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RESCALING THE STATE IN FLANDERS NEW PROBLEM OR OLD SOLUTION? A DESCRIPTIVE – CRITICAL APPROACH Caroline Temmerman – research assistant of the SBOV Prof. Dr. Filip De Rynck Prof. Dr. Ellen Wayenberg Prof. Dr. Joris Voets
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RESCALING THE STATE IN FLANDERS NEW PROBLEM OR OLD SOLUTION?A DESCRIPTIVE – CRITICAL APPROACH Caroline Temmerman – research assistant of the SBOVProf. Dr. Filip De RynckProf. Dr. Ellen WayenbergProf. Dr. Joris Voets Policy Research Centre on Governmental Organization - Decisive Governance (SBOV III - 2012-2015) EGPA Conference 2012 – Study Group V
Regionalgovernance in Flanders • Screening of ‘governance’ – arrangements’ (2012): mappingregionalgovernance in Flanders: • “Allformalizedstructuresaimingforconsultation or collaboration, in which more thanone independent organization is involved and with a regional focus” • 2.229 arrangements classified, including: • Policy domain • Goal • Type of governancestructure • Organizational features • Partners • Financial means
Results of the regionalscreening • Regionaldifferentiation
We have a problem • White Paper on the Internal State reform: “aproliferationof structures at the intermediategovernmentallayer” (Flemishgovernment, 2011) • 1990-2012: fastgrowth of numberand types • ‘We have a problem’: • Institutionalfuzziness • Lackof efficiency • Accountability problem
Focus of our paper • Analyzingthisphenomenon: what does ‘governance’ mean? • Explaining: howcanthisgrowth been understood? • Interpreting: is there a policy problemandwhat is the problemthenexactly?
1 Analyzing • A fourdimensional model of regionalgovernance (Miller and Lee, 2009) • Collaborativegovernance as onepossible form of regionalgovernance
Results of the regionalscreening • Intermediateconclusionsresulting the meta – analysis (1): • Minority of the structure is of a collaborativegovernance type (28% in the Mid-West area) (public – private) • Governancestructures are verymuchspecialized or sectoralized • Both governmental (central – provincial – local) and private and nonprofite actors are responsiblefor the creation of governancestructures, HOWEVER the balancesdiffer and rescaling is partly contingent with regional features and pathdependencies
Results of the regionalscreening • Intermediateconclusionsresulting the meta – analysis (2): • Most of the partnerships are of the service delivery type (mostly as a result of sectoral policies) • Alldimensions of regionalgovernance (Miller and Lee 2011 apply in Flanders • Financial power of the Flemishgovernment in structures of a horizontalnature. = Content related power? • Mixed position of the provinces: bothcentral and local actor • Flexibility of scales (~ FUA)
Analyzing: ourframework (Cfr. Miller and Lee, 2009)
2 Explainingregionalgovernance • The Flemishgovernmentitself is responsiblefor the rise of new governance arrangements • .. By her role as meta-governor of intermunicipal cooperation • Impact of the decreeon inter-municipal cooperation (2001) on cooperative behaviour of localgovernments • Allocations of grantsiflocalgovernmentswork together (forexample in housingpolicy and culture) • ..By the creation of sectoral decrees, imposing the foundation of top-down regionalgovernancestructures • Eg. Socio-economicdevelopmentagencies • .. Byforcinglocalgovernments to participate in regional cooperation structures
3 Interpretingregionalgovernance • Recapitulation: 3 mayorpolicy problemsaccording to Flemishgovernment • (1) Institutionalfuzziness • (2) Lack of efficiency • (3) Accountability problem • Basedon the analysis: • (1) Great diversity of activities, with different empirical forms and at different levels of governance • (2) How to measure efficiency? Service delivery vs. joint decision making • (3) Different notions of accountability, linked to the function of the arrangement and dimension of regionalgovernance (see next slides)
Accountability in intermunicipal partnership • Accountability lines are clearlydefined • Accountability and democraticproblem is ownresponsability of localgovernments • However, research shows thatinternal management of municipalities is notyetadapted to the evolutiontowards joined-up government • Little interference of localgovernmentalinstitutions (MT, Council, Executive of Mayor and Aldermen) with IMP • Authority of the mandatories is oftennotclearlydefined • Little control over choicesthat are made in the IMP • Little feedback towards the localgovernmentsabautactivities of the IMP
Conclusions • (1) The political discourse should be nuanced • ‘Institutional mess’ is partly created from inside the institutional framework itself • Criteria of efficiency and accountability differ • Mostly service delivery • (2) Debatesabout the organization of the public sector shouldberenewed • NOT rooted in classicaldiscussions of institutionalorganization of the state • BUT usinginsights of network and collaborativegovernance theory • (3) Members of the state shouldrethinktheirroles in the network society