Oral Comps Slides

1. Oral Comps Slides Major Ben Zweibelson Seminar 4, SAMS Lesson D316

2. Question 1: theory of warEach student likely needs their own stuff here.

3. However, pleasure and pain are only root motives for decision to act. They would not fully explain much of human behavior in and out of war. Schopenhauer: German Philosopher (1788-1860) Nietzsche: German Philosopher (1844-1900) PL S P E G R The Will to Survive (Live) The Will to Power WTS WTP All human action relates to a core desire to survive, reproduce, and prosper. All human action relates to a core desire to increase one’s power. This overrides survival in terms of risk. PA

4. Special Theory on Actors and Organized Conflict; The ODARR Cycle and Origin of Decisions to Act. Includes enemy and friendly COG analysis. Adjust forces, values, and contextual factors PL Orientation Phase S P E adjust G R adjust Reflection Phase Decision Phase adjust PA adjust WTS Actions are also taken to protect friendly COG vulnerabilities in the most recent observed friendly COG. WTP All actions are directed against critical vulnerabilities in the most recent observed enemy COG. Action Phase Re-Orient Phase Our COGs are linked to our pain/loss of prosperity concepts as well as our WTS/WTP gravitational pulls. The enemy is linked the same. Enemy COGs Friendly COGs CC, CR, CV. COGs are open systems CC, CR, CV. COGs are open systems

6. Question 2: Gaddis and ‘continuity/contingency with history’

7. Gaddis: Why and How should Historians Think? (metacognition) Continuity: historians (unlike scientists) represent what they can never duplicate. History requires a level of consistency that is closer to objective truth than subjective interpretation (histiography explains how this often occurs, and why). Contingency: historians must think critically about how they represent history- flawed processes produce faulty expectations of what the future is. If historians follow too abstract a path (or too detailed/pedantic), or if they give into social biases and faulty logic, they will misinterpret history. unknown (exteriority) Continuity History FUTURE Change in Historical Perspectives (Hatch’s Wheel) Gaddis: no time-traveling for history- no changing it. Gaddis: “weighing concepts- Hitler’s love of dogs and children is irrelevant.” Linear Time; Space Theories in science are reproducible; history does not repeat (but themes occur) Contingency More Accurate/ Relevant History objectivity Debatable/quasi- Relevant History Counter-Factual Arguments (what if Barbarossa…) Gaddis: “distillation”- not every detail is critical; historians decide what gets relayed in narratives. Known (interiority) Inaccurate/ irrelevant History PRESENT information Gaddis: “path dependency”- Hitler kicked out of art school caused WWII Histiography Human Limitations in Cognition Gaddis: constructed memories: Churchill’s youthful portrait subjectivity PAST language event Hayden White: The Content and the Form Peter Novack: That Noble Dream Mary Jo Hatch: Operational Theory Deluze/Guitari: A Thousand Plataeus Values Tenets Culture Identity Gaddis: historians hide their methods

8. Question 3: theories of Herbst, Kalyvas, Brinton, and Parsa

9. Herbst: States and Power in Africa • Follows Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel thesis that biological and geographic determinism shaped Africa- not the traditional Euro-centric theory of technological/genetic determinism. • Low densities of people over massive tracts of land- this generated a different set of values in African leaders (use Mary Jo Hatch wheel). • 3x African costs for state expansion: • Cost of expanding domestic power infrastructure. To rule a distant location, you needed to control military out there and transmit info over roads. • The nature of national boundaries. capitals build container/distribution points out from central power; colonial “new capitals” were coastal; pre-colonial ones were not. • The design of state systems. – winning wars brought slaves; there was little organizational infrastructure to gain. Thus, post-conflict Africa differed from European conflicts over land. • Africans had different agriculture and industrial/economic structures; trading for guns, mining minerals, limited farming (migrant). • Colonial imposed boundaries remain- Africa struggles with post-imperialism. Brinton: The Anatomy of Revolution Brinton covers American, French, English, and Russian revolutions and acknowledges that his thesis on revolutionary cycles does not synch with all of them. Brinton argues that revolutions end the worst abuses and inefficiencies of the old regime while bringing greater uniformity and equality to the state system. While man changes his mind on many issues (hereditary monarchy, aristocracy, classes, civil rights, land and property ownership, slavery) man does not change his habits. Originally radical ideas transition in the revolutionary cycle into state propaganda and national self-identity for posterity within the post-revolution society. Finally, successful revolts create a tradition of revolution within that society. Parsa’s: States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions Parsa uses states as his unit of analysis (realism perspective). He studies Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines revolutions by exploring social versus political factors. Variables used: Popular opposition to regime Type of political regime Class coalition- present or absent Level of state intervention Iran: centralized state power with extreme repression of moderate opposition; class structure transformation was moderate, and radical theocrats were in the power structure. Outcome: social revolution. Nicaragua: Same as Iran in power and repression; popular opposition was high, and class coalition was present. Revolutionary challengers were initially weak- class structure transformation was high. Socialists in power structure; outcome: social revolution. Philippines: centralized power with moderate repression of opposition. Class coalition was absent, and revolutionary challengers were initially strong; no transformation in class structure, reformist bourgeois were in the power structure- outcome: political revolution. Kalyvas: The Logic of Violence in Civil War Kalyvas asks the question “why are civil wars so violent- or perceived as such?” He defines civil war as “armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the onset of the hostilities.” Five factors of Civil War bias: 1. Partisan bias (taking sides); 2. Political bias (equating war with peace); 3. Urban bias (overlooking bottom-up processes; emphasis on top-down hierarchy); 4. Selection bias (disregarding nonviolence); 5. Over-aggregation bias (working at too high a level of abstraction- “the will of the people”).

