1 / 35

Labor Economics of Sports I:

Labor Economics of Sports I:. Wage Determination. An Overview . Smoothly functioning markets Labor Supply and Labor Demand Is LeBron James underpaid? Human Capital Monopsony and Free Agency Salary Arbitration Superstars and Winner-take-all When to turn pro?.

theta
Download Presentation

Labor Economics of Sports I:

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Labor Economics of Sports I: Wage Determination

  2. An Overview • Smoothly functioning markets • Labor Supply and Labor Demand • Is LeBron James underpaid? • Human Capital • Monopsony and Free Agency • Salary Arbitration • Superstars and Winner-take-all • When to turn pro?

  3. What’s the difference between Tara Lipinski

  4. And Funny Cide?

  5. To see answer: Consider Labor Supply x • Indifference curves • Show desires • Personal trade-off • Goods vs. Leisure L

  6. To see answer: Consider Labor Supply x • Indifference curves • Show desires • Personal trade-off • Goods vs. Leisure • Constraint in 2 parts • Exogenous Income (I) • Vertical Segment • Downward sloping • Slope=wage (-w) L

  7. To see answer: Consider Labor Supply x • Indifference curves • Show desires • Personal trade-off • Goods vs. Leisure • Constraint in 2 parts • Exogenous Income (I) • Vertical Segment • Downward sloping • Slope=wage (-w) • Best off at tangency • Best possible mix Leisure Work T L L*

  8. What happens if I rises • Pure income effect • Moves straight up • What causes this? Leisure Work

  9. What happens if I rises • Pure income effect • Can afford more of everything • Moves straight up • What causes this? • Tara v. Funny Cide More Leisure Less Work

  10. Responses to changes • What happens if w rises? • Constraint gets steeper • Two effects • Substitution effect: • Leisure costs more • Work more • Longer careers in baseball • Income effect: • Can afford more of everything – including leisure • Oscar de la Hoya quits boxing

  11. The Other Blade of Scissors The Demand for Labor • Firm weighs marginal costs & benefits • Marginal benefit • Marginal Revenue Product=MR*MPL • Marginal cost • Wage or salary (w) • Profits maximized when: w=MR*MPL • What happens to MPL when add workers? • What happens to Demand when: • Workers become less productive? • Output becomes more valuable? • Why did NBA salaries skyrocket in 1990s?

  12. What is LeBron Worth? w • Simplify problem • Fixed Supply” of LeBron • What sets wage? • Demand! D SLJ L

  13. What drives demand? • Attendance • Gate revenue up $5.3M in Cleveland • Venue revenue • Sponsorship revenue up 17% • Media revenue • Local TV ratings up 265% • Regional TV ratings up 231% • LeBron may be a bargain

  14. Human Capital • What is an investment? • Can invest in people as well • Increase skills – why are you in college? • General vs specific skills • Worker pays for general skills • Firm cannot recoup investment • Firm helps pay for specific skills • Firm can recoup investment • So why doesn’t it pay all? • Examples? • A rationale for the reserve clause?

  15. Monopsony ME $ • Upside down Monopoly • Lower wages • Lower employment • Deadweight loss • Application to sports? • Can you buy a suit from Jim Thome? • Might have 30 years ago S wc wm D L Lc Lm

  16. Monopsony and Baseball • Early years marked by “thievery” • Nat’l Assn of Professional Base Ball Players • Pittsburgh Pirates named for piracy of players • William Hulbert – a unique thief • Steals 5 players from other clubs • Calls for end to thievery • Forms National League of Baseball Clubs • Key: Teams reserve 5 players • Eventually extended to all players: Reserve Clause

  17. Seemingly Innocent • Reserves for length of contract • PLUS one year • Key: Players not allowed to play without a contract • Recursive system keeps players stuck • Other leagues copy – often verbatim

  18. Free Agency • All major sports have eliminated Reserve Clause (later we’ll see how) • Limits on Free Agency differ • NHL has many classes of free agency • NFL allows teams to keep “franchise player” – at a price • Salary caps in NBA & NFL limit movement

  19. A-Rod and the Yankees • Do rich teams get all the best players? • The Yankees and Alex Rodriguez • Didn’t pursue him • Pursued him • Why did they change their minds? • Think Marginal Product

