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Rationales the big picture

Giochi cooperativi per incentivare la collaborazione tra operatori Internet per l’offerta di nuovi servizi a valore aggiunto.

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Rationales the big picture

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  1. Giochi cooperativi per incentivare la collaborazione tra operatori Internet per l’offerta di nuovi servizi a valore aggiunto Stefano Secciain collaborazione con J.-L. Rougiera, A. Pattavinab, M. Mycekc , M. Pioroc , A. Tomaszewskic a Telecom ParisTech, France; b Politecnico di Milano, Italy; c Warsaw University of Technology, Poland Corso di Teoria dei Giochi, ApplicazioniCollegio Borromeo, Università di Pavia, 29-30 Marzo 2010, Pavia

  2. Rationalesthe big picture

  3. COORDINATED Peering ROUTING (recall)

  4. Current inter-domain routingcurrent practice across top-tier interconnections • Current BGP routing in the Internet core • Routing decisions based on unilateral costs • Lack of routing coordination, especially on peering links • Routing on peering links is increasingly unstable • High risk of congestions  route deviations • OBJECTIVE: control the coupling between IGP and BGP routing ISP international ISP international Change of colour = change of top-50 carrier border (10 min sampling) ISP national ISP national ISP national ISP national ISP regional ISP regional ISP regional ISP regional ISP regional ISP regional

  5. Coordinated inter-provider BGP routing a game-theoretic approach ClubMED: Coordinated Multi-Exit Discriminator game selfish game + dummy game + congestion game Is a potential game: Nash equilibrium minimum of the potential function IGP cost variations  potential min. threshold enlargement of the Nash set Coordination policies to select efficient multipath equilibrium sets Tp page 4

  6. Toward an extended peering framework • Each peer sees the extended peering frontier as a unique frontier such as for the classical peering • Routing decision: where to route the egress aggregate flow from its community toward the other communities of the other peers • The receiving peer deaggregates the flow: one toward its destination, one transiting toward another peer folllowing BGP • Gd is now characterized by ingress costs and transit costs page 5

  7. An extended peering game example page 6

  8. COOPERATIVE CONNECTION-ORIENTED ROUTING

  9. Cooperative provider alliancesarchitecture and protocol extensions • Inter-provider MPLS/G-MPLS provisioning • Definition of the functional architecture • An end-to-end network service as result of service elements composition

  10. Cooperative provider alliances AS-level routing Proposition of an AS-level source routing algorithm Requirements: 1. Policy routing 2. Directional metrics 3. Pre-computation 4. Multipoint routing 5. Route diversity page 9

  11. COOPERATION INCENTIVES FOR INTEGRATED RESOURCE RESERVATION

  12. How to incent provider cooperation? a Shapley value perspective • Modeling of cross-provider resource optimization • Application of cooperative game theory to motivate it • Shapley value: strategic weight of the importance of each player in each possible (sub)coalition • As income distribution incentive for cross-provider added-value services • Accounting for how much each provider has reserved resources for other providers’ services • The Shapley value can be used to assign the payoff (income) of a player (provider) as function of its marginal contribution to the coalition. It is calculated as follows: • consider all the possible permutations of the providers • for each per mutation and each provider, calculate the marginal contribution that the provider grants if it joins the coalition formed by the predecessor providers • for each provider, calculate the average of its marginal contributions on all the permutations.

  13. Static reservation in Provider Alliances a Shapley value computation example Shapley value computation Starting with per-destination link reservation levels How much each provider in each ordered subcoalition can guarantee? What is itsmarginal contribution in terms of bw reservation? The weighted average is the SV p1 = 0.5, p2 = 0.25, p3 = 0.25 page 12

  14. Static reservation in Provider Alliances a Shapley value perspective • Modeling of cross-provider resource optimization • Abstract representation of reservation levels • From router link level toward AS-level

  15. Static reservation in Provider Alliances a Shapley value perspective • Modeling of cross-provider resource optimization • Application of cooperative game theory to motivate it • Shapley value: strategic weight of the importance of each player in each possible (sub)coalition • As income distribution incentive for cross-provider added-value services • Accounting for how much each provider has reserved resources for other providers’ services Per inter-AS link and per-flow bandwidth reservation levels i = injected t = terminated tr = transit

  16. Static reservation in Provider Alliances Shapley value properties • Shapley value properties contextualized • Symmetry • If a provider reserve as much bandwidth as another provider for a flow, both should get the same amount • Efficiency • All the revenues related to a service are shared among the providers that reserved the resources for that service • Null player • If a provider reserve no bandwidth for a tunnel service, it will get zero • Anonymity • The name of the provider does not affect the value imputation • Additivity • The combination of more games (more tunnels) result in the sum of the single Shapley values

  17. Static reservation in Provider Alliances a Shapley value-based revenue distribution Fair multi-provider schemes for cost/revenue sharing Extension for all per-destination flows page 16

  18. Related publications • S. Secci, J.-L. Rougier, A. Pattavina, M. Mycek, M. Pioro, A. Tomaszewski, " Connection-oriented Service Management in Provider Alliances: a Shapley Value Perspective", submitted to Euro-NF 5th Int. Workshop on Traffic Management and Traffic Engineering for the Future Internet, 7-8 Dec. 2009, Paris, France. • M. Mycek, S. Secci, M. Pioro, J.-L. Rougier, A. Tomaszewski, A. Pattavina, "Cooperative Multi-Provider Routing Optimization and Income Distribution", in Proc. of 2009 7th Int. Workshop on the Design of Reliable Communication Networks (DRCN 2009), 25-28 Oct. 2009, Washington, USA. Interesting overview of Shapley value applications • S. Moretti, F. Patrone, Transversality of the Shapley value, Top, 16, no. 1, 1-41, July 2008. Technology framework paper • R. Douville, J.-L. Le Roux, J.-L. Rougier, S. Secci, "A Service Plane over the PCE Architecture for Automatic Multi-Domain Connection-Oriented Services", IEEE Communications Magazine, Vol. 46, No. 6, June 2008. PhD dissertation • Stefano Secci, Multi-provider Service and Transport Architectures, Politecnico di Milano and Télécom ParisTech - ENST, Dec. 2009

  19. This is the end…QUESTIONS?

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