EE515/IS523 Think Like an Adversary Lecture 3 Cryptography in a Nutshell

1. EE515/IS523 Think Like an AdversaryLecture 3Cryptography in a Nutshell Yongdae Kim

2. Recap • http://syssec.kaist.ac.kr/courses/ee515 • E-mail policy • Include [ee515] or [is523] in the subject of your e-mail • Student Survey • http://bit.ly/SiK9M3 • News posting • KLMS http://edu3.kaist.ac.kr/course/view.php?id=14461 • Match making, criticism • KLMS • Text only posting, email!

3. In a Nutshell • Security by Obscurity is not secure! • Conservative modeling for adversary • State-sponsored, Hacktivists, Hacker+Criminals, Researchers ;-) • Care for the weakest link. • Plan for unknown attacks. • Check for environmental changes • All stages are important • Attacker modeling, design, implementation, deployment, operation • Check News! • Cyber Warfare?

4. Security & Risk • We only have finite resources for security… • If we only have $20K, which should we buy? Product A Prevents Attacks: U,W,Y,Z Cost $10K Product B Prevents Attacks: V,X Cost $20K

5. Risk • The risk due to a set of attacks is the expected (or average) cost per unit of time. • One measure of risk is Annualized Loss Expectancy, or ALE: ALE of attack A Σ ( pA × LA ) attack A Annualized attack incidence Cost per attack

6. Risk Reduction • A defense mechanism may reduce the risk of a set of attacks by reducing LA or pA. This is the gross risk reduction (GRR): • The mechanism also has a cost. The net risk reduction (NRR) is GRR – cost. Σ (pA × LA – p’A×L’A) attack A

7. Basic Cryptography Yongdae Kim

8. Eve Yves? The main players Bob Alice

9. Attacks Normal Flow Destination Source Interruption: Availability Interception: Confidentiality Destination Destination Source Source Modification: Integrity Fabrication: Authenticity Destination Destination Source Source

10. Taxonomy of Attacks • Passive attacks • Eavesdropping • Traffic analysis • Active attacks • Masquerade • Replay • Modification of message content • Denial of service

11. Big picture Trusted third party (e.g. arbiter, distributor of secret information) Bob Alice Information Channel Message Message Secret Information Secret Information Eve

12. Terminology for Encryption • A denotes a finite set called the alphabet • M denotes a set called the message space • M consists of strings of symbols from an alphabet • An element of M is called a plaintext • C denotes a set called the ciphertext space • C consists of strings of symbols from an alphabet • An element of C is called a ciphertext • K denotes a set called the key space • An element of K is called a key • Ee is an encryption function where e  K • Dd called a decryption function where d  K

13. Encryption • Why do we use key? • Or why not use just a shared encryption function? Adversary Encryption Ee(m) = c Decryption Dd(c) = m c insecure channel m m Plaintext source destination Alice Bob

14. SKE with Secure channel Adversary d Secure channel Key source e Encryption Ee(m) = c Decryption Dd(c) = m c Insecure channel m m Plaintext source destination Alice Bob

15. PKE with insecure channel Passive Adversary e Insecure channel Key source d Encryption Ee(m) = c Decryption Dd(c) = m c Insecure channel m m Plaintext source destination Alice Bob

16. e e’ Ee’(m) Public key should be authentic! • Need to authenticate public keys Ee(m) e Ee(m)

17. Digital Signatures • Primitive in authentication and non-repudiation • Signature • Process of transforming the message and some secret information into a tag • Nomenclature • M is set of messages • S is set of signatures • SA: M ! S for A, kept private • VA is verification transformation from M to S for A, publicly known

18. Key Establishment, Management • Key establishment • Process to whereby a shared secret key becomes available to two or more parties • Subdivided into key agreement and key transport. • Key management • The set of processes and mechanisms which support key establishment • The maintenance of ongoing keying relationships between parties

19. Symmetric vs. Public key

20. Symmetric key Encryption • Symmetric key encryption • if for each (e,d) it is easy computationally easy to compute e knowing d and d knowing e • Usually e = d • Block cipher • breaks up the plaintext messages to be transmitted into blocks of a fixed length, and encrypts one block at a time • Stream cipher • encrypt individual characters of plaintext message one at a time, using encryption transformation which varies with time

21. Hash function and MAC • A hash function is a function h • compression • ease of computation • Properties • one-way: for a given y, find x’ such that h(x’) = y • collision resistance: find x and x’ such that h(x) = h(x’) • Examples: SHA-1, MD-5 • MAC (message authentication codes) • both authentication and integrity • MAC is a family of functions hk • ease of computation (if k is known !!) • compression, x is of arbitrary length, hk(x) has fixed length • computation resistance • Example: HMAC

