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ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS Bill Presentation to the Select Committee on Labour & Public Enterprises NCOP. 29 November 2005. Background: an improved ECB.
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ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS Bill Presentation to the Select Committee on Labour & Public Enterprises NCOP 29 November 2005
Background: an improved ECB • MTN raised concerns with PPCC that the competitive mobile market was treated like the fixed-line monopoly market simply because both were “infrastructures”. • We submitted that regulating infrastructure, per se, leads to: • Onerous access obligations on the competitive mobile investment. • Disincentive to investment in network coverage and density by infrastructure licensees. • Encouragement of free-riding. • Less scope for differentiation and so less competition! • We suggested this be addressed by linking regulatory intervention to the degree of competition in a given market through a competitive analysis process; and so differentiates fixed from mobile. MTN is pleased that revisions in ECB, especially Chapter 10, have cleared much of the confusion between regulating the fixed-line monopoly and the competitive mobile market.
Current complexity of intervention process in Chapter 10 THE PROCESS CAN BE SIMPLIFIED TO PROVIDE INVESTMENT CERTAINTY AND ENSURING THAT INTERVENTION IS DRIVEN BY ROBUST ANALYSIS
A few critical issues can easily be addressed • MTN believe that the ECB can be made a very effective piece of legislation by addressing 5 specific issues: • Providing ICASA with guidance on how to select and define markets. eligible for intervention so the scope of ex-ante regulation is clear to all and sundry. • Providing unequivocal definition of the SMP threshold so intervention can be applied quickly to the right players. • Linking a number of obligations to competitive analysis (Chapter 10) so regulation is always driven by the finding of market failure. • Ensuring proportionality of remedies so we avoid under or over-regulating the sector. • Proper definition of interconnection to minimise scope for disputes. A SMALL NUMBER OF EDITORIAL AMENDMENTS CAN BE USED TO ADDRESS THESE ISSUES AND ENSURING THAT THE ECB DELIVERS ITS OBJECTIVES.
ISSUE 1: Proper definition of interconnection to minimise scope for disputes
ISSUE 2: Providing ICASA with guidance on how to select and define markets eligible for regulation so the scope of ex-ante regulation is clear to all
ISSUE 3: Providing unequivocal definition of the SMP threshold so intervention can be applied quickly to the right players
ISSUE 4: Linking a number of obligations to competitive analysis ( Chapter 10) so regulation is always driven by a market failure
ISSUE 5: Ensuring proportionality of remedies so we avoid under or over-regulating the sector
South Africa is close to embracing a world class regulatory framework • The ECB is a few amendments away from being a highly effective and robust piece of legislation. • MTN’s proposed amendments are driven by a desire to ensure regulation is deployed quickly and fairly when market failure is established – not by self-interest. • This is because MTN believes in competition, rather than regulation to deliver government objectives, but also acknowledge the role of regulation when markets alone fail to deliver.