10. Crane Brinton’s The Anatomy of Revolution “A Theory of Revolt”

11. Question 4: JP 3.0, 5.0- does current doctrine reflect systems thinking?

12. Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur. Systems Thinking: a Logic of Positivism, Reductionism, Mechanistic and Linear Procedures • JP 3-0 Foundation: Joint operations doctrine is built upon the bedrock principles of war and associated fundamentals of joint warfare. • Objective • Offensive • Mass • Economy of Force • Maneuver • Unity of Command • Security • Surprise • Simplicity • Restraint • Perseverance • Legitimacy JP 3-0 FM 3-0 • Operational and Mission Variables: FM 3-0 warns of “precise binning” but the positivist and reductionist procedures are lost. • PMESII-PT centric. • Echoes JP 3-0’s definition of ‘Unified Action.’ • Quotes Clausewitz on uncertainty, chance, and friction. (when your logic creates abnormalities, you can categorize them under these catch-alls). • Traditional war and irregular war defined within Clausewitzian concept. Reverse engineer termination criteria to objectives, COGs, and DPs along a LOO. • 12 principles of war use Jominian systems thinking that use mechanistic, reductionist, and positivist constructs • Joint Operation Planning Process • Centers of Gravity Identifying desired and undesired effects with a systems perspective –IV-8(3) JP 3-0. Effects: describe system behavior JOPP: Step 1: Initiation Step 2: Mission Analysis Step 3: COA Dev Step 4: COA Analysis and wargaming Step 5: COA Comparison Step 6: COA Approval Step 7: Plan/Order Development JP 3-0 LOGIC: the nature of warfare is characterized as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states…IW is a violent struggle between state and non-state actors. JP 3-0 Unified Action: the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of the governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.

13. Centers of Gravity: Using Systems Thinking in a Positivist, Reductionist, and Mechanistic Logic JP 3-0 FM 3-0 • Clausewitz: A COG comprises the source of power that provides freedom of action, physical strength, and the will to fight. • Dr. Kem: the COG is the thing you fear most; it is the actual power. Also uses the Strange CC/CR/CV modeling. • Dr. Strange: CC/CR/CV modeling. • Critical capabilities: crucial enablers for COG to function. • Critical requirements: essential resources for CCs to work. • Critical vulnerabilities: CRs that are vulnerable to attack or exploitation. • * JP 3-0: the essence of operational art lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy, or otherwise exploit it…to achieve military objectives. • Dr. Reilly: ‘Cognitive Map’ that reverse engineers end-states, COGs, and lines of effort backwards in time. Quotes Clausewitz: A COG is the source of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance. A COG is singular in nature- JP 3-0 wants one at each level of war. In conventional fights, JP 3-0 prefers strategic COG to be government or leader; and operational COG as the fielded forces. No tactical COGs. LOOs, PLOs- no LOEs. Linear causality. Baseball makes the runner go to 1st, then 2nd base; war might require us to run to 3rd, then 1st, then 2nd… Garandagangi makes the distinction between non-minded, uni-minded, and multi-minded systems; COGs work for uni-minded (EBO systems based) logic. Quotes Clausewitz also. The loss of a COG ultimately results in defeat. –this is linear causality and reverse engineering on a positivist logic base. FM 3-0 goes beyond JP 3-0 and states “COGs are not limited to military forces and can be either physical or moral; eliminating them requires holistic integrated efforts of all national IOPs.” 6-8. Supports JP 3-0 and sees a single COG at each level of war. The Army does not have a COG at the tactical level either (just USMC). As Kem says, it is semantics- a tactical COG equals a decisive point.

14. Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0 JP 3-0 FM 3-0 • Termination: military operations terminate when they achieve and preserve military objectives linked to the national strategic end-state. 3x approaches: imposed (threatened or actual occupation of enemy territory) or negotiated settlement (coordinated political, diplomatic, military, and economic actions), and the indirect approach (when gaining legitimacy and influence over the relevant population; this employs IW to erode an enemy’s power, influence and will over the population. • End State and Objectives: developed after the termination criteria are established (Reilly reverse engineering). The military end-state is the point after which the President does not require the military IOP in the lead. • Effects: “Combined with a systems perspective, the identification of desired and undesired effects can help commanders and their staffs gain a common picture. An effect is the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, set of actions, or another effect. • Objectives: prescribe friendly goals. • Effects: describe system behavior. • Tasks: direct friendly action. • 4. COGs: see previous slide. • 5. Decisive Points: a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contributes materially to achieving success.-IV-12, JP 3-0. Positivist logic; Clausewitzian. Termination criteria lend to linear causality and reverse-engineering within a neo-realism logic. FM 3-0 does not use ‘termination’ in doctrine. It does use ‘strategic end state’ in 6-8. The POTUS translates national interests and policy into a national strategic end-state. FM 3-0 ties ‘end-state’ to JP 3-0 same term. Operational objectives are linked to COGs, and tactical OBJs are linked to decisive points (which follow LOEs to target COG CVs. Very systematic process. FM 3-0 does not use ‘effects’ in JP format; D-2 states that “Army forces DO NOT use joint systems analysis…or effects assessment.” Army forces conduct operations according to Army doctrine. Linear causality: effect occurs when A+B equals C. Implies reverse engineering and positivism. Positivist logic; Describing instead of explaining. This deals with interiority instead of exteriority! “This holistic understanding helps commanders and their staffs identify COGs, critical factors, and decisive points to formulate LOOs and visualize the CONOPs.” –IV-12 JP 3-0. Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur.

15. Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0 JP 3-0 FM 3-0 Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur. Positivist logic; Clausewitzian. Termination criteria lend to linear causality and reverse-engineering within a neo-realism logic. FM 3-0 shares LOO with JP 3-0, but introduces Lines of Effort: the LOE helps planners link multiple tasks with goals, objectives, and end-state conditions; LOE follows LOO systems approach in linear causality and uni-minded systems (COGs). FM 3-0 uses JP 3-0’s operational reach; the limit of a unit’s operational reach is it’s culminating point (6-74). FM 3-0 uses similar terms as JP 3-0 with simultaneity and depth; and introduces ‘phases’ as a planning/execution tool to synchronize an operation. FM 3-0 does not use JP 3-0’s phrasing of moral failure; it does paint a more holistic approach- within a systemic framework. • 6. Direct versus Indirect: “In theory, direct attacks against enemy COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction is the most direct path to victory.” IV-12, JP 3-0. • Indirect: the indirect paths are used when a JTF cannot conduct a direct attack; they still indirectly target COG CVs in order to set the conditions for successful direct attacks. Once again, this uses positivist logic and linear causality. • Lines of Operations: a LOO describes the linkage of various actions on nodes and or decisive points with an operational or strategic objective. • Operational Reach: the distance and duration over which a joint force can successfully employ military capabilities. Reach is fundamentally linked to culmination; geography may limit it- but technology offers methods for bypassing barriers and limitations. • Simultaneity and Depth: • Simultaneity: the application of military and non-military power against enemy key capabilities and sources of strength; (JP 3-0 implies operational shock in a Naveh-style here; even talks about moral and or physical failure in cohesion. Simultaneity also refers to concurrent conduct of operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. • Depth: overwhelming the enemy in multiple domains- depth applies to time as well as space; this goes into Boyd’s OODA Loop. Linear causality: effect occurs when A+B equals C. Implies reverse engineering and positivism. Direct paths imply linear causality again; not adaptive complex systems. Very EBO centric thoughts here; that simultaneity in action against appropriate enemy forces results in a ‘moral failure’ echoes some of the British and USAAF’s flawed ‘morale bombing’ in WWII.

16. Elements of Operational Design JP 3-0 JP 3-0 Positivism refers to a set of epistemological perspectives and philosophies of science which hold that the scientific method is the best approach to uncovering the processes by which both physical and human events occur. FM 3-0 Positivist logic; Clausewitzian. Termination criteria lend to linear causality and reverse-engineering within a neo-realism logic. Positivist logic; in FM 3-0 as well here. Tempo: used in 6-80; FM 3-0 ties tempo to enemy specifically. FM 3-0 uses ‘culmination’ where there is a point in time when a force no longer possesses the capability to continue its current form of operations. This is a land-centric logic that differs with JP 3-0 (Air, Sea Power). FM 3-0 includes RISK as well. This is Clausewitzian logic that addresses the fog, friction, and “luck” – risk relates to time and space; “it is a potential catalyst that fuels opportunity.” • 11. Timing and Tempo: “With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react.” IV-16 JP 3-0. • Tempo: the rate of military action. Tempo has military significance only in relative terms. “information superiority facilitated by a net-centric environment enables the JFC to dictate tempo.” • Forces and Functions: JFCs focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both. • Attacking Functions: destroys/disrupts enemy’s ability to employ its forces; • Attacking Forces: self-evident. • Leverage: gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all domains and the information environment. Can be achieved through asymmetrical actions and concentration and integration of joint force capabilities (IV-17). • Balance: the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. • Anticipation: JP 3-0 emphasizes description and volume of information as the means to understanding and anticipating what Taleeb calls ‘Black Swan’ events- unknown-unknowns. This does not work with Design’s logic of interiority and exteriority with complex adaptive systems. • Synergy: combining military forces and capabilities so that their sum is greater than individual totals. Or, 1+1+1=5. • Culmination: has both an offensive and defensive application; essentially when your chess opponent and you have the same number of pieces… Description over explanation represents the systems thinking approach of Positivists. We had tons of information in Iraq, yet we did not dictate tempo in 2004-2005 at all. There is a difference between tons of description and the right explanation. How can you anticipate this with a complex adaptive system if your planning logic requires you to reverse engineer within linear causality and uni-minded system logic such as EBO? 19. Arranging Operations: sounds like synergy, tempo, forces and functions, and balance. Not sure why JP 3-0 even uses this one…