  20. Ronald Coase and The Curse of the Bambino • Economists believe free agency overrated • Were things different pre-free agency? • In 1920 Red Sox sold Babe Ruth to Yankees • Connie Mack twice sold off championship teams • Key is the Coase Theorem • First applied by Ronald Coase to pollution • Don’t need government to solve an externality • Just need well-defined property rights

  21. The Idea of the Coase Theorem • Consider: pizza factory and a brewery • Brewery’s fumes affect pizza makers • If Pizza factory has property rights • Brewer compensates pizzeria • Or reduces pollution • If Brewer has property rights • Pizzeria compensates Brewer • Or cuts back pollution • Result independent of rights • Pollution – or its impact - reduced • Only difference: who gets paid

  22. The Coase Theorem and Free Agency • Free Agency does not affect talent • Babe Ruth worth more in NY • Yankees paid owner of Red Sox in 1920 • Now he would pay Babe Ruth • Players flow to most valued use • Only difference is who gets paid • Implications of Revenue Sharing?

  23. Rank Order Tournaments • Market bases reward on productivity • As productivity rises – so does reward • Some rewards are discontinuous • Second by one stroke or ten? • Senior VP vs CEO • Based on “rank order” in contest • Not on actual contribution

  24. Why Use Rank Order? • Best to pay MRP • Incentives appropriate • Equivalent to paying “piece rate” • Usually don’t pay “piece rate” • Pay by hour, month, year • Seems inefficient • Key: How to judge productivity?

  25. Tournaments Stimulate Effort • Want workers to try hard • Cannot always see how hard they try • Easier to see who tries hardest • Set up distinct rewards • Winner makes much more than loser • Bigger spread gives greater incentive

  26. Problems with Tournaments • What if contest seems uneven? • Joe Louis & the “Bum of the Month” • Participation and effort may fall • Is trying hard the only way to win? • Tonya Harding whack, whack, whack • Shoot first, pass second • May compress wages to avoid sabotage

  27. The Economics of Superstars P • Like tournament – skewed rewards • Disproportionate reward to being best • Who wants 2nd best surgeon? • Fixed supply • Rationed by price • TV skews rewards • Greater access to best • Decline of minor leagues S D’ D Q

  28. Problems Caused by Superstar Effect • Little Girls in Pretty Boxes • Eating disorders rampant –especially gymnasts • 2/3 among college gymnasts – not even elite! • Would violate labor laws – if paid • Injuries go untreated • “Would lose muscle tone” in cast • Faust’s Gold • East German girls given “vitamins” • Birth defects, medical and sexual side-effects • What about the boys? • Some want to be big: BALCO scandal • Some want to be small: jockeys and tapeworms

  29. Measuring Inequality • Does free agency affect salary distribution? • Measure with Lorenz Curve • Compares population with income • To see line up by income (Excel) • Fish-eye increases with inequality • What do absolute equality/inequality look like? • Problem: Curve is hard to interpret • Gini Coefficient: a more precise measure • Ratio of fish-eye to triangle • Has risen with Free Agency in all sports

  30. Arbitration • A way to deal with disputes • Mediation – play the middleman • Arbitration – play the judge • Binding vs non-binding • Danger of arbitration • Can be addictive • Must consider motives of arbitrator

  31. The Problem with Arbitration • Arbitrator likes job • Doesn’t want to offend either side • Chooses middle • Lose incentive to compromise • Arbitration “addictive” Firm Labor Arbitrator

  32. Final Offer Arbitration • Each side makes final offer • Arbitrator must choose one • Restores incentive to compromise • Problem with practice in baseball • Ignores ½ the market • Can consider only credentials & peers • Worse than free agency • Ripple effect of others’ errors

  33. When to Turn Pro? • When to cut down tree or sell wine? • Key tradeoff for all three the same: • Waiting => lose current income • Selling => miss out on higher value • Consider LeBron James • If went to college: Would improve skills • But: Would delay earnings • For simplicity assume career length fixed • Risk may also play a role • Insurance as scouting report

  34. A Simple Decision Rule • Simplifying assumptions • Earns S if turn pro right away • Ignore uncertainty or risk of injury • Skills & earnings rise at rate g in school • Would earn (1+g)S if wait one year • Earnings worth less in one year • Interest rate = r • Present value of waiting: • LeBron stays in school if g>r • Turns pro if g<r

More Related