Preparedness for cyber security threats

1. Preparedness for cybersecurity threats domestic aspects of cyber security Jaan Priisalu

2. Topics • Hansabank in general • Baltic e-crime notes • Electronic payments importance • Message to my managers • Local cooperation

3. Estonia Latvia Lithuania St. Petersburg Our target market is the Baltics and Russia. As a universal bank our business model is based on a large customer base. Acquisition and retention of new customers is a key goal for us. Our main focus is on medium-sized companies and private individuals with above average purchasing power, however, we serve all customer groups. With closeto 2 million active customers, 300 branches and 9,112 employees, Hansabank is a leading financial institution in all three Baltic countries. St. Petersburg Moscow Kaliningrad data as of September 2007

4. Baltic e-crime • Criminal communication language is Russian • E-channels make up to 98% of transactions • Before phishing went to Australia, it was called “Ligupidamisega” • In DDoS organizers were here (although industry started from Israel) • Before dropper attacks were published in England, we saw it in Baltic's • Biggest Internet card payment gateway hacker was living in North-East Estonia, studing in Tartu University and working for Webmedia We are living in the criminal gateway and test bed Money laundering pressure is still rising

6. General Trends for Management • “Security explosion” continues: • It will slow growth of net economy • In our “transit” countries money laundering will grow • Security services will develop in IT markets • Attacks will be further automated • Criminals are internationally “specialising”, industry formed 2003 • Police will be forced to enhance international cooperation and private sector involvement • Governments have to rethink privacy, introduce hardware ID-s • Even more internet banks will be temporarily closed • Mobiles will be attacked for profit • Most of internal networks will be penetrated through web surfing • Servers are attacked for profit • Political motivation is already affecting us, trend will grow Hansabank dirct loss trend was, it can turn only up.

7. Local cooperation • Local banks – Internet security is not for competing • Telcos – good partners • Government • Police is competent • Partners in educating citizens • Joint identification infrastructures • Commercial organisations are unable to fight political risks • Early warning by using customers as part of detection • CERT-s • Estonian CERT – works • Lithuania – Litnet works, national in process • Latvia – established • Customer personalised data is not exchanged, usually IP-s

8. Needs for successful networking • Responsibility of network participants • Starts from timely response of computing device owner • Road traffic behaviour is agreed, including incident resolution • Authority of incident resolvers • Who has authority to take down illegal systems (like bot command centers) – defender, police or military • When consumer rights will be sacrificed to rule enforcement • Who has right to develop and use “weapons” • Privacy • Hiding identities (car registration number plates) creates “priviledges” for persons with more ressources • Persons should have tools to defend themselves – more information, not less • IP address is like phone number, it should be legal to correlate “insult calls” • Governanace in the networks • Border routers enforcing interconnect policies do exist • Visual identification document cross-use does exist • Money laundering prevention should cover all e-funds transfer methods • Policing needs right measurement – standard reporting should work