Agenda

1. OECD workshopon Inter-Agency Crisis ManagementLessons, improvementsand challengesafterthe 2010 earthquake in ChileJune 28, 2012

2. Agenda • Earthquake and tsunami impact. • Emergency response. • Lessonslearned and mainimprovements.

3. Juan Fernández

4. Juan Fernández 4

5. Highway #5

6. Highway #5

7. Dichato 7

8. Dichato

9. Talcahuano 9

10. Santiago

11. Concepción

12. Mainimpacts • 526fatal losses and 25 peoplestillmissing • 370,000 destroyed/seriouslydamagedhouses (11% of total) • 79destroyedhospitals • 3,049 destroyed and damagedschools • 1,250,000 childrenout of school • 221destroyed and damaged bridges • 900towns and communitiesaffected • 75% of thepopulationlives in theaffectedarea • Total costestimated at US$ 30 billion (~15% of GDP)

13. Systemmainweaknessesduring crisis • Basic communication systems were down for more than 12 hours • No transportation capabilities available to authorities • Confusing and contradictory information was given by different sources • Multiple unnecessary decision points in the tsunami alert process and decisions made based on intuition • No special force available specialized in emergency procedures nor dedicated to help in initial evaluation of damages • Heavy looting begun after the earthquake • Disorganized war room dynamic: • Unrestricted access • Everybody sitting around the same table randomly • Press with direct access to the room

14. Agenda • Earthquake and tsunami impact. • Emergency response. • Lessonslearned and mainimprovements.

15. Emergencycommittee • Assumed a role that ONEMI wasnotpreparedtoassume(e.g. foodsupply, ONEMI building) • Coordination role withintheGovernment and withprivate and non-profitsectors. • Informationgathering—one of themainchallengesforgooddecisionmaking. • No pre-existingorganizationalstructure—lack of rules and protocols. • Staffedwithpeoplefromdifferentgovernmentservices, fromthearmedforcesand theprivate sector. • Helpovercomeweakorganizational, people and financialcapabilities at the local level. • Unintendedconsequences : flexibility, creativity

16. Government response organized in 3 stages

17. Agenda • Earthquake and tsunami impact. • Emergency response. • Lessonslearned and mainimprovements.

18. Populationknowledge Lack of fires Robust civil infrastructure Somethingsthatworkedwell Chile’s coastal population have a very good understanding of the need to evacuate in the event of any big earthquake Chile’s construction norm and developers being responsible for 10 years provided a civil infrastructure that was able to protect Chilean citizens overall Chile’s energy network shuts down automatically in the event of any major earthquake

19. a. ImproveONEMI’s response and civil protectioncapabilities

20. Main issues identified at ONEMI Implication Key issues identified a There is no clear communications protocol between ONEMI-SHOA-SSN. Define processes and protocols that maximize efficiency and effectiveness in crisis response Process b Lack of predefined check-list of what needs to be done at each point in time and no standardized evacuation protocol in case of Tsunamis c Evacuations take at least 35 min to be triggered and no mass communication channels are used to inform the population d There is no clear chain of command from National to Comunal level Set up structure that facilitates crisis management Organizat. structure Too many advisors in the crisis committee that are not efficiently organized to address issues; decisions made basedonintuitionnottechnicalexpertiseorprotocols e Ensure each individual knows what to do during a crisis f People prepa-redness People in the Civil Protection network do not clearly know their roles g There is no ongoing assessment of emergency procedures knowledge Lack of robust telecommunication platforms among SHOA-ONEMI headquarter-ONEMI regional-SSN h Get the appropriate resources in place Infras-tructure i Absence of seismic sensors to monitor activity in real-time j Absence of transportation capabilities available for authorities Place the right human resources in the right place Talent k Key positions at national, regional and local level are not appropriately staffed

21. 36 opportunities for improvement across 5 dimensions Do we have the appropriate resources in place? Are the processes for crisis management effective? Infrastructure Process Organizational structure for emergency operations Does each individual know what to do during a crisis? Do we have the right human resources in the right place? Preparedness Talent Do we have an organizational structure that facilitates crisis management and ensures efficient use of resources?

