The changing rationale for public funding: Why do we have publicly financed universities?

1. The changing rationale for public funding: Why do we have publicly financed universities? Aldo Geuna Department of economics University of Torino

2. Content • Changing roles of the university • Traditional rationale: Post-WWII approach. • Changing characteristics of university research. • New rationale: Contractual-oriented approach. • Advantages and Potential Unintended Consequences: What it matter is from where you start.

3. Changing roles of university • To reproduce and transmit existing knowledge (Paris). • To improve critical reasoning and other skills • of individuals: • (i) as input to their work (Bologna); (ii) to develop democratic, civilised society (Cambridge/Oxford).

4. Changing roles of university 3. To increase knowledge base: (i) by pursuing knowledge ‘for its own sake’; (ii) by developing useful knowledge. Berlin: the Humboldian university To serve training and research support needs of economy (at regional and national levels). The entrepreneurial university (?)

5. Post-WWII Rationale: The endless frontier

6. The post-1945 rationale • Public good • Linear process • Budgetary expansion • Academic quality increasing with funding • Ex-ante judgement of research promises • Evaluation by academic community (peers)

7. Market-failure - Public good • Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) laid foundations of economics of science • Emphasised certain characteristics of scientific knowledge as apublic good: • non-rival – others can use the knowledge without detracting from the knowledge of the producers • non-excludable – other firms cannot be stopped from using the information MORE • expansibility- The possibilities of multiple transfers make it possible to distribute information very widely without loss. => • Non-appropriable at least completely (see patents and see discussion on Tacitness).

8. Market-failure - Public good => Private benefits less than social benefits. • Also long timescale of basic research while firms usually have short-term investment perspective. • Social benefits also wider than private benefits • Firms would not have invested in research on e.g. smoking-cancer link, ozone hole, global warming => Firms tend to under-invest in research (less than socially optimal – free riding)

9. Market-failure - Public good • To raise research funding to socially optimum level, government needs to invest. • Main product from govt-funded research = economically useful information, freely available to all. • By increasing funds for basic research, govt can expand the pool of economically useful information. • This information published– assumed to be durable and costless to use. • Close connection between university teachingand researchmeans universities also produce graduates with up-to-date knowledge and skills.

10. Linear model: V Bush ‘Social Contract’ - The endless frontier • Scientific discoveries in early 20th Century & WW2  belief in linear model of innovation. • Basic research  App. res.  Devlpt  Innovation. • V. Bush report “The Endless Frontier”: WWII (radar, atomic bomb, etc…) • Government responsibility = to fund basic research – will eventually  wealth, health & nat. security.

11. Linear model: V Bush ‘Social Contract’ - The endless frontier • Contract not very explicit re exact form of benefits nor when. • Used to justify substantial increases in gov’t funding. • Viewed as investment in future welfare. • Science also seen as inherently unpredictable (‘serendipity’), ex-ante judgment. • Scientists in best position to judge which research best to fund (peer review).

12. Linear model: V Bush ‘Social Contract’ - The endless frontier • Essential characteristics of V Bush social contract • high level of autonomy – few strings attached • institutionalisation of peer review to allocate funds • belief that basic research best done in universities

13. Main funding mechanisms 1 • Institutional core funding for universities (not US) – general university funding (GUF) • block grant for teaching and research • allocated on incremental or formula basis • provides funding for research infrastructure (labs, equipments, technicians, libraries etc.) – “the well found laboratory”

14. Main funding mechanisms 2 • Project funding (only in some countries) • for specific research projects – additional costs • proposals submitted – ‘responsive mode’ • judged by peer review • funding decision by committee of scientists (often discipline-based)

15. What about mission-oriented research? • Ignores university research funded by government departments and ‘mission-oriented’ agencies • e.g. defence, health, energy, agriculture, space • ‘Mission-oriented research’ (cf. curiosity-oriented’) • very large funding (especially in US but also UK and F) • not just confined to technical universities

16. What about mission-oriented research? • Areas chosen reflected political priorities - ‘demand-pull’ model • US – defence, space, health • Japan – agriculture, energy • UK – defence, aerospace • France – defence, nuclear energy

17. Changing characteristics of university research.

18. Changes in 1980s – 1990s • Driving forces • Economic problems (recession, inflation,1970s); • Growing costs of welfare state – health, education, social security; • Liberal versus social-democratic views of government (new public management; the EURO); • Weakening of the military rational; • Globalisation and growing economic competition;

19. Changes in 1980s – 1990s • Driving forces: • Growing importance of scientific and technological knowledge – the ‘knowledge economy’; • The emergence of new technology driven industries: biotech, ICT, nanotech; • ‘Massification’ of HE (from 7-8% to 40-70% NS) due to both increased demand and increased # of students finishing secondary education; • Growing cost of research.

21. Changing public research systems • Governments (first in the UK then in other countries) introduced new/revised policies: • To enhance quality and efficiency of public research; • To stimulate business investment in research; • To strengthen research links/collaboration between public and private sectors; • To increase supply of QSEs;

22. Changing public research systems • To adapt to needs of service sector (increasingly important in OECD countries); • To achieve a target level of R&D spending (e.g. 3% in EU “Barcelona target”); • To fund research in priority fields; • To stimulate public understanding/engagement.