17. Question 5: Jomini versus Clausewitz, Steel Cage Match

18. Mechanistic Logic Positivist Logic Jomini Clausewitz Similarities in Warfare Theories Follow these rules exactly regardless of future conflict, and you will win. If not- you are an idiot. The enemy is predictable and does not adapt. Seek the Napoleonic victory- tactical wins that accomplish strategic goals. This ignores the operational level of war. Jomini was widely read prior to the American Civil War; probably carried by most officers- geometric considerations continued with artillery, engineering, and naval applications in the 19th century. “War is an extension of Politics.” -KVC “In total war, politics become an extension of war”- D/G, A Thousand Plateaus (they flip the maxim). Warfare is complex- applying reductionist mathematics and procedures does not work well in complex war. Clausewitz was not read outside of Prussia until the late 1880s- it arrived to West Point only then and Jomini still had a huge hold upon the US military. • Both Clausewitz and Jomini see military conflict as a perpetual behavior by societies (nation states)- they do not subscribe to what Anatol Rapoport (On War intro, 1968 edition) terms ‘eschatalogical war theories.’ • Clausewitz goes mechanistic in some parts of ‘On War’ by arguing procedures and formulas for field artillery and relative troop strengths. • Jomini follows Machiavelli's ‘The Prince’ by crafting a process, a checklist of war principles and formulas for a military general to follow. Doing this in ANY conflict will deliver them victory- this is pure mechanistic linear logic. • Clausewitz does not follow principles of war, but he does take a positivist leap in logic by designating the ‘enemy’s fielded forces’ as the primary thing (COG) that must be destroyed to win. Differences in Warfare Theories • Jomini remains tactical. He does not go operational level as Clausewitz does. Jomini wants the politicians to get out of the way of the military in war- Clausewitz sees the “trinity” between government, military, and violent passions of the masses. • Jomini applies geometry, lines, and linear causality in a highly mechanistic fashion- Clausewitz goes further conceptually and avoids many of the pitfalls of prescriptive procedurizing that Jomini craves.

19. Anatol Rapoport’s non-Clausewitzian War Philosophies (editor and wrote the intro to the 1968 Penguin Classic “On War” There is a final war. Eschatological (final war) Philosophies of War Cataclysmic (world destruction) Philosophies of War Prevent all war. Divine Eschatological (religious final battle) Natural Eschatological (planet extinction; human extinction) Global Cataclysmic War Theory Human (messianic) Eschatological (people here now) Ethno-centric Cataclysmic War Theory • Rapoport claims the Soviets switched to this during the Cold War- the chief difference is: • War is NOT a tool. • The outside world wants to destroy the unique ethnic identity of the select people. • Protective measures such as the Berlin Wall are not for keeping people in, but keeping outsiders out. • The world will end in a final show-down. • Example: MAD in the Cold War fueled this logic; Soviets sought to preserve their state versus Capitalist westerners. • Rapoport calls this a system-theoretical approach. The principles are: • War is NOT a tool. • ALL war is bad. • Global government is the answer to ending conflict. • International systems will aid in preventing global cataclysmic war. • The nuclear age advanced this logic. • Example: The United Nations pursues international systems and a form of weak global governance with the general position that all war is bad…NATO is not an example of this; NATO is an alliance under Clausewitzian logic. Religious movements that feature an “Armageddon plot” or the return of a savior with the destruction of all non-believers follow this logic. A final war will, God Willing, end human conflict; this is pre-determined (linear causality), and the chosen people will reign supreme. Example: Iran launching WMD at Israel to trigger emergence of 12th Imam. A group of people already on the planet that will bring about the final battle- the Nazis, early Soviet Party, and other extreme non-religious groups followed this logic. The Proletarian Revolution where workers of the world unit. American Manifest Destiny during the Great Plains Indian Wars has components of this logic also. Example: Soviet Party of the early 20th century followed this logic, according to Rapoport. Extreme environmentalism movements; anti-human movements (by humans, oddly). Non-human events such as planet destruction, asteroid event, or disease epidemic that ends human (or all) life. Example: the dinosaurs did not wage “war” but their existence was terminated this way. Humans waging limited war while an asteroid hurtles towards us makes a similar example….

20. Question 6: Explain relationship between conceptual and detailed planning

21. FM 5-0 Design Doctrine (Teaching Artistry via. “Paint By Numbers”) Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Deliverables Problem statement Create Environmental Frame Initial guidance; end state; time Create Problem Frame Operational Approach (design frame) • Problem Statement • Initial CDR’s Intent • CDR’s Initial Planning Guidance • Mission Narrative • Other Products Narrative and graphical description Refinement of environmental frame Broad actions to achieve end state tensions Relevant actors; interrelations- PMESII-PT Resources and Risks Areas for action to achieve end state Decisive Points* LOOs, LOEs* Starting with an ‘End State’ and working backwards does not work with ill-structured problems. ‘Environment’ bounds. ‘Ecology’ conceptually allows distant yet relevant inclusion into the system. There is a problem with the word ‘problem.’ Transformation requirements exceed military capabilities; cultural change requires extensive time and resources. Phenomenon persist through feedback loops and ‘retention.’ Transformation requires emergence and anticipation (not prediction). Avoid description- seek explanation. PMESII-PT bounds the ‘known’ and goes descriptive and deconstructive. Doctrine is static. Theory is flexible. Detailed Planning Methodology: Linear Causality and Short Term Targets Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Frame your environment with knowns (facts), known unknowns (assumptions and PIR/CCIR), and force influence the future of your world as a goal (end-state) to aim against. Build COAs and “war-game” scenarios to decide upon the preferred action to undertake. Build detailed integrated instructions (OPORDs, graphics) to direct forces. Execute action. Collect information and reflect upon action. Make adjustments and continue towards end-state.

