12. IV. The State of Nature • Why? • Why won’t people be able to get along? • Why will the scarcity lead to this nasty situation?

  13. Prisoners’ Dilemma • Scenario: • You and an accomplice are arrested on suspicion of committing some nasty crime • The District Attorney and the police have been unable to produce enough evidence to convict you of that offense

  14. Prisoners’ Dilemma • We do have enough evidence to convict you of some lesser charge • The only way the DA can nail you for the more serious offense is if one of you rats out the other • Conversely, you and your partner can largely elude prosecution if you both stay silent • You and your partner are placed in separate holding cells and are unable to communicate with each other • DA enters and offers you the following:

  15. Rat Hang Tough Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma

  16. From your perspective, you and your accomplice are faced with the following: Don’t Cooperate with each other (rat) Cooperate with each other (hang tough) Don’t Cooperate with each other (rat) Cooperate with each other (hang tough) Prisoners’ Dilemma

  17. Rat Hang Tough 0, 10 Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma

  18. Rat Hang Tough 0, 10 Rat Hang Tough Prisoners’ Dilemma

  19. Column Player Rat Hang Tough 0 , 10 Rat Row Player Hang Tough 10 , 0 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  20. Rat Hang Tough 5, 5 0, 10 Rat Hang Tough 10, 0 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  21. Rat Hang Tough 5, 5 0, 10 Rat Hang Tough 10, 0 1, 1 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  22. What to do? Which strategy should you select? Rat Hang Tough 5, 5 0, 10 Rat Hang Tough 10, 0 1, 1 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  23. Dominant Strategy Rat Hang Tough Dominant Strategy 5, 5 0, 10 Rat Hang Tough 10, 0 1, 1 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  24. Dominant Strategy Rat Hang Tough Dominant Strategy 5, 5 0, 10 Rat Hang Tough 10, 0 1, 1 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  25. Neither player can improve his/her position, Nash Equilibrium Rat Hang Tough 5, 5 0, 10 Rat Hang Tough 10, 0 1, 1 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  26. Neither player can unilaterally improve his/her position Nash Equilibrium Rat Hang Tough 5, 5 0, 10 Rat Hang Tough 10, 0 1, 1 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  27. Prisoners’ Dilemma • Generalized Form: • Rank Outcomes, from most preferred to least preferred • 1 = first choice • 2 = second choice • 3 = third choice • 4 = fourth choice • Choice is “cooperate” or “not cooperate”

  28. Don’t Cooperate Cooperate 3 , 3 1 , 4 Don’t Cooperate Cooperate 4 , 1 2 , 2 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  29. Prisoners’ Dilemma • Symbolic Form: • We’re in a Prisoner’s Dilemma situation whenever: T > R > P > S Temptation to defect > Rewards of Cooperation Rewards > Punishment for Not Cooperating Punishment > Sucker’s Payoff

  30. Prisoners’ Dilemma • Note that even if we start at the cooperative outcome, that outcome is not stable • Each player can improve his/her position by adopting a different strategy

  31. Don’t Cooperate Cooperate 3 , 3 1 , 4 Don’t Cooperate Cooperate 4 , 1 2 , 2 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  32. Prisoners’ Dilemma • But since both players have changed strategy we end up at the non-cooperative outcome, where both players are worse off than if they had chosen to cooperate

  33. Don’t Cooperate Cooperate 3 , 3 1 , 4 Don’t Cooperate Cooperate 4 , 1 2 , 2 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  34. Prisoners’ Dilemma • And, as we noted, this non-cooperative outcome is also a Nash equilibrium outcome; • Neither player has any incentive to change strategy since whoever changes will do immediately worse by making the move

  35. Don’t Cooperate Cooperate 3 , 3 1 , 4 Don’t Cooperate Cooperate 4 , 1 2 , 2 Prisoners’ Dilemma

  36. Prisoners’ Dilemma • Problem for Hobbes, indeed for any political or moral philosophy, is how do we stabilize the cooperative outcome? • Hobbes does not develop the language of the P.D., but he is the first both to recognize the difficulty and consider fully the implications

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