22. Most of the initiatives are neither cost nor time intensive Preparedness Org. structure for emergency ops. Process Talent Infrastructure 17 14 13 12 10 34 21 27 19 15 36 18 30 16 24 32 11 4 8 6 2 5 Qualitative assessment of initiatives as a single unit 0m 6m Time to implement 12m ~50% of the initiatives are zero cost, but require appropriate management 24m 54m 100 500 1.500 2.000 0 Cost (CH$ MM) Operational and up front expenses expected for 2011

23. Formal process Informal process Example of detailed process analysis and redesign Revised Detection process – End State Actual process a1 a5 Police, fire fighters Inform earthquake Answer questions a2 a4 Inform earthquake Answer questions ONEMIs regionales Redundancy: either SHOA, ONEMI or SSN can generate reports if necessary, as opposed to only SSN a8 n6 a3 a6 a14 Receive reports and acknowledge them Bigger than 5 Merc.? Map incident by calling adjacent regions First Earthquake assessment Receive reports ONEMI national Yes a9 a7 Require quake report Require Tsunami report Detection is done automatically and precisely with sensors n4 n5 a10 a13 Input into Tsunami forecast table Official Tsunami report SHOA Require quake report Official Tsunami report n2 n1 n3 a11 a12 Sensors detect earthquake Bigger than X? Official Earthquake report Collects data Official Earthquake report SSN Yes a15 a16 n7 n8 Feel the earthquake Asses if earthquake is > 7 Merc / 20 sec Feel the earthquake Asses if earthquake is > 7 Merc / 20 sec Coastal community Earthquake report is generated automatically by the system • Earthquakes and Tsunamis detected by sensors and communicated to all stakeholders automatically • - Total steps reduced from 11 to 5 steps, resulting in a ~90% time reduction (from ~25-30 min to ~ 2 min) • Back – up processes incorporated so if any of the agencies fail the others can take care of it SOURCE: McKinsey & Co

24. b. Fromdisastermanagementtodisasterriskreduction

25. Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) United Nations (UN) Japan International CooperationAgency (JICA) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) California Emergency Management Agency (CAL EMA) International consultancies and agreements

26. National system of emergency and civil protection MainChallenge Create and establish a nationalsystem of emergency and civil protection, including a riskreductionstrategywith civil societyplaying a central role. • Someguidingprinciples • Multisectorial approach. • Central governmentgetinvolvesonlysubsidiarily. • Minimizediscretionarydecisionmaking. • Relienceonexistingcapabilities. • Focusonpreventionratherthan response.

27. National system of emergency and civil protection Clearlydefinedemergencylevels Emergencyoperationscommittee Formal role forthearmedforces • Non-permanentbodies at the local and nationallevelto plan, coordinate and directactionstorespondtoanemergency. • Deployment of publicresources, relyonarmedforcesforhumanitarianaidsupport. • ReceivetechnicalsupportfromtheAgency. • Level 1—can be addressedwithresourcesavailable at the local level. • Level 2—can not be addressed at the local level. • DefinedbythePresident. • Clear rules foreachlevel. • Togetinvolved in emergencyprevention and preparedness, and in humanitarianaid. • Involvmentmust be requiredbyemergencyoperationscommittes. • First response taskforce.

28. National system of emergency and civil protection National Agency of Civil Protection National Council of Civil Protection NationalCivil ProtectionStrategy NationalFund of Civil Protection • Advisorybodyintegratedbymembers of differentsectors. • Public, private and civil societymembers. • HelpMinister of the Interior developingtheNational Civil ProtectionStrategy. • Replicated at local level. • To secure a long-term source of financing for public and private prevention activities and initiatives. • Promote and implementprevention and emergency response actions. • Coordination and advisory role. • Descentralizedorganization. • Replaces ONEMI. • Defines priorities and guidingprinciplesforriskreduction and preparedness. • Must be revised at leastevery 5 years. • Complementedbynationalplansof differentsectors. • Replicated at the local level.

29. Challenges going forward • Maintain a sense of urgency even a long time after the earthquake has happened. • Have capable and motivated people in key positions and hold them accountablefor the quality of their work when risks are latent. • See Civil Protection as a country wide issue that requires coordination and cooperation among multiple agencies(ministers, armed forces, private companies, etc) • Keep all those who would be involved in crisis management well trained and informed. • Secure fundingto support the different initiatives and the human resources responsible for them in the long term. • Long term commitment of every agency involved to push this effort forward.

30. Gracias.