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TRADING IN STRATEGIC RESOURCES : NECESSARY CONDITIONS , TRANSACTION COST PROBLEMS, AND CHOICE OF EXCHANGE STRUCTURE TAIL

TRADING IN STRATEGIC RESOURCES : NECESSARY CONDITIONS , TRANSACTION COST PROBLEMS, AND CHOICE OF EXCHANGE STRUCTURE TAILAN CHI School of Business Administration, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U.S.A Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15, 271-290 (1994) .

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TRADING IN STRATEGIC RESOURCES : NECESSARY CONDITIONS , TRANSACTION COST PROBLEMS, AND CHOICE OF EXCHANGE STRUCTURE TAIL

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  1. TRADING IN STRATEGIC RESOURCES: NECESSARY CONDITIONS, TRANSACTION COST PROBLEMS, AND CHOICE OF EXCHANGE STRUCTURE TAILAN CHI School of Business Administration, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, U.S.A Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15, 271-290 (1994) Professor and Carl A. Scupin Faculty Fellow University of Kansas By Sergio Grove

  2. Outline • CONDITIONS FOR STRATEGIC RESOURCES TRADING • Imitability, mobility and tradability. • The two conditions. • TRANSACTION COSTS PROBLEMS/BARRIERS • Causal ambiguity and problem of adverse selection. • Tacitness,problem of moral hazard, cheating and holdup. • Ex-ante and Ex-post interpretation. • STRUCTURAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSACTION COST PROBLEMS • Residual claimancy/Residual Control • IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHOICE OF TRANSACTION MODES • Acquisition, Collaborative Venturing. • CONCLUSION AND EXTENSION

  3. CONDITIONS FOR STRATEGIC RESOURCES TRADING • Imitability • Imperfect imitability can be conceptually ascribed to causal ambiguity-uncertainty about the causal connections between managerial actions and economic results (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982). It means the firm that owns the resource has better knowledge of the causal connections to success than potential imitators. Value Chain (Porter 1980). • Mobility • Imperfect mobility can be conceptually ascribed to specificity-the condition that a resource is specialized to firm-specific needs so that it has less economic value to other firms than to its present employer (Peteraf, 1993). • Tradability • Potential to temporary use it in conjunction with resources that are not put under the-control of the firm can yield a higher return than its present best use within the firm (Chi 1994, p.274). Source: Tacitness, Complexity, and Specificity.

  4. CONDITIONS FOR STRATEGIC RESOURCES TRADING • Condition 1: Two firms that possess complementarity (strategic) resources will have an incentive to trade these resources when neither of them expects to be able to exploit the complementarity more profitably by trying to replicate the resources of the other on its own or acquire imperfect substitutes on the open market. • Condition 2: Strategic resources of one firm and the normal resources of other. Condition I (strategic to normal) + Normal to strategic. • Open market acquisition. • Imperfectly Imitability to Tradability.

  5. TRANSACTION COST PROBLEMS • Causal ambiguity and problem of adverse selection. • Information asymmetry between firms about the content and quality of the resource (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). • Tacitness, moral hazard, cheating and holdup. • Tacitness(Routines, tacit and practical knowledge). • Moral Hazard (e.g., shirking, and the appropriation of quasi-rents). • Cheating / Holdup (e.g., fake numbers, manipulate production, and opportunistic renegotiation of contract).

  6. STRUCTURAL REMEDIES FOR TRANSACTION COST PROBLEMS • Adverse Selection(information) and Moral Hazard (action) result from measurement problems (How to measure information and output). Remedy by linking an input contributor's pay-off with the outcome of the production process. Apportionment of residual claimancy. • Cheating and Holdup. Resource interdependency and cause coordination to fail. Integration and quasi-integration to achieve unified or balanced control over interdependent resources. Economic commitment in the shape of co-investment as an economic bond (i.e., collateral) as “deterrence building.” Assignment of residual control.

  7. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CHOICE OF TRANSACTION MODES • Acquisition • Cheating and Holdup problems are mitigated. • All firm acquisition reduces moral hazard (shirking). • Collaborative Venturing • Adverse selection and moral hazardproblems are increased. • Cheating andholdup problems can also increase.

  8. CONCLUSIONS • Trading is needed to conduct a full analysis of the exchanges involving imperfectly imitable and imperfectly mobile firm resources. The definition should include not only acquisition of a firm or part of it that possesses the resources in question, but also trade in their service or knowledge base. • Identifies four primary transaction cost problems in the trading of strategic resources: adverse selection, moral hazard, cheating, and holdup. • Adverse selection and moral hazard result from difficulties in measuring the capabilities and efforts of an exchange partner. Apportionment of residual claimancy. • Cheating and holdup result from resource interdependency created through the exchange. Assignment of residual control.

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