23. Changing public research systems • Reforms aiming to make the contribution of public research systems more effectively to innovation (were they successful?): • Universities given increased autonomy and/or transformed into quasi-private (NPO) organisations (e.g. France, Italy, Japan, Denmark, Slovak Republic); • Decreased reliance on block funding and more on competitive project funds; • More emphasis on evaluation of HEIs and PROs (RAE early developed in the UK/NL);

24. Changing public research systems • More emphasis on mobility of students and researchers; • Changes to IPR for universities and public research organisations (e.g. Germany, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland) • Encouragement to protect and exploit intellectual property (IP) • Technology/knowledge transfer made formal ‘third mission’ of universities (e.g. UK, Denmark, Norway) • Growth in patents during 1990s although slowed since 2000

25. New rationale: Contractual-oriented approach

26. The contractual-oriented approach 1 • Implementation: • Competitive mechanisms for resource allocation; • Financial quasi-market incentives to steer university behaviour to meet societal needs and increase efficiency. GUF declined in relative terms, and in some cases e.g. UK, Australia (but also in part Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Belgium) now allocated on basis of performance see RAE; • Policies to increase selectivity and concentration;

27. The contractual-oriented approach 2 • Project-based funding (see FIRB/ANR in Italy/FRANCE) increased in importance with a shift from responsive mode to directed programmes and to research linked to needs of ‘users’ (though decrease in recent years in UK);

28. The contractual-oriented approach 2 • Growing emphasis on ex post evaluation; • New government funding initiatives based on ‘challenges’ and competition e.g. Joint Infrastructure Fund (especially UK).

29. The contractual-oriented approach 3 • Implicit assumptions • Possible to evaluate quality of research output reliably (is it? S&T indicators, ISI, citations, metrics); • Possible to identify most promising research avenues (is it? Student presentation on Foresight); • Costs can be reduced without sacrificing quality (is possible? teaching versus research);

30. The contractual-oriented approach 4 • Due to existence of economies of scale and scope, concentration increases output of overall system (do they exist? At what level? See unintended consequences); • Admin and other costs associated with more competitive system are small cf. benefits.

31. Advantages and Potential Unintended Consequences: What matters it is from where you start

32. Advantages • Creates incentives for performance (of a specific type). • In some system (see Italy, France) allocation “a pioggia” create disincentives for the most productive. • Scientific production is Skewed: • 60% of researchers produce one paper or the majority of papers is produced by the top scientists. [Lotka, A.J. (1926) The Frequency Distribution of Scientific Productivity, Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, 16/12, 317-323.]

33. Skewness in Science

34. Unintended consequences of the new rationale 1.Increased concentration of resources 2. Disproportionate incentives for short-term research 3. Conflicting incentive structures 4. Exacerbation of ‘Matthew effect’

35. Increased concentration of resources • Resources increasingly concentrated in few leading research universities • Implicit assumption that there are economies of scale/scope • But no strong empirical evidence for economies of scale/scope in university production • Either for research itself at level of department or institution (but ‘critical mass’ effect at level of group) • Or for joint production of teaching and research • Some scale economies for teaching and admin, and hence perhaps indirect benefits for research • Mobility of students and researchers

36. Increased concentration of resources • Adverse consequences • Fewer resources in lower ranked departments/ institutions to support new ideas and new people – decreased diversity may be detrimental to research in longer term, even if more ‘efficient’ in short term • Lower ranked institutions less able to contribute to meeting regional needs • Temptation to undercharge, bidding for funds on marginal rather than full-cost basis – driving down prices to detriment of universities (become financially overstretched, staff overworked); Evaluation of real opportunity costs.

37. Disproportionate incentives for short-term research • Evaluations tend to focus on short term e.g. publications in last few years • Emphasis on addressing needs of users may lead to neglect of longer-term research • Lack of incentives for long-term, path-breaking, ‘risky’ research • Decreased variety of research lowers probability of scientific novelty

38. Conflicting incentive structures • Different competitive funding schemes may create conflicting incentive structures • e.g. high-quality publications for RAE VS helping ‘users’ • Weakened teaching incentives • Traditional academic incentive structure (‘open science’) in conflict with private-oriented incentive structure linked to business-financed research: • Work with industry may bring problems of secrecy, delay in publication etc. • Risk that incentive structure of subsidiary source of funds may dominate university research behaviour

39. Exacerbation of ‘Matthew effect’ • Merton (1968) – success in research brings status and funding – further increases chances of future success • “To them that hath shall be given” – the ‘Matthew effect’ • Evidence shows very small proportion of researchers produce large share of most influential publications • ‘New economics of science’ (e.g. David) elaborated this in terms of path-dependence and self-reinforcing mechanisms (e.g. ‘increasing returns’) • Growing range of uncoordinated funding sources reinforces cumulative, self-reinforcing process • Means that researchers at lower-status universities locked into a ‘vicious circle’ as compete for resources and status – again lowers diversity