22. How Random is the Hash function?

23. Applications of Hash Function • File integrity • Digital signature Sign = SSK(h(m)) • Password verification stored hash = h(password) • File identifier • Hash table • Generating random numbers

24. Hash function and MAC • A hash function is a function h • compression • ease of computation • Properties • one-way: for a given y, find x’ such that h(x’) = y • collision resistance: find x and x’ such that h(x) = h(x’) • Examples: SHA-1, MD-5 • MAC (message authentication codes) • both authentication and integrity • MAC is a family of functions hk • ease of computation (if k is known !!) • compression, x is of arbitrary length, hk(x) has fixed length • computation resistance • Example: HMAC

25. MAC construction from Hash • Prefix • M=h(k||x) • appending y and deducing h(k||x||y) form h(k||x) without knowing k • Suffix • M=h(x||k) • possible a birthday attack, an adversary that can choose x can construct x’ for which h(x)=h(x’) in O(2n/2) • STATE OF THE ART: HMAC (RFC 2104) • HMAC(x)=h(k||p1||h(k|| p2||x)), p1 and p2 are padding • The outer hash operates on an input of two blocks • Provably secure

26. How to use MAC? • A & B share a secret key k • A sends the message x and the MAC M←Hk(x) • B receives x and M from A • B computes Hk(x) with received M • B checks if M=Hk(x)

27. PKE with insecure channel Passive Adversary e Insecure channel Key source d Encryption Ee(m) = c Decryption Dd(c) = m c Insecure channel m m Plaintext source destination Alice Bob

28. Digital Signature • Integrity • Authentication • Non-repudiation I did not have intimate relations with that woman,…, Ms. Lewinsky WJ Clinton

29. Digital Signature with Appendix • Schemes with appendix • Requires the message as input to verification algorithm • Rely on cryptographic hash functions rather than customized redundancy functions • DSA, ElGamal, Schnorr etc.

30. Mh x S VA u 2{True, False} Digital Signature with Appendix M Mh S SA,k h m mh s* s* = SA,k(mh) u = VA(mh, s*)

31. Authentication • How to prove your identity? • Prove that you know a secret information • When key K is shared between A and Server • A  S: HMACK(M) where M can provide freshness • Why freshness? • Digital signature? • A  S: SigSK(M) where M can provide freshness • Comparison?

32. Encryption and Authentication • EK(M) • Redundancy-then-Encrypt: EK(M, R(M)) • Hash-then-Encrypt: EK(M, h(M)) • Hash and Encrypt: EK(M), h(M) • MAC and Encrypt: Eh1(K)(M), HMACh2(K)(M) • MAC-then-Encrypt: Eh1(K)(M, HMACh2(K)(M))

33. Challenge-response authentication • Alice is identified by a secret she possesses • Bob needs to know that Alice does indeed possess this secret • Alice provides responseto a time-variant challenge • Response depends on both secret and challenge • Using • Symmetric encryption • One way functions

34. Challenge Response using SKE • Alice and Bob share a key K • Taxonomy • Unidirectional authentication using timestamps • Unidirectional authentication using random numbers • Mutual authentication using random numbers • Unilateral authentication using timestamps • Alice  Bob: EK(tA, B) • Bob decrypts and verified that timestamp is OK • Parameter Bprevents replay of same message in B  A direction

35. Challenge Response using SKE • Unilateral authentication using random numbers • Bob  Alice: rb • Alice  Bob: EK(rb, B) • Bob checks to see if rb is the one it sent out • Also checks “B” - prevents reflection attack • rb must be non-repeating • Mutual authentication using random numbers • Bob  Alice: rb • Alice  Bob: EK(ra, rb, B) • Bob  Alice: EK(ra, rb) • Alice checks that ra, rb are the ones used earlier

36. Challenge-response using OWF • Instead of encryption, used keyed MAC hK • Check: compute MAC from known quantities, and check with message • SKID3 • Bob  Alice: rb • Alice  Bob: ra, hK(ra, rb, B) • Bob  Alice: hK(ra, rb, A)

37. Key Establishment, Management • Key establishment • Process to whereby a shared secret key becomes available to two or more parties • Subdivided into key agreement and key transport. • Key management • The set of processes and mechanisms which support key establishment • The maintenance of ongoing keying relationships between parties