22. Linking understanding to action… Conceptual Planning: Detailed Planning: Holistic Approaches (Design Theory) Positivist/Mechanistic Approaches (Systems Logic) Naveh (In Pursuit of…, other works also) Kuhn’s Paradigm Shifts Betanafly’s General Systems Theory Organizational Theory (insert authors) Michael Foucote “Problematization” Lectures Clausewitzian (On War) Historic Vignette Metaphor Preference Jominian (principles of war) Scientific Deduction (Kuhn, Capra, Taleeb, Laszlo, Bosquette) “This is like that” Historical Precedence Fighting the Last Conflict (Linn) Weigley’s American Way of War Rivals are phenomenon within a complex system. The enemy is a state, group, actor, or super powered individual. Design Deliverables Adaptive Metaphors (creation and destruction) Detailed Planning Deliverables FM 5-0: operational approach with graphic and CDR’s intent. Narratives in theory convey EXPLANATION not description. MDMP, JOPP, MCPP all follow procedures that create precise and detailed OPORDs, FRAGOs, and other actionable products. Military doctrine comes out of this logic, as does AAR and historical products. “Learning to Learn” –Naveh, Garandagangi, Foucote “Reflective Practitioner”- Shoen Interiority and Exteriority- Deluze and Gutari Unknown Unknowns- Black Swans (Taleeb) Each logic uses different vocabulary, theoretical concepts, narratives, and metaphor construction to make sense of the world (holistic in tension with positivist reductionism)

23. Question 7: The relationship between Design and Battle (Mission) Command

24. Holistic Approach Mechanistic Logic Mission (Battle) Command Metacognition/problematization Design Positivist Logic Naveh: Persistent Creativity Linear Causality Similarities between both Battle Command is the art and science of: Understanding - Visualizing Describing Directing Leading Assessing Forces In order to impose a CDR’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Design Theory differs from Army Design Doctrine. Do not confuse the two. Design Theory seeks explanation, not description. Mary Jo Hatch’s Cycle of Cultural Change is a good foil for illustrating why Design doctrine and Battle Command as procedures do not really ever challenge any core structures or logics of the military institution. Battle Command borrows from Boyd’s OODA Loop- a cycle of leading and assessing the process while continuing to try to out-think and out-act the enemy. Design theory is not so proceduralized- complex systems are not susceptible to such linear causality. Design operates on a different logic than MDMP and detailed planning. Battle Command acts as an overarching conceptual framework for detailed planning- but it uses the same Clausewitzian and Positivist logic unlike Design. • Both Design and Battle Command consider the enemy (or rival) an adaptive and critical thinking (learning) actor instead of a static (mechanistic Jominian) opponent. • Design doctrine and Battle Command place the Commander at the center (the architect) of both processes. • Design doctrine (not theory) does suggest PEMESII-PT and METT-TC to support environmental framing and LOEs… • Both Design doctrine (not theory) and Battle Cmd combine analytic and intuitive thinking…but Design theory does not limit thinking to within interiority of system and within positivist/reductionist logic with institutional biases. Differences in logics Analytic Decision making: “approach the problem systemically” • Design Theory seeks EXPLANATION over description. Battle Command wants description- this reinforces the positivist, reductionist, and linear causality logic. • Battle Command recommends PMESII-PT to understand, and METT-TC to visualize…Design Theory avoids proceduralization. • BC relies on ‘pattern recognition’ for anticipation; this potentially follows Taleeb’s ‘Black Swan’ fallacy of only considering the known knowns; Deluze/Guatari and the interiority/exteriority. Intuitive Decision making: the act of reaching a conclusion emphasizing pattern recognition, experience, knowledge” Battle Command returns to the reverse engineering logic of positivism: the CDR “visualizes a desired end-state…and then a broad concept of how to reach it.

25. Question 8: FM 6-22 Army Leadership: Informal Leadership

26. Informal Leadership: Getting someone that is higher in rank than you (or position of authority) to see things your way (IF you are right) without getting a beat-down.” Problematize towards Cognitive Synergy See Design. “My Big Fat Greek Wedding” Transfer of Creative Ownership Turning your idea into “what the boss was saying all along” and having him take ownership of the “creation” of his idea. Sua-Sponte Sliding Scale of Informal Leadership Approaches Passive Aggressive General Benedict Arnold at Saratoga; he took off without explaining to his boss what he was doing, and directed the battle to an upset victory over Gentleman Johnny. Contrast in Logic COL xxxx and his position on COIN versus guerilla warfare in OEF 2010-2011. XXX was investigated (and cleared) of any insubordination. IDF and their problems with SOD and the Hezbollah 2006 War. Subordinate leaders like Naveh used logic arguments on why SOD was superior to detailed planning- they all got sacked by senior leadership. General MacArthur’s actions during the Korean War over which he got fired by the POTUS; McCrystal’s actions during OEF 2011. Confrontational

27. Question 9: complicated versus complex

28. Simple problem: Completing my six year-old’s math homework. • Intricate problem: Completing a tough crossword puzzle. There is only 1x right solution. • Complicated problem: Normandy Amphibious Assault on D-day. • Complex Problem: Accomplishing vague strategic goals that change under limited conditions (no troops on ground) with NATO and the Arab League in Libya while waging 2x other wars. • Complex: • open systems • unknown unknowns • exteriority • adaptive actors • innovation • holistic approaches • dynamic • explanation over description • reduction does not explain • mechanistic resistant • Intricate: • one solution • many steps • time consuming • precise • reverse engineerable • mechanistic • 100% predictable • Simple: • Closed systems • Known knowns • clear actors • linear causality • reduction friendly • mechanistic friendly • principles/procedures • reverse engineerable • predictable • Complicated: • Closed systems • Known unknowns • many actors • often linear • description rich • reduction friendly • interiority • mechanistic prone (COGs)

