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Survey of safety regulations used in major ‘named’ US races. By Dan Nolan and Evans Starzinger January 27, 2012. Draft 1. Summary:. Safety regulations are fragmented among a handful of regional constituents and become complex
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Survey of safety regulations used in major ‘named’ US races By Dan Nolan and Evans Starzinger January 27, 2012 Draft 1
Summary: • Safety regulations are fragmented among a handful of regional constituents and become complex • Safety regulations focus primarily on ‘minimum equipment requirements’, which are NOT core factors in recent safety incidents • Opportunity = unify and simplify SRs to make them easier for sailors while refocusing on core safety issues
SR’s used by offshore & coastal racesUS Sailing has 57% share
SR’s used by buoy racesUS Sailing has 13% share Anecdotal Prime reason for “ISAF but Not US Sailing Prescriptions” is requirement for PDF when starting/finishing Sample size: 17 major ‘named’ races
Wide Range of SR complexityMonohull Cat 1/2 Word count of SR
Modification of SRs, among those using ISAF OSRsFew Races use OSR’s ‘as is’, but most with limited modifications Newport to Bermuda Race Number of SRs Modified in NOR Number of Races
Summary: • Safety regulations are fragmented among a handful of regional constituents and become complex • Safety regulations focus primarily on ‘minimum equipment requirements’, which are NOT core factors in recent safety incidents • Opportunity = unify and simplify SRs to make them easier for sailors while refocusing on core safety issues
Actual Safety incidents not related to equipment requirementsUS Offshore incidents over the past decade • 2013 Island’s race, two broken rudders, one boat lost & one Fatality • 2012 Ensenada race, navigation and watch keeping errors, 4 deaths (minimal local SR’s) • 2012 Farallon’s race, seamanship judgment and race course layout, 5 deaths (ISAF SR’s with local modifications) • 2012 Clipper race, weather routing & heavy weather tactics, 2 serious injuries (MCA/SOLAS commercial SRs) • 2012 Bermuda return, broken rudder, boat abandoned • 2012 Bermuda return, severe injury, crew helo evaced • 2011 Chicago Mackinac, wind induced Capsize, 2 deaths (Mac SRs) • 2011 Annapolis to Newport, severe grounding at 12kts (ISAF SRs) • 2008 Galveston, TX Regatta de Amigos, keel broke off 1 death (ISAF SRs) • 2002 Block Island Race, unconscious MOB, 1 dead (ISAF SRs) • 2002 Newport to Bermuda, rig and prop strut failed in large waves – Andrew 70 (ISAF SRs)
Back-up:Longer list of incidents 2013 Island’s race, two broken rudders, one boat lost & one Fatality2012 Ensenada race, navigation and watch keeping errors, 4 deaths (minimal local SR’s)2012 Farallon’s race, seamanship judgment and race course layout, 5 deaths (ISAF SR’s with local modifications)2012 Clipper race, weather routing & heavy weather tactics, 2 serious injuries (MCA/SOLAS commercial SRs)2012 Bermuda return, broken rudder, boat abandoned2012 Bermuda return, severe injury, crew helo evaced2011 Fastnet, keel broke off, boat lost all crew safe (Rambler 100)2011 Chicago Mackinac, wind induced Capsize, 2 deaths (Mac SRs)2011 Annapolis to Newport, severe grounding at 12kts (ISAF SRs)2011 Passage from Selsey Bill West Sussex, MOB (drown while tethered with spinlock PFD), one fatality (Lion)2011 UK school vessel, Poor heavy weather management, one serious Injury during gybe (Liquid Vortex)2008 Galveston, TX Regatta de Amigos, keel broke off 1 death (ISAF SRs) (Cynthia Woods)2008 South China Sea race, keel lost (poor fit of the replacement keel into the hull socket, movement fatigued keel bolts), boat saved (TP 52 Strewth)2007 Coastal passage from Plymouth, keel broke off (due to fabricator modifications to the design), one fatality (Hooligan)2006 Day sail (with paying guests) in sheltered waters, two accidental gybes resulting in two injuries (Roaring Meg)2003 Delivery from Hamble, MOB Fatality (Pastime)2002 Block Island Race, unconscious MOB, 1 dead (ISAF SRs) 2002 Newport to Bermuda, rig & prop strut failed in heavy seas – Andrew 70 (ISAF SRs)1992 Vendee delivery, keel bulb broke off, one fatality (Coyote)
Relatively few races with stability requirementDespite ISAF SR 3.04.3 recommendation
Stability requirementsOffshore races* * Note: The ‘coastal’ Chicago YC race to Mackinac island has added a 103 ORR SI for 2012
Distribution of ORR stability indexCumulative percentage ORR cat 1 recommendation ORR Cat 2 recommendation 36 ORR vessels < 103
Stability measurement cautionNo silver bullet in extreme conditions • “ No yacht, no matter how stable, could consistently resist capsizing when hit beam-on, with a 55% LOA breaking Wave” (Wolfson research) • “No correlation between yachts in trouble and any stability measurement, except weak correlation with boat size” (1998 Hobart race analysis) • “There is a suggestion that shallow keel boats are more resistant to capsize than deep keel boats in extreme breaking wave conditions” (1994 Queen’s birthday storm)
SR Header Numbers Most Modified SR header number Fundamentals & Definitions Number of times modified
Top 10 modified OSRs General requirements Hatches & companionway Com equipment. Including AIS Number of races modifying
Summary: • Safety regulations are fragmented among a handful of regional constituents and become complex • Safety regulations focus primarily on ‘minimum equipment requirements’, which are NOT core factors in recent safety incidents • Opportunity = unify and simplify SRs to make them easier for sailors while refocusing on core safety issues
A few main constituents for outreachInvite members of each into an ‘OSR user advisory committee’? • Specific races with significant modifications • Newport to Bermuda race committee • Pacific Cup • Spinnaker Cup • Lighthouse • Associations with custom modifications or complete standalone SRs • SF OYRA • PIYRA • YRA of LIS • PHRF • Mac • SSS
Focus on root causes of recent worldwide incidents mostly not ‘minimum Equipment’ issues 1. Structural and design factors Boat does not break Boat does not stay upside down for a long time 2. Intense Weather Forecasting and routing Heavy weather tactics Fatigue and attitude management 3. Higher risk taking offshore Boat selection routing 4. Navigation & groundings Keep head out of boat Chart plotters not 100% accurate 5. MOB Most deaths have apparently been with unconscious MOB or trapped Most boats NOT following current best practices on tethers/jacklines 6. Emergency voice communication equipment Sat phone proven extremely helpful in offshore experience – ‘after the fact’
Next step key decisions: • Can USSailing convince ISAF to support a ‘lite(r)’ and more focused SR? (probably not at least in a short time frame) • Does USSailing want to develop an SR independent of ISAF? • If so, will the various US constituents participate in and support a unified and simpler US SR?