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Improving policies by improving governance. Rachel Glennerster Executive Director, J-PAL Department of Economics, MIT PSI June 6, 2013. Overview. The problem Citizens as direct monitors Citizens as voters All impact results based on randomized evaluations. The problem.
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Improving policies by improving governance Rachel Glennerster Executive Director, J-PAL Department of Economics, MIT PSI June 6, 2013
Overview • The problem • Citizens as direct monitors • Citizens as voters • All impact results based on randomized evaluations
The problem • Substantial increase in democracy but often very imperfect • Very low levels of voter knowledge • Persistence of corruption, vote buying • Little debate about policies • Increase in policies that benefit the majority • E.g free primary education • Still very poor services
High levels of provider absenteeism Absence Rates India Indonesia Uganda Bangladesh Uganda India Peru Indonesia Ecuador Bangladesh Peru 4
Direct monitoring by citizens • Encouraging local monitoring has mixed results • in Uganda for health, reduced absenteeism and infant mortality (Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) • In Indian for education, no impact on effort or service (Banerjee et al, 2010) • Existing beneficiary control systems were nonfunctional at project start • Top down audits more effective than increased community monitoring to reduce corruption in Indonesian road projects (Olken, 2007)
Improving representative democracy • Encouraging evidence that voting behavior is malleable to campaigns • Reduced ethnic voting 9% (Banerjee et al, 2010) • Increased female voting 12% (Gine and Mansuri, 2010) • Reduced violence by 11% (Collier and Vicente, 2008) • Mainly tested very specific information/messages • Can this be applied to a spectrum of aspects of quality? • Can it generate • increase competition on economic/quality issues? • Improvements in policies and services?
Info on corruption: Brazil • Federal audits of municipal governments • Randomized order of audits • Some results released prior to election, some afterwards • Allowed test of: • whether voters punish corruption, • how much do they punish corruption • and in what circumstances
Voting in urban India • Scorecards on municipal candidates disseminated in random slums • Legislative activity and committee attendance • Discretionary expenditure • Incumbent and challenger qualifications • High performing incumbents benefit from transparency, low performing are hurt • Respond to information that effects them • Spending on their slum Banerjee et al, 2011.
MPs in Uganda • Scorecards created for all MPs by AFLI • Attendance, participation, initiative in parliament and committees, peer reviews • Activity and accessibility in constituency • Randomly announced in advance where there would be intense dissemination of the scorecards • Change in short run self reported voting intentions • No change in actual voting • No change in politician behavior Humphreys and Weinstein, ongoing.
MP Debates in Sierra Leone Bidwell, Casey, and Glennerster, ongoing
Pre and post debate knowledge and stated preferences • 5% change stated party preference • 13% change to undecided
Outstanding questions • Can community monitoring/empowerment be made to work consistently and cost-effectively? • What are the key design elements to make it effective? • Is community monitoring only effective in certain environments? • Can providing information up the chain of command improve governance? • Can informed voters lead to better quality services? • Can we bring together the community monitoring and informed voter work? • For example, provide information on health worker absenteeism at district level in different districts prior to elections