29. Question 10: function and utility of narrative in Design; relation to discourse.

30. emerging current extinct unknown known Narrative: Discourse: language Information Problematize! Narrative is defined by doctrine (FM 5-0) as: “mission narrative”- the expression of the operational approach for a specified mission. It describes the intended effects for the mission, including the conditions that define the desired end-state.” It represents the articulation of the CDR’s visualization of the mission (echoes battle command). Narrative in Design Theory: Naveh discusses “codification of doctrine” and “planners are shackled while designers create.” Hayden White: The Content and the Form: history versus histiography; Peter Novak: That Noble Dream: narratives are incomplete- historians are biased in writing them. Humans (feminist movement, civil rights movement) try to take ‘ownership’ of some narratives- the military may do the same (“We do amphibious assaults, not you…We do FID- you do SFA…”) Design Theory: post-modern philosophy such as Deluze and Guatari’s A Thousand Plateaus devote a chapter to the tension between information (exteriority and interiority) and language (flawed, human- associated with thoughts, but not information). This is a tough concept- needs five more slides to really explain. Discourse is mentioned in FM 5-0 Design Chapter 3 where the CDR fosters an environment where ‘problematization’ occurs- this is the critical thinking portion of seeking explanation (WHY questions and BECAUSE answers) instead of just description (WHAT questions with HOW, WHERE, WHEN answers). FM 5-0 Design does imply some critical thinking benefits of Design: “Design enables commanders to view a situation from multiple perspectives”- this supports the logic that complexity requires organizational intelligence- not a lone Napoleon. metacognition New vocabulary Discourse occurs here: metaphoric processes to fuse new understanding and convey to others. Narrative is a product of the system logic: empirical material explained with metaphor and language (flawed) and organized in theoretical concepts which publish into narratives.

31. Question 11: Define Adaptive Work and describe how one leads to this effort.

32. Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: People’s Liberation Army Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999) 140-141. Liang and Ziangsui argue that over the last 20 years, the world has grown more complex, yet the military ignore the increased complexity of war and instead focus “on the level of weapons, deployment methods and the battlefield, and the drawn-up war prospects are also mostly only limited to the military domain and revel in it.” Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the World; a Holistic Vision for Our Time. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. Fritjof Capra, The Web of Life Jeff Conklin, Wicked Problems and Social Complexity (CogNexus Institute, 2008. http://cognexus.org/wpf/wickedproblems.pdf Last accessed 05 January 2011) 4-5. “This is the pattern of thinking that everyone attempts to follow when they are faced with a problem…this linear pattern as being enshrined in policy manuals, textbooks, internal standards for project management, and even the most advanced tools and methods being used and taught in the organization.” Solution: Unclear Flexible Problematizing Metacognition Creation/destruction Process Persistent Adaptation Emergence Gerald M. Weinberg, Rethinking Systems Analysis and Design (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982) 12. “If our previous experience with systems analysis proves anything, it proves that anyone who tries to use all the information- even about the simple systems existing today- will be drowned in paper and never accomplish anything…The synthesist is someone who makes very specific plans for action, and more often than not stays around during the execution of those plans to adjust them to ongoing reality.” Innovation Learning Problem: Unclear Positivism Reductionism Mechanistic Linear Procedures Linear Causality Making Sense Pre-determined END STATE Reframe Positivist, mechanistic Approaches Linear Causality Pre-determined END STATE Positivist, mechanistic Approaches Alex Ryan, The Foundation For An Adaptive Approach; Australian Army JournalFor the Profession of Arms, Volume VI, Number 3 (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2009) 70. “With the industrial revolution, the planning and decision-making process gradually built up a well-oiled machine to reduce reliance on individual genius.”

33. Question 12: How do you build organizational learning to facilitate integrated planning?

34. Examples of learning while in conflict: • US Army in Philippines 1899-1901 (Linn’s The Philippines War • British in Malaya in 1956 versus US Army in Vietnam (Nagl’sLearning to Eat Soup with a Knife) • Israeli military in 1973 war with Egypt- adaptation becomes necessity. • Washington at Battle of Trenton (raid tactic achieved operational and strategic requirements) Adaptive and Critical Thinking Organization Flexible Problematizing Metacognition Creation/destruction Process Persistent Adaptation Rigid and Non-Learning Organization (Traditional, Proceduralized) • Examples of resistance to changing an organization while in conflict: • US Army in Cold War (Carl Builder’s Masks of War) • Linn’s Echo of Battle- peacetime strategists reinvent themselves with emergent technology to reinforce worldviews. • Egyptian military in 1973 war with Israel- planning phase 1 works, but what about phase 2? Positivism Reductionism Mechanistic Linear Procedures

