Protection: A Theoretical View

1. Protection: A Theoretical View Lt Col (retd) Jim Storr PhD

2. Introduction

3. Doctrine? ‘Command’ is defined as ' … the direction, coordination and control of military forces.' ‘Control’ is ‘the process by which a commander … organises, directs and coordinates the activities of the forces allocated to him…' So Command = direction + coordination + control; and Control = organisation + direction + coordination Thus Command + = direction + coordination + 2 x control; Control ?

4. Why 'do' Force Protection? • It keeps people alive; uninjured, healthy: • Humanitarian considerations • Morale • Commander's duty • Legal obligations • Maintains operational effectiveness

5. Clausewitz • How good is your early 18th Century German? • Zweck • Mittel • Ziele

6. The Dialectic • An interchange of Ends (aims) and Means • Ways, Ends and Means? • Also, an interchange between enemy and friendly forces

7. The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces

8. The Dialectic Own Aims Own Means

9. The Dialectic Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

10. The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

11. The Dialectic Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

12. Force Protection? Preventing this Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

13. Force Protection? To enable us to do this Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

14. Example 1: 1982

15. Example 2: BATUS and Digital Situational Awareness (SA)‏ • Better SA: Knowing where my tanks and his tanks are • ... fewer of my tanks are lost because we know where the enemy is • ... therefore more of my tanks cross the line of departure • ... therefore I'm more likely to win; to win quicker; and to suffer fewer casualties.

16. Example 2: BATUS and Digital Situational Awareness All just a wee bit 'Cold War' • Better SA: Knowing where my tanks and his tanks are • ... fewer of my tanks are lost because we know where the enemy is • ... therefore more of my tanks cross the line of departure • ... therefore I'm more likely to win; to win quicker; and to suffer fewer casualties.

17. Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Northern Ireland • Improvements in countering IEDs keep soldiers alive • ... but you can't stop terrorists inventing new kinds of bombs • ... so you're always reacting? • The terrorist always has the initiative?

18. Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices in Northern Ireland • But: • Link intelligence, tactics, organisations, scientific advice, EOD policy, training, EW, ... • Wargame • Couple them very closely into a very responsive system • You can then react very quickly to changes in the threat • ... and begin to predict, and even pre-empt, changes in the threat

19. Example 2: Improvised Explosive Devices in Northern Ireland • And: • .... so you can begin to reduce the terrorist's initiative • ... and he's no longer 'doing' terror • What do you call a terrorist who can't 'do' terror?

20. Deductions • Force Protection can have operational-level consequences • You are removing, or at least affecting, his MEANS; and thus also his aims

21. The Dialectic You are now doing this Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

22. The Dialectic ...and preventing him doing this Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

23. The Dialectic What is this? Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

24. Countering IEDs • A lot of very expensive technology? • The '10% / 30% / 60%' Rule • Deductions: • 1: Minor unit tactics are twice as important as technology • 2. Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it

25. Countering Irregular Activity • A lot of very expensive technology? • The '10% / 30% / 60%' Rule • Deductions: • 1: Minor unit tactics are twice as important as technology • 2. Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it

26. Other Examples • Urban and rural multiple patrolling • Helicopter top cover to rural foot patrols • Many of these measures are highly asymmetric • They will not translate directly to other theatres

27. Observation Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres?

28. Observation Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres? Yes?

29. Observation Have the lessons of Northern Ireland been carried into other theatres? Yes? No

30. Conclusions

31. 1: The Dialectic Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

32. 1: The Dialectic Force Protection is not just about this Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

33. 1: The Dialectic It's also about this Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

34. 1: The Dialectic Which directly affects this Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

35. 1: The Dialectic Hence we can win Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

36. Deductions (2)‏ • Tactical Force Protection measures can have operational level consequences: They can deny the insurgent, or terrorist, the ability to achieve his aims; and hence contribute directly to operational success

37. Deductions (3)‏ • Issues such as minor unit tactics can be twice as important as technology • Luck can play a significant part: if you are prepared to exploit it • That requires suitable organisations and processes at the theatre, or campaign, level.

38. Questions?

39. The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means

40. The Dialectic Own Forces Enemy Forces Enemy Aims Own Aims Own Means Enemy Means