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Prepared by: Enrique, Lihong, John, Jongkuk

Contractual Commitments, Bargaining Power, and Governance Inseparability: Incorporating History into Transaction Cost Theory ( Argyres and Liebeskind 1999 ). Prepared by: Enrique, Lihong, John, Jongkuk. Motivation.

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Prepared by: Enrique, Lihong, John, Jongkuk

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  1. Contractual Commitments, Bargaining Power, and Governance Inseparability: Incorporating History into Transaction Cost Theory(Argyres and Liebeskind 1999) Prepared by: Enrique, Lihong, John, Jongkuk

  2. Motivation • To argue that focusing on the characteristics of isolated transactions can be insufficient to explain the scope of the firm • In the TCE, an individual transaction is the unit of analysis for predicting organizational form • Governance inseparability can constrain a firm’s governance options • To extend TCE theory by incorporating two factors that serve to produce governance inseparability • Contractual commitments • Changes in bargaining power

  3. Definitions • What is governance inseparability? • A condition in which a firm’s past governance choices significantly influence the range and types of governance mechanisms that it can adopt in future periods • It implies that most firms will become constrained over time by their existing arrangements in place, which will limit both their scope and their strategic flexibility

  4. Definitions • Governance inseparability can constrain a firms governance options in two ways: • Constraints on governance switching • It may constrain a firm from switching from one governance mode to another for the same type of transaction • Constraints on governance differentiation • It may obligate a firm to use an existing governance arrangement for a new transaction

  5. Main Argument (1) • What causes governance inseparability? • Contractual commitments and constraints on governance switching • E.g., franchising agreements and exclusive dealerships pose significant barriers to further agreements, and also limit moves toward forward integration by the franchisor • Contractual commitments and constraints on governance differentiation • E.g., a firm’s prior commitments to its other existing divisions play an important role in preventing the firm from sustaining the specialized governance arrangements needed to develop new ventures

  6. Main Argument (1) • Are contractual commitments avoidable? • A firm cannot exist efficiently without commitments • Contractual commitments are necessary for a firm to earn rents, which come from ownership of unique capabilities • Then, why a firm cannot take steps to create safeguards against inseparability? • The effects of bounded rationality on contracting • E.g., in industries that feature rapid technological innovation, anticipating future hazards and opportunities is often very difficult

  7. Main Argument (2) • What causes governance inseparability? • Changes in bargaining power and constraints on governance switching • E.g., Unionized labor uses its bargaining power to restrict outsourcing • E.g., Increased franchisee bargaining power allows franchisees to impose new constraints on future contracts a franchisor might wish to offer • Changes in bargaining power and constraints on governance differentiation • E.g., In the 1980’s, union bargaining power prevented U.S. long-distance trucking firms from differentiating their organizational arrangements to suit the short-haul trucking market.

  8. Main Arguments (2) • Why firms cannot anticipate and safeguard against changes in bargaining power? • Changes in bargaining power are often difficult to foresee • There is a large number of interrelated factors that affect the relative power of contracting parties • These changes may occur very gradually over long periods of time so that their future importance is difficult to perceive • Contract disputes can result in sudden changes in relative bargaining power • Even if these changes could be foreseen, the range of feasible governance mechanisms is restricted in transactions involving employees and consumers • Human assets cannot be owned in the same way that physical assets can be owned (incomplete internalization)

  9. Implications • Use of alternative governance mechanisms • Different firms may govern identical transactions in different ways, as long as each firm is also a party to other types of transactions • Compared with younger firms, older firms tend to be more encumbered with past commitments, constraining their ability to switch or differentiate their internal governance mechanisms • The degree to which a firm can switch or differentiate its governance mechanisms will also depend on the legal jurisdiction in which it operates

  10. Implications • Limits to firm scope • The greater the difference is between a transaction’s optimal governance mechanism and a firm’s governance arrangements in place, the greater the cost will be to the firm of internalizing that transaction • Greater uncertainty will reduce the vertical and horizontal scope of the firm • Competition and industry evolution • Because commitments may foreclose future opportunities to adjust to more efficient governance modes, the governance choices that firms make at the early stage may well determine their long-run competitive success • Organizations will be inert according to the degree that the contractual commitments constrain their subsequent governance options

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