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Populism in the Nordic Countries The Case of Swedish New Democracy

Populism in the Nordic Countries The Case of Swedish New Democracy. POL333 Populism and Political Parties. Outline of the presentation. Main aim : New Democracy as an example of the ( right - wing ) populist political party

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Populism in the Nordic Countries The Case of Swedish New Democracy

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  1. Populism in theNordicCountriesThe Case ofSwedish New Democracy POL333 PopulismandPoliticalParties

  2. Outlineofthepresentation • Mainaim: New Democracyas anexampleofthe (right-wing) populistpoliticalparty • Theoretical background: Mudde`s, Stanley`s approach to populism • Spottingpopulism: manicheanviewofpolitics, antiestablishment appeal, denigrationofelitesandvalorisationofthepeople • Context (politics in Sweden), historyoftheparty, itsdiscourse, votersand role oftheparty in thepoliticalsystem

  3. Politics in Sweden • Constitutional monarchy • Parliament (Riksdag) – onechamber (up to 1970 - bicameralism) • Parliamentaryregime (negative parliamentarism, role oftheSpeaker) • Proportionalelectoralsystem (4% threshold, 12% regionalthreshold, 29 multimemberelectoraldistricts, modifiedSainte-Laguë, adjustmentseats – 310/39) • Party system – “frozen” party system, theNordic model of the five-party system (1988 election) • Consensualdemocracy, strongwelfare-state (positionof SAP)

  4. Predecessorsof New Democracy • Skåne Party – 80s, successfulat a locallevel (Malmö) • Sjöbo Party – formed in 1991, exploitingtheanti-immigrationniche • 1988 – referendum on politicalrefugees in Sjöbo (Sven-OlleOlsson) • Result in 1991 municipalelection in Sjöbo • SwedenDemocrats(successful in the 2010 election) • Basedmainly on anti-immigrationsentiments (economiccontext) • Not nationalsuccessbutstillactiveat a locallevel

  5. Historyof New Democracy • Founded in November 1990 (registrationFebruary 1991) • IanWachtmeisterand Bert Karlsson – public-knownfigures • Rapid increaseof support in public opinionpolls • Stoodforthe 1991 parliamentaryelection

  6. Party leadershipandorganizationalstructure • Lackofinterest in buildingup a nationwide network oflocalorganizations X spontaneousprocess (paidlicences/contracts) • Neitherwomen`s organization, nor youthleague – impact on therapid declineoftheparty later • Crucial role ofthetwoleaders in theprocessofcandidateselection • Company-likestructure– bedifferentfromtheestablishedparties

  7. Party ideology – neoliberalismandxenophobia • Dominance ofeconomy in the party rhetorics (“The economy rules everything.”) • Theadvocacyof a classical (neo)liberal“minimal state” • Reductionoftaxes (as a conditionof autonomy andpersonalfreedom) • Strongly in favorofprivatizationofstate-run companies, healthservices, education • Deregulationofthe public sector • Anti-immigration/immigrantsdiscourse: immigrants as a threat to Swedish identity andculture, immigration = risingcrime, immigrants are expensiveforthestateandtakeSwedishjobs

  8. Party ideology – neoliberalismandxenophobia • EconomiccompetitionbetweenSwedesandimmigrants • Callforimmediateassimilation • „Swedishnessunderattack“ – i.a. AIDS andAfricanrefugees • „Swedishchildrenwillhave to turntoward Mekka“ (Franzén) • Deportationofimmigrantwhowouldcommit a seriouscrime in Sweden • „anti-Swedishracismanddiscrimination“ – reaction to theclaimed positive discrimination • Criticismofforeigndevelopmentaidpolicy (referendum) • Liberalizationofalcoholpolicies • Pro EU attitude (X voters) • Refused to positionitself on theleft-rightscale

  9. Spottingpopulism I. – peoplecentrism • The“man in the street” • Representing “common man using nothing but common sense” • “If people are strange, we are strange as well”, trying to present themselves as being close to the people (football matches) • The background of a decisionis not important as long as thedecisionisgoodforthepeople • The case ofKarlsson`s resignationand his comeback to the party leadership: „I can`t quit just like that…I`d would be a fool not to listen to what the people wanted”

  10. Spottingpopulism II. – anti-elitism • „usvsthem“ dichotomy – common man commonsensevspoliticalbureucratsandelites(= establishedparties) • Complicatedlanguageemployed by politicalelites • Opposingtheentire“political class” • Satiricalapproach (twonovels by Wachtmeister: Elefanterna, Krokodilerna) • Swedishpolitics = duckpond; politicians = elephants (overweightformtoo much sitting, withtheirtinyearsandgapingjaws); • Programmefor „betterlife, more funand more money in yourpocket“ • Neoliberalapproach to elitesassociatedwithsocioliberalwelfarestatewithhightaxes

  11. Spottingpopulism III. – people as a sovereign • Limitationofpowerofpoliticalelites • “Power to thepeople, not to the iron butts.” • More personalization in the PR system (preferentialvoting) • More referenda • Commonsense as theleadingprinciplefordecisionmaking

  12. Electoralresultsandvotersof RP • 1991 election – 6.7% ofvotes • Niches in Swedishelectoralarena: • Therightistshift in theelectorate, negative perceptionofacceptanceofrefugeesfrom 6% in 1988 to 26% in 1991 • 30% of party defectors (20% in 1988), growingdistrust to politicians, declining party identification, timingofvotedecision • Sociology of ND voters: not university education, smalltraders/enterpreneursandhighrankingofficials • Attitudesofthevoters: immigration as importantissue, criticismofpoliticalparties, distrust to politicians, smalldifferencesbetweenparties – combinationof protest andissue (immigration) voting

  13. Developmentofthe party I. • Quick fall of the party • Internal arena – a conflictbetweentheleadershipandthemembersafterthe 1991 election (neworganization charter – no localbranches), tooauthoritarian style ofleadership (expulsionofmembersopposingtheleaders) • 1993 – anothercentralizationofthe party (franchizing-like model, contractswithlocalorganizations) • A protest conferenceofsomelocalbranches in August 1993, formationof a intra-party oppositionfaction • ContinualMPs` defections (leadership style, immigration stance) • ContractwithMPs (imperative mandate)

  14. Developmentofthe party II. • Unsuccessfulexploiting holding the balance ofpower (not reliable support ofthe non-socialist government, undermined by thenpactofthegovernmentand SAP, from 1993 on more moderateattitide) • Split betweenKarlssonandWachtmeister (Wachtmeister no longerlikecommonpeople, support ofBildtcabinet, taxation) • „Ian (…) isthebiggestcrocodileofall.“ • ResignationofWachtmeister, Karlssonrefused to becomethechairman • H. Colliandersupported by Karlssonand S. Dybecksupported by Wachtmeister • V. Franzén as thenewKarlsson`s favourite(andthenthechairwomanofthe party) after Colliander agreed with government on child-care allowances • 1994 election – 1.2% ofvotes

  15. Conclusion • Successorsof New Democracy – SwedenDemocrats (more radical profile – seeJungar 2013) • Thefirstelectorallysuccessfulpopulistpolitical party in Sweden • Combinationofeconomicneoliberalism, xenophobiaandpopulism • Looseorganizationalstructure, internaldisputes • Typicalproblemwithopportunitygainingthe power (X protest voting) • Dissappearencefromthepoliticalscene in Sweden

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