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Study on Spoofed Call Detection and Prevention i n 3GPP

ITU Workshop on “Caller ID Spoofing” (Geneva, Switzerland, 2 June 2014). Study on Spoofed Call Detection and Prevention i n 3GPP. China Mobile. Contents. Background 3GPP progress Conclusions and recommendations. 3GPP Progress. Backgroud

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Study on Spoofed Call Detection and Prevention i n 3GPP

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  1. ITU Workshop on “Caller ID Spoofing” (Geneva, Switzerland, 2 June 2014) Study on Spoofed Call Detection and Prevention in 3GPP China Mobile

  2. Contents Background 3GPP progress Conclusions and recommendations

  3. 3GPP Progress • Backgroud • A variety of methods and technologies that can be used to make spoofed calls which can cause substantial loss to users and operators. • The origin of problems is wider than just 3GPP networks(TS 23.081) and relates to ISUP(TS 29.163）, also used in fixed PSTN.

  4. 3GPP Progress • Security Study on Spoofed Call Detection and Prevention • The project was set up in 3GPP since 2012. • Spec number: TR 33.831 • Rapporteur: LI, Xiangjun,China Mobile • Contributor:NSN,Ericsson,HuaWei,NEC • Latest TR: Draft S3-131201 • http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/33831.htm

  5. 3GPP Progress • Objective • Outline valid threat scenarios for caller id spoofing coming to 2G and 3G CS domains. • Analyze and evaluate if any tools in 3GPP can be used to counteract this problem. • Study possible required technology mechanism to detect and prevent.

  6. 3GPP Progress • Spoofed call Scenarios • Spoofed call using the VoIP • Spoofed call using the PRI/PBX • Spoofing id from an IP-PBX towards IMS • Spoofing of caller ID • Spoofing of caller location • ……

  7. 3GPP Progress • Security Requirements • the caller ID received should be authorized. • The unauthorized caller ID should be alerted. • The unauthorized caller ID should be logged. • If the spoofed call is detected, the network should be able to tear down the call and/or save in blacklists. • ……

  8. 3GPP Progress • Candidate solutions for detection • IBCF checking incoming requests from untrusted networks • Present only trusted Calling Line Identifiers • Out of Band Methods closed to user group

  9. 3GPP Progress The solution ‘CS domain protected by an IMS network’ shows some restrictions ： the call is originated in an untrusted network while the caller ID of the incoming session belongs to a trusted network. • IBCF checking incoming requests from untrusted networks

  10. 3GPP Progress This solution proposes to present Calling Line Identifiers to the terminating user only if they can be regarded as ‘trusted’. A federation (originating, transit and terminating network(s)) of trust is formed by bilateral or multilateral agreements . • Present only trusted Calling Line Identifiers

  11. 3GPP Progress This solution is appropriate for an individual service provider，and not appropriate as a general purpose protection mechanisms for spoofed calls in general. This is mainly because they require a third party that is trusted by both caller A and caller B, which seems infeasible to set up for any given parties A and B. • Out of Band Methods closed to user group • Verifying Through “Middle” 3rd Party • Using Time-based One Time Password (TOTP) to Verify Caller • Verifying Caller through Shared Confidential Data

  12. Conclusions and recommendations • 3GPP SA3: • This technical report analyses solutions for the spoofed caller ID problem. It seems practically infeasible to provide a solution that requires modifications to the signaling system 7. • SA3 has finalized the present TR. If a more effective solution requiring standardisation is found, a new WID can be created.

  13. Conclusions and recommendations • From CMCC perspective: • The solutions in the present TR have not fully meet China Mobile’s requirements, and more requirements are needed to be implemented into specifications. • We recommend ITU to joint with other SDOs such as 3GPP to continue cooperation on Caller ID spoofing, which can reach a further common understanding.

  14. Thanks！

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