37. Question 13: ANP- relationship between strategy and operational art

38. Clausewitzian Theory Neo-Realism Mechanistic Logic Liberalism Operational Art Strategy Positivist Logic Humanism Operational Art links tactical action to the pursuit of strategic objectives. Clausewitzian logic guides operational art towards destroying the enemy to compel a nation to obey our will. Strachan in The Lost Meaning of Strategy says that now, non-state actors initiate conflict, they are fought by civilians, and principle victims are not soldiers but non-combatants. FM 3-0 chapter 3, FSO: “Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative…” the goal of FSO is to apply landpower as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land. FM 3-0 uses ‘operational variables’ to describe the operational environment in terms that describe military aspects of the system, but the population’s influence on it. This means that FM 3-0 doctrinal logic uses reductionism for PMESII-PT- they do consider strategic (DIME) factors. Gaddis: Surprise, Security, and the American Experience – Gaddis sees post 9-11 where Powell and Weinberger doctrines (nation-state centric) are irrelevant. McDougall’s Promised Land, Crusader State explains US foreign policy as our assumption (Hatch’s model) that we can, should, and must reach out to help other nations share in the ‘American Dream.’ American values and tenets of democracy, freedom from government and military intrusions (see Leach’s Roots of Conflicts) do not equal the military hierarchical process and institutionalism logic. Carnes Lord’s Crisis Management, A Primer. Lord presents Pearl Harbor as a political, not a military failure- the US enacted the 1941 oil embargo and Roosevelt sent mixed diplomatic messages- this drove Japan to make their move (just as they did against Russia in 1908). Cohesive Elements • As Gaddis notes, western strategic form follows the hierarchy that operational art uses. “The White House is a necessary hierarchy because no one is the President’s equal.” • Gaddis explains how Eisenhower built a large military industrial complex with more hierarchy and procedures. • McDougall implies that Americans apply western values of democracy and the American Dream to all other societies- this is similar to how western militaries apply Clausewitzian logic to other rivals and enemies universally. • Hew Strachan’s The Lost Meaning of Strategy: modern war is no longer the ‘golden era’ of Clausewitzian state-on-state total war. It is with non-state actors, failed states or rogues. European states now view war as a peacekeeping requirement (Rapoport’s global cataclysmic war theory, not Clausewitzian). Tensions • Operational art (western logic) relies upon hierarchy of control and procedures for uniformity and repetition- although Eisenhower increased this on the political side (strategy) after WWII, some components of American Strategic culture (Weigley) are in tension with this. Peacetime: small military; • NSC-68 represents a tension between traditional American strategic culture (we pick our fights) and Cold War ‘containment’ that follows a military systems-process of ‘they pick were we fight.” • B. Liddell Hart, Strategy. Hart sees indirect strategy as superior in the nuclear age- this is in tension with Clausewitzian logic (destroy the enemy directly).

39. Question 14: ANP- What is deterrence? What is the military’s role?

40. Figure 1a: Zweibelson Political Science Theory on 21st Century Irregular Warfare Trends Regarding Nuclear-armed Nations = victory = undetermined = failure Super-power nations Large complex militaries Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Japan 1945 Conflict in the Q1 is not direct; Nuclear nations use proxy conflicts in Q4 for indirect action Germany 1945 Berlin Air Lift 1947 Conflict in the Q2 is the golden era for most western military cultures- Q1 Q2 Korean War Limited War Low Intensity Conflict Total war High Intensity Conflict Vietnam War (RNA) Afghanistan 1988 (USSR) Panama 1989 Vietnam War (Viet Cong) Iraq 1990 Afghanistan 2001-present Q4 Q3 Iraq 2003 Iran-Iraq War 1988 (Iraq) Conflict in the Q4 is where weaker nations and actors seek to exploit super-power nations on terms that are better than in Q3. Bosnia 1999 Libya 1985 Iraqi Civil War 2004-present Conflict in the Q3 is between non-nuclear nations or with one nuclear (usually superior) power. Lebanon 2006 (Israel) Failing nations Rogue state

41. Advanced Nations Complex Military IOPs USSR (Cold War) Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 Germany 1945 Berlin Air Lift 1947 Japan 1945 Korea 1953 Q1: Nuclear Nations in Q1 use deterrence to not fight in Q2 with other nuclear nations. Q1 Q2 Vietnam 1974 (Chinese & Soviet Aided) Low Intensity Conflict High Intensity Conflict Vietcong Irregular Forces North Vietnam (subpar military IOP) Iraq 1991 French in Algeria 1956 Libya 1985 Kosovo 1999 Iraq 2003+ Iraq 2003 Q4 French utilized D2DE for air power with tactical success (strategic failure) Panama 1989 Q3 Somalia 1994 Haiti 1994 Afghanistan 2001+ Planned; not executed US Victory Undetermined Outcome US Failure Failing or Failed States Non-State Actors; Weak military IOPs French Example 1

42. Figure 1: D307 Cold War Arms Escalation Gravity Pipe U.S. now looks from atop the nuclear gravity pipe; from here it attempts to prevent other nations from rising up. GDP ratio GDP ratio Post-Cold War: U.S. downsizes nuclear arsenal while maintaining first strike capability for hostile actors. USSR obsolete. Russian Federal Republic rises from ashes and secures existing nuclear infrastructure. Attempts to maintain nuclear superpower status. GDP ratio Cold War ending; USSR unable to fund their nuclear military IOP. Efforts now towards nuclear non-proliferation and reduction. START Treaty GDP ratio 1980s: President Reagan begins ‘Star Wars program. SALT 2 Treaty SALT 1 Treaty 1970s: U.S. begins MIRV warheads. Soviets challenged to match MIRV quality; react with IBCM quantity for MAD. GDP ratio GDP ratio 1969: First man on moon; space race won by United States 1957: Sputnik: first space satellite U.S. reframing: NASA and space race increased due to Soviet satellite success Smaller ground forces; USAF SAC takes lead on nuclear option; NASA space race. GDP cost ratio acceptable. 1950s perceived missile gap with Moscow. Soviet military maintains large ground forces; closed market economy (Socialist) does not grow as rapidly as U.S. free market; USSR spends higher ratio to balance. GDP ratio Reframe: expand nuclear delivery to IBCM, bomber, and submarine capabilities. GDP ratio 1940 Manhattan Project; 1945 Hiroshima/Nagasaki 1945+ secret atomic program; 1949 atomic bomb USSR United States WWII Nazi missile technology/scientists

