Military Cooperation in the Gulf: Action Rather than Words and Intentions

1. 1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 Fax: 1.202.775.3199 Web: www.csis.org/burke/reports Military Cooperation in the Gulf: Action Rather than Words and Intentions Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy October, 2008

2. The Evolving Range of Threats 2

3. Conventional Military Power

4. Comparative Iran vs GCC Spending: 1997-2007 $413.7 Vs. $55B: GCC Spent 7.5 times as much 4 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008

5. Comparative New Arms Orders: 1988-2007 5 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008

6. Land Force Threats 6

7. Comparative Military Manpower in 2008 7 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008

8. Comparative Total Armor Strength By Category 8 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008

9. Comparative Total Gulf Tank Strength versus High Quality Tanks 9 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008

11. Air/Missile Threats 11

12. Comparative Gulf Total & High Quality Combat Air Strength 40-60% of Iran’s Total holdings are not Operational 12 Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008

13. Naval Threats 13

14. Comparative Major Naval Combat Ships Derived from IISS, Military Balance, 2008 14

15. Ending the GCC Threat to the GCC 15

16. Asymmetric Warfare and “Wars of Intimidation” 16

17. Most Likely Foreign Threats Are Not Formal Conflicts • Direct and indirect threats of using force. (I.e. Iranian efforts at proliferation) • Use of irregular forces and asymmetric attacks. • Proxy conflicts using terrorist or extremist movements or exploiting internal sectarian, ethnic, tribal, dynastic, regional tensions. • Arms transfers, training in host country, use of covert elements like Quds force. • Harassment and attrition through low level attacks, clashes, incidents. • Limited, demonstrative attacks to increase risk, intimidation. • Strike at critical node or infrastructure.

18. Some Tangible Examples • Iranian tanker war with Iraq • Oil spills and floating mines in Gulf. • Libyan “stealth” mining of Red Sea. • Use of Quds force in Iraq. • “Incidents” in pilgrimage in Makkah. • Support of Shi’ite groups in Bahrain. • Missile and space tests (future nuclear test?). • Naval guards seizure of British boat, confrontation with US Navy, exercises in Gulf. • Development of limited “close the Gulf” capability. • Flow of illegals and smuggling across Yemeni border.

19. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps • 125,000+, drawing on 1,000,000 Basij. • Key is 20,000 Naval Guards, including 5,000 marines. • Armed with HY-3 CSS-C-3 Seersucker (6-12 launchers, 100 missiles, 95-100 km), and 10 Houdong missile patrol boats with C-802s (120 km), and 40+ Boghammers with ATGMs, recoilless rifles, machine guns. • Large-scale mine warfare capability using small craft and commercial boats. • Based at Bandar e-Abbas, Khorramshar, Larak, Abu Musa, Al Farsiyah, Halul, Sirri. • • IRGC air branch reported to fly UAVs and UCAVs, and • control Iran’s strategic missile force. • 1 Shahab SRBM Bde (300-500-700 km) with 12-18 launchers,1 Shahab 3 IRBM Btn (1,200-1,280 km) with 6 launchers and4 missiles each.

20. “Closing the Gulf” • 3 Kilo (Type 877) and unknown number of midget (Qadr-SS- 3) submarines; smart torpedoes, (anti-ship missiles?) and smart mine capability. • Use of 5 minelayers, amphibious ships, small craft, commercial boats. • Attacks on tankers, shipping, offshore facilities by naval guards. • Raids with 8 P-3MP/P-3F Orion MPA and combat aircraft with anti-ship missiles:(C-801K (8-42 km), CSS-N-4, and others). • Free-floating mines, smart and dumb mines, oil spills. • Land-based, long-range anti-ship missiles based on land, islands (Seersucker HY-2, CSS-C-3), and ships (CSS-N-4, and others). Sunburn? • IRGC raids on key export facility(ties).

21. The Entire Gulf: Breaking the Bottle at Any Point 21 Source: EIA, Country Briefs, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, January 2008

22. Hormuz: Breaking the Bottle at the Neck • 280 km long, 50 km wide at narrowest point. • Traffic lane 9.6 km wide, including two 3.2 km wide traffic lanes, one inbound and one outbound, separated by a 3.2 km wide separation median • Antiship missiles now have ranges up to 150 km. • Smart mines, guided/smart torpedoes, • Floating mines, small boat raids, harassment. • Covert as well as overt sensors. Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg

23. Iranian Nuclear and Missile Programs

24. Nuclear Uncertainty 24

25. Technology Base 25

26. Lashkar A’bad Sites circled in red unknown pre-mid 2002 Ardekan Gachin

27. Bunkered underground production halls Vehicle Entrance Ramp (before burial) Admin/engineering office area DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image 20 SEP 02

28. Vehicle Entrance Ramp (after burial) Bunkered underground Centrifuge cascade halls Helicopter pads New security wall Dummy building concealing tunnel entrance ramp Admin/engineering office area 21 JUL 04 DigitalGlobe Quickbird commercial satellite image

29. Effective Concealment 29

30. 30 The Range of Delivery Options 30

31. Iranian Missile Developments 31

32. Growth in Iranian Missile Range 32

33. Enhancing Military Cooperation 33

34. The GCC Threat to the GCC

35. Solutions 35

36. Planning for Conventional Warfare • Integrate C4, battle management, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. • Integrate air and air defense systems. • Interoperable mine warfare, ASW, and counter anti-ship missile, conventional missile options. • Create own conventional deep strike air (and missile?) options. • Create collective defense options for land forces. • Develop interoperable capabilities to deal with threats to tankers, shipping, offshore facilities and coasts. • Emphasize joint warfare approaches that tie in paramilitary and security forces.. • Show can work effectively with US, UK, France. • Forward defense cooperation with Iraq, facilities in Saudi and Kuwait. 36

37. Keeping a Decisive US Qualitative Edge in US Forces and Arms Transfers to the Gulf ($10.5B in FY087 & FY09)

38. Planning for Asymmetric Warfare • • Deterrence and conflict prevention as critical as defense. • • Again, need integrated GCC force planning and war planning efforts. • Must show GCC will act together. Cannot divide or exploit weakest link. • . Exercise realistic “red-blue” war games to determine common options and requirements. • • Follow-up with realistic CPXs and FTXs. • • Emphasize joint warfare approaches that tie in paramilitary and security forces. • • Demonstrate have exercised a retaliatory capability. • • Show can work effectively with US, UK, France. • • Strike at critical node or infrastructure. 38

39. Planning for WMD Warfare • Collectively emphasize diplomacy and arms control options. • Coordinated and integrated missile and air defense, border security, and specialized counterterrorism assets. • • Seek US guarantees on extended deterrence. • Consider full impact of Israeli-Iranian level of deterrence. • Make it clear that GCC states will act in unity; collective defense and deterrence. 39

40. Options for Missile Defense 40

41. Planning for Counterterrorism (CT) • Interoperable quick reaction forces. • Interoperable (integrated) intelligence, data bases, human factors, immigration, law enforcement data. • • Integrated infrastructure and petroleum defense, repair, recovery. • Expand pipelines, LOCs to Indian Ocean and Red Sea. • Cooperation, training, exercises in using internal security and military forces in counterterrorism missions. Common approach to border and coastal security. • Integrated CT staff in GCC headquarters. • Integrated cooperation with UN and friendly state CT operations. 41

42. The Key to Credibility, Deterrence, and Effectiveness: Transparency 42