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GE Real Estate. UCONN Presentation October, 2008 Skip Wells Managing Director. Agenda. GE Overview Real Estate Fundamentals Credit Crisis Questions. GE Overview. GE. Jeffrey R. Immelt Chairman of the Board & CEO GE. THE FOUR BUSINESSES OF GE. KEY STATISTICS. Capital
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GEReal Estate UCONN Presentation October, 2008 Skip WellsManaging Director
Agenda GE Overview Real Estate Fundamentals Credit Crisis Questions
GE Jeffrey R. Immelt Chairman of the Board & CEO GE THE FOUR BUSINESSES OF GE KEY STATISTICS Capital Energy Infrastructure Technology Infrastructure NBC Universal • 300,000+ employees worldwide • Operating in more than 100 countries • Manufacturing facilities in more than 32 countries Q2’08 FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS • Total Assets: $847 billion • Gross Revenue: $47 billion • Net Earnings: $5 billion 4
GECapital Michael A. Neal Vice Chairman, GE President & CEO, GE Capital BUSINESS UNITS BUSINESS UNITS KEY STATISTICS Aviation Financial Services • 73,000+ employees worldwide • Operating in more than 50 countries • Backed by GE’s AAA rating • Commercial Finance • Capital Solutions • Corporate Financial Services • Healthcare Financial Services • Real Estate Q2’08 FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS Energy Financial Services • Total Assets: $696 billion • Net Earnings from discontinued Ops: $2.8 billion • Net Income: $2.4 billion GE Money Treasury 5
GEReal Estate Ron Pressman President & CEO GE Real Estate BUSINESS UNITS BUSINESS UNITS KEY STATISTICS North America Lending • 2,000+ employees worldwide • Operating in 31 countries • 480+ million sq ft of global real estate Americas’ Equity GE Real Estate International Q2’08 FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS • Total Assets: $90.6 billion • Total Volume: $9.3 billion • Net Income: $483 million Global InvestmentManagement 6 6
GEReal Estate PORTFOLIO Product Geography Asset Class Other AsiaPacific 4% Nordic 2% Hotel 6% U.S. 47% Equity 44% Office 40% Mexico 6% Retail 10% Other Europe 8% France 6% Other 15% Japan 9% Debt 56% Industrial 14% UK 9% Multifamily 15% Canada 10%
Key concepts/definitions Commercial Real Estate: Investment Tranches: Borrower Cash Equity • Income-producing properties, primarily leased to 3rd-party tenants • Examples: Office, retail, multi-family, industrial, self-storage, hotel • Asset value less the total amount of Leverage. • Financing that is subordinate/junior to Mortgage Debt. Secured by a pledge of the property owner’s partnership interests in the asset. MezzanineDebt(70-90%LTV) 1st MortgageDebt(40-75% LTV) • Real estate financing secured by a recorded mortgage lien. • Mortgage Debt is the most senior level of financing on a property. Capital Stack
Lender Execution Strategies • Hold Loan on Balance Sheet- 100% of loan retained by originating lender. - Strategy employed by Life Co’s, Banks & Finance Companies. • Syndicate the Loan to Other Lenders- Sell a portion or all of the loan to other balance sheet lenders. - Strategies include pari-passu and senior/sub sales. - Primarily employed by Banks & Finance Companies. • Securitize the Loan in a CMBS Pool- Loan is combined with a group of other similar loans in a pool. - Lender sells rated securities in the pool to a wide range of investors. - Lender makes an “arb” – difference between avg. interest rate on the loans and the average rate paid out to investors. - Strategy used by Wall Street firms.
Real Estate Metrics Cap Rate: Rate of return used to derive the capital value of an income stream. Property value = NOI / Cap Rate. Loan-to-Value (LTV): Ratio of Leverage to the total value of an asset. Cash-on-Cash (CoC): NOI / loan amount on the property. Debt Coverage Ratio (DSCR): NOI / debt service (interest & amortization) on the loan.
Leverage $100MM asset purchase price; $7MM NOI $15MMEquity $35MMEquity $20MM8% MezzDebt Leverage Increases Buying Power & Returns … And Risk $100MMEquity 1.3xDSCR $65MMMortgageDebt @6.00% $65MMMortgageDebt @6.00% 1.8xDSCR Equity Yield: 7.0% 8.9% 10.0% Equity Return on $110MM Sale: 10.0% 28.6% 66.7%
Deal Process AssetManagement Approval &Closing Marketing Sourcing Underwriting • Advertisements in newspapers, magazines, trade publications. • Meetings with new and existing clients to communicate strategy & product offerings. • Hosting dinners, golf outings, sporting events and group trips to build personal relationships with customers. • Networking at industry conferences, outings. • Receipt of a financing package from customers or brokers. • Analysis of property financials, asset quality, market conditions and execution strategy. • Negotiate loan pricing, proceeds and structure while in competition with other lenders for the business. • Execute a term sheet / loan application with the client. • Detailed analysis of property rent roll and expenses. • Property site inspection and identification of rent and sale comps. • Engineering and environmental due diligence completed by expert 3rd-party consultants. • Complete a credit request to obtain internal approval for the deal. • Presentation of credit request & analysis to committee for approval. • Preparation and negotiation of legal documentation. • Execution of legal documents and wiring of money. • Host a closing dinner with the client. • Monitoring of loan performance, focused on CoC, DSCR, and LTV. • Execute future funding draws, loan extensions, asset releases, and cash flow sweeps. • Seek approval for and close any modifications to the loan terms. • Complete foreclosures of assets where borrower is in default.
