Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures

1. Options for Protection: Protecting National Electric Grids and Critical Infrastructures Bronius Cikotas John Kappenman

2. An Overview of Space Weather & EMP Risks and the US Electric Power Infrastructure Comparing Space Weather Threat to Other Power System Threats Conventional Terrestrial Threats Geomagnetic Storm Threats High Winds & Ice Loading – Design Code Storm Development Electromagnetic Processes nearly Instantaneous Lightning – Shield Wires & Lightning Arresters Geographic Extent Planetary Scale - Impact at each station – with Large Cumulative Impact Seismic – Design Code Terrestrial Weather – Air mass related that can take many days to evolve - Hurricanes Industry Design Approach Design Evolutions have unknowingly Escalated GIC Risks and Potential Impacts Un-Recognized Systemic Risk – No Design Code Yet to minimize this Threat Severe Threats are geographically confined Continuously monitor and base operational decisions on Terrestrial weather conditions

3. Common Solution Approaches - Overview • Hardening the Power Grid for Naturally Occurring Geomagnetic Storms also Hardens against slow pulse or E3 portion of EMP • Hardening the Power Grid for Fast Pulse or E1 portion of EMP Threat also diminishes Threat from RF Weapon Attacks (IEMI) • Proximity Control – important for Physical Attacks also diminishes Threat from IEMI • Layered Mitigation Approach for both Geomagnetic Storms and EMP • Improved Situational Awareness for Power Grid Operators is needed and is readily available (Emphasis on disturbance environments/GIC levels instead of ambiguous K Indices) • Hardening - Major Emphasis should be focused on Preventing Storm-Related Catastrophic Failure - Remedial Design measures for the Grid (transformer neutral devices) are readily feasible and cost effective

4. Common Solution Approaches - Overview • Given Sufficient Time the Reoccurrence of Large Storm Event is a Certainty – with Significant Consequences for Society • Power Grid has not been designed for Terror or War Fighting Mission, but it does provide an attractive and asymmetric target. • Proliferation of Nuclear Materials & Designs is a reality • Non-Nuclear Device Options are readily available & growing in unchecked capability • Methods for Hardening Infrastructures are known and readily available – not a Technology Push • International Standards & Guidelines exist for Hardening against EMP and IEMI Threats

5. Common Solution Approaches – GIC Blocking • Blocking Devices will Protect Transformers and Grid from Damage • Devices were originally developed in early 1990’s • At Present Only Limited Numbers of Devices are installed • Wide-Spread Installation Needed to Reduce GIC Flows • Appropriate & Robust Design will work to Block GIC from Storms and EMP • Can be easily applied Remedially to Today’s Power Grids GIC Blocking Capacitor Hi-Speed ByPass Electron Tube is Critical High Speed / High Current Technology

6. Improved Situational Awareness View of Storm Environment - May 4, 1998 Provides Details on Impacted Region to End-Users Synoptic Condition Map provides Ability for End-Users to Quickly make Situational Assessments

7. Improved Situational Awareness Storm and GIC Flows in New England Transformer GIC Red & Green Indicate Polarity of GIC – Red Into Transformer, Green Out of Transformer Geo-Electric Field Orientation and Size of Vector Indicate Relative Direction and Intensity of Field Power Grid State Estimation at 4:16 UT May 4, 1998

8. Improved Situational Awareness Other Critical Infrastructures • Improved Situational Awareness – End Users of Electric Power with Critical Functions • Examples are various IT, Telecommunications, SCADA centers • Critical Systems which have UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) and Back-Up Generation Capability • “Island or Disconnect from the Grid” for extra protection • UPS’s general vulnerabilities to Harmonic Distortion due to Geomagnetic Storms (from Defense Dept work)

9. Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening • Shielding Structures • Filtering • Zoning or Nesting of Multiple Barriers

10. Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening Concept of Layered Mitigation

11. Common Solution Approaches – E1-EMP & IEMI Hardening • Cable Management • Power cables • Data communications (e.g. IT networks) • Auxiliary circuits (e.g. door openers, fire alarm) • Sensitive circuits Widespread migration to Fiber Optic-based Data and Signal Cabling is an important improvement in Robust Hardening for E1 & IEMI Threats

12. Example of Bulkhead Device for EMP Protection for Power Supply to Secure Facility 4138 Bi-tron™Series Configuration 13.8kV Power Out 13.8kV Power In Flange Provides secure grounding of power feed penetrations at Facility Wall Perimeter

13. Time Scale of EMP Protection MOV – much slower New Advanced Fusion Systems technology significantly improves Protection margin compared to MOV