43. Question 15: ANP- American Foreign Policy Traditions:

44. American Foreign Policy: U.S. Strategic Culture over 300 years (1711-2011) Conventional War against China Uni-polar 21st Century Gulf War I Panama Final Soviet Battle in Western Europe Korea Berlin Airlift Military Industrial Complex Air Power, Nuclear Age Total War (global threat) End of Imperialism Clash of Ideologies America= defender of democracy World “Policeman” Cold War Kennan’s Long Telegram NCS-68 UN resolutions Brinksmanship Proxy Wars Détente Glasnost WWII Entering the World Stage Peacetime small army Fear of European invasion Coastal forts and navy Monroe Doctrine foreign policy Avoid European wars JIB/JAB for democracy American Civil War WWI Golden Era Span-Amer. War Builder’s Masks of War Weigley’sAmerican Way of War Civil War Somalia Mex-Amer. War Libya? Philippines 1899 Isolationist Early America Discarded Conflicts Vietnam Jomini’s Principles of War Teddy Roosevelt and the navy Linn’s Guardians and Heroes (Echo of Battle) Mahan and Naval strength equals economic strength Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny (messianic eschatological) PME establishment (West Point) Impressment Colonial ‘sub-status’ Troop quartering Taxes, economics War 1812 Cuba Contras Amer. Revolution Afghanistan? Iraq? French Indian War Triggering Powell Doctrine: we need an exit strategy. Blackhawk Down: send enough combat power with right mission. Avoid COIN. “Training tomorrow’s enemies to help us Today” Colonial Period Leach’s Roots of Conflict Paine’s Common Sense Locke, Hume, Age of Enlightenment

45. Question 16: Historical Example of Military Force and Diplomacy- the American Civil War

46. Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War) Clausewitz Winfield Scott Napoleon (Legacy) Jomini Mahan Prussian Staff Mass Armies Mexican War Defensive superiority Frontal Assault Army requires resources West Point Smaller population Crimean War Doctrine History Slave based agricultural economy Confederate Army Logistics Geography in Mississippi Southern fixation on States Rights Union Naval Blockade Rifled muskets Steam engines Trains Telegraph Armor Screw propellers Balloons Artillery Tactics State-centric ‘gentlemen’ caste Union Army New Technology Siege mentality Confederacy divided Politics Political nepotism and corruption Vicksburg Confederate prosperity Resources Tobacco and Cotton Trade President Davis in Richmond Mississippi- key waterway South lacked infrastructure South unable to industrialize faster than North South lacked international trade Linn (Echo of Battle) Wiegley (American Way of War) Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts) Hagerman (The American Civil War) Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective)

47. Divergent Cognitive Diagram for Confederate Commander Problems 1861-1863 Interwar Theorists (pre-Civil War) Clausewitz Winfield Scott Jomini Napoleon (Legacy) Mahan Prussian Staff Centers of Gravity Napoleonic Wars Mexican War Offensive frontal assaults Defensive advantage Union organized some staff specialization Napoleonic tactics must adapt with paradigm shift in technology Artillery dominates Screw propellers Telegraph Doctrine History Naval Armor Tactics Rifled Muskets Industrialization Theory Military’s Role Steam Engine Speed and Mass increased Constitution Forces Terrain Infrastructure in North and South Manifest Destiny Outdated Army (active) Small Officer Corps Increased casualties Inability to C2 Western Territories JIB/JAB Post Mexican War stand-down Pre-industrial Warfare (tactical) Post-Industrial Warfare (multiple campaigns) Defensive advantages 3/5 slave votes State Rights Inter-war period discourse on tactics New technology US distrusts large standing army Inter-war theorists unable to discourse new technology vs old tactics Kuhn (Paradigm Shifts) Wiegley (American Way of War) Hagerman (The American Civil War) Linn (Echo of Battle) Historian Interpretation (post-Civil War reflective)

48. Figure C: Fishbone Diagram for Confederate Commander Problems 1861-1863 Various caliber firearms require munitions Confederate supply dispersed across states President Davis lacked influence and leadership Confederate supply lines lack rail Problem: failure to supply forces 1 Logistics Confederacy organized around states Dependent on water transit South lacked international trade partners Confederates interior lines critical State-centric mindset hamstrung strategy Spies littered message couriers Davis was removed from local environment Telegraph vulnerable Problem: failure to coordinate tactics and strategy 2 C2 & ISR Calvary sent north Armies too large to maneuver quickly without signal conditions optimal Vicksburg isolated by river; a strength was also a weakness Siege mentality lacked recon Mexican War given too much credit; Clausewitz and Crimean War not enough. Mahan led West Pointers but Jomini and Mexican War veterans steered tactics American value on life; militia factor Rifled muskets Steam engines Trains Telegraph Armor Screw propellers Balloons Artillery Problem: failure to apply violence effectively to accomplish ENDS. 3 Failed Discourse (tactics vs. emerging technology) Jomini and Napoleon favored frontal assaults Artillery of 1820s outranged by muskets of 1860s South lacked industrial base of North

49. Question 17: How Economic Theory can Influence Military Operations

50. Figure 1a: Musings on Political Science Theories Nation-state primary actors Humans are anarchistic naturally; individual liberty is trumped by state survival Anarchy is not the cause of conflict. Free trade and interdependent democracies will reduce conflict. Legitimacy in tension with cost to act. Zero-sum game for power; balance of power Statism, Survivalism, Self-Help Realism Q1 Q2 Liberalism Compatible in some aspects Compatible in some aspects Implicitly Peaceful World Implicitly Chaotic World Compatible in some aspects Ideology not compatible with others. Q4 Q3 Marxists; Communists; Socialists Social Constructivists Compatible in some aspects Ideological; counter-capitalist; individual worker is the power- the state serves the worker; final battle vs. capitalism; Non-marxist nations will always threaten Marxist ones. Changing values and perceptions will change government and society; meta-cognition and game theory works here. Individuals comprise actors