Unrated Bonds BB Bonds AAA Bonds BBB Bonds A Bonds AA Bonds Housing Bubble Starts the Problem Rating Agencies Regional/ National Banks Investors Investment Bank Homeowners Mortgages Issues: • Sub-prime credit • Over supply • Teaser rates • Limited underwriting • High leverage • Low interest rates from Fed (Greenspan) • Originate to sell model – short term sale vs. long term investment • Pricing driven by demand for bonds • Ratings driven by pooling effect • Ignored credit quality and real estate fundamentals • Investors increase allocation to real estate given strong recent track record • Relied on rating agencies for due diligence
Wall Street meltdown …making lenders less willing to take risks Long term corporate borrowing costs rise & borrowing costs rise for banks • Rates on long-term bonds shot up • Even top-rated companies had to pay more interest to raise capital for long-term needs • Banks more fearful to lend • Libor (interbank lending rate) shot up • Impacts rates on mortgages, small-business loans, credit cards, student loans • Banks less willing to lend • More difficult for consumers & businesses to get credit in already tight market • Consumers pulling back 3 Month LIBOR Consumer credit ($B) AAA Corporate Bond Yield 2008
Investors spooked Failing firms set off worry about other firms… … and investors seek safer bets • Banks more fearful to lend • Libor (interbank lending rate) shot up • Impacts rates on mortgages, small-business loans, credit cards, student loans • 9/15/08: Lehman declares bankruptcy • 9/16/08: AIG bailed out by the government • Cost of insuring financial firms against default skyrockets (credit default swaps) Yield on 3-Month Treasury Bill As demand increases for short-term Treasury notes, the return on the investment declines.
Confidence returns with rescue plan…but plummets as credit markets remain weak Dow Jones Industrial Average Sept 18 Dow : +410 Sept 17 Dow : (449) Sept 29 Dow : (778)
Liquidity dries up A rush out of money markets… … makes it harder for companies to borrow • Large companies usually sell commercial paper to money market funds to cover day-to-day operations • Companies couldn’t borrow due to turmoil, freezing their ability to do business • Traditionally viewed as ultra-safe investment • One long-standing money market mutual fund lost money due to Lehman exposure • Many investors reduced money market fund holdings Weekly Change in Commercial Paper Outstanding ($B) Week Ending Oct 1: (95)Billion
Macklowe EOP • Blackstone acquires assets as part of its $38.5B LBO of Equity Office Properties (EOP) in Feb ‘07 • Macklowe properties purchases 7 Class A Manhattan office properties from Blackstone for $7.OB in Feb ‘07 • Deutsche Bank provided $5.7B of property level financing for 1 year, and a Fortress/Deutsche JV provided a $1.2B equity bridge. Macklowe invested $50MM of equity • Financing split into 3 separate collateral pools, with senior mortgages securitized and mezz debt tranched & syndicated • Borrower short-term strategy: sell 1 or 2 assets in strong market to reduce the basis in the portfolio, and to bring in permanent equity partners and reduce the debt load. Long-term strategy is to roll rents to market and significantly improve portfolio cash flow.
Capital Structure…$50MM Owner’s equity to secure $7.0B deal $50MM Macklowe Equity, $1,155psf $1.2B Equity Bridge Loan, $1,147psf Fortress Investment (70%) and Deutsche Bank (30%) Secured by equity pledges in all assets owned by Macklowe, plus a $1B personal guarantee from Harry Macklowe $65MM Mezz 5 Tranche78% LTC, 3.6% CoC, $852psf $68MM Mezz 5 Tranche80% LTC, 3.0% CoC, $944psf $159MM Mezz 4 Tranche80% LTC, 3.1% CoC $238MM Mezz 2 Tranche75% LTC, 3.3% CoC $200MM Mezz 4 Tranche77% LTC, 3.2% CoC, $906psf $64MM Mezz 4 Tranche73% LTC, 3.8% CoC, $798psf $308MM Mezz 2 Tranche69% LTC, 3.6% CoC $200MM Mezz 3 Tranche68% LTC, 3.6% CoC, $793psf $128MM Mezz 3 Tranche68% LTC, 4.1% CoC, $745psf $793MM Mezz 1 Tranche61% LTC, 4.0% CoC, $760psf $65MM Mezz 2 Tranche58% LTC, 4.2% CoC, $679psf $36MM Mezz 2 Tranche59% LTC, 4.8% CoC, $638psf $650MM Mezz 1 Tranche55% LTC, 5.5% CoC, $643psf $550MM Mezz 1 Tranche56% LTC, 5.4% CoC, $608psf $1.6B First Mortgage41% LTC, 6.1% CoC, $510psfSecuritized $485MM Existing 1st Mortgage23% LTC, 10.4% CoC, $274psfSecuritized $180MM Existing 1st Mortgage14% LTC, 20.3% CoC, $150psfSecuritized POOL #14 Properties, 3.2MM sf, 93% Occupied POOL #22 Properties, 1.2MM sf, 98% Occupied POOL #31 Property, 1.8MM sf, 99% Occupied
The Good Old Days when DJ>10000 and “Par” did not mean buying bad loans in a Bailout