Towards Lasting Peace and Stability

1. Towards Lasting Peace and Stability Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan UN and GCTF Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegrtation of Violent Extremist Offenders Presented by Dr. D.M. Stone, MajGen USMC (Ret)

2. Detention: Viewed as a Problem Historic failures in custody and care serve as recruiting tools for foreign fighters. Detention had also served as a place for insurgents to conduct recruiting, training, and disciplining of future combatants.

3. Defining Strategic Success • VICTORY • Establish an alliance with moderate Iraqis • Empower them to effectively marginalize violent extremists • Provide momentum to the process of reconciliation with Iraqi society

4. The Plan • Phase I: Apply COIN principles to TIF, separate extremists from population, and protect populations both inside and outside the TIF • Phase II: Defeat the insurgency within the TIF, succeed in the battlefield of the mind, and identify ideas which are contagious • Phase III: Engaging populations with detainees, families, and releasees and establish a “social epidemic” which advances the objective of empowering the moderate ummah to marginalize the violent extremists within Iraq

5. TF-134 Goals • Ensure standards of care and custody • Determine if detainee is Imperative Security Risk • if so, reduce the risk, replace the destructive ideology • when no longer a threat, release • Identify detainees who are Enduring Security Risks • Collect information from detainees and provide intelligence • Defeat any insurgency within the TIF

6. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Previous Detention Process (before July 2007) Capture MAG CELL & CRRB Release GO Review Detention UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

7. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Current Engagement Process AFTER Capture Assessment & Transition In Interrogation MNFRC & C2X/Corps Vetting MAG CELL & CCCI Education Civics & Islamic Discussions MNFRC Rehearing C2X/Corps Vetting Family Advocacy VOTECH & Work Programs Post-Release Release Govt of Iraq Reintegration & Reconciliation Pledge & Guarantor UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

8. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO The Powder Keg Exploding, Jihadist University BEFORE 2004-2007 Poor Intelligence Inability to Segregate Extremists No Services Inadequate Command and Control In 2007 there were a total of SIX detainee murders and up to 25 severe mutilations. In 2008 there have been zero detainee murders and zero mutilations. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

9. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Empowering moderates through: AFTER Intelligence Reconciliation Services Segregating Violent Extremists Proper Command and Control UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

10. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO TF Bucca Force Reduction Impacts BEFORE AFTER Surge DEPARTURE OF 16TH MP BDE ARRIVAL OF 16TH MP BDE * TIFRC SERVICES BEGIN * TIFRC Services did not start until Sep 07 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

11. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO BEFORE AFTER TIF Weekly Re-internments 2004-2008 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 MNFRC Start Pledge Start Reintegration Services Start 26 Week Moving Avg. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

12. ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE INSURGENT AND TERRORIST TTPs JIDC CELL ORGANIZATION IDENTIFY INSURGENT LEADERS MEETING PLACES SAFE HOUSES 4XEFP IIRs ABU NUR IED EFFORTS WITH JIEDDO, CEXC, AND NGIC WEAPON SMUGGLING ROUTES PENDING ATTACKS CACHE LOCATIONS INTEL SUPPORT TO SONS OF IRAQ INTEL SUPPORT TO MISCAP RECOVERED IDENTIFY SONS OF IRAQ INFILTRATORS UTILIZE LEGAL SYSTEM SOURCE OPNS DEVELOP TARGETS PV2 Byron Fouty 5XIIRs NINEWA OVER 1000 INTERROGATIONS IP CDR AQI PERCEPTION OF SOI IDENTIFY RECONCILIATION CANDIDATES ASSESS SONS OF IRAQ EFFECTIVENESS TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT

13. UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO TIF Release & Re-Internment AFTER Cumulative Re-Internment UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

14. Reconciliation Services COIN Operations Engagement Programs - Civics - Education - Votech - Jobs - Religious Discussion MNFRC Prime Minister President Western Executive Rule of Law Vice Presidents GoI Partnerships Pan-Arab MEDIA Legislature Care & Custody Iraqi Detainees Special Populations - Youth - Women - Mentally challenged - Foreign Fighters - Enduring Threats Ministries MOHR MOE MOJ Social/Cultural Outreach Sheiks/Leaders ICRC INGOs Tribes/Clans USG & MNF-I Amnesty International Families OSD UN CALL MNC-I USM-I

15. Strategic Releases Strategic Releases:Capitalize on external Arab IO capabilities using Foreign Fighter detainees willing to publicly speak against Jihad Sunday, 18 September 2005 “Bernie’s” Timeline (ISN 168058— al Shayie) Dec 2004 – Failed VBIED attack on Jordanian Embassy 31 July 05 – Turned over to Saudi Arabia Mar 2008 – Bernie meets the DCG-DO in Saudi Arabia

17. There is inadequate prison bed space in which to house current and projected inmate populations. UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO

18. Battlefield of the Mind Moderates Extremists GOI and Coalition

19. United Nations Best Practices • Defining Goals and Objectives • Prison Context • The Role of Different Actors • Reintegration Components • Looking to Other Relevant Fields

20. Defining Goals and Objectives • #1 In developing a rehabilitation program, it is important to first clearly define the program’s goals and objectives and identify indicators of success and failure. • #2. Good prison standards and practices can offer an appropriate starting point for building an effective, safe and smoothly operating rehabilitation program.

21. In Coalition and GIRoA detention/corrections, there is a lack of a validated inmate classification system to identify prisoners by category, risk and radicalization. UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO

22. #3. An importanat first step is developing an effective intake, assessment and classification system for new inmates. • #4. Where possible, States should consider establishing separate facilities for those inmates going through the rehabilitation programs. • #5. Ensure that all relevant staff are appropriately and professionally trained and educated to deal with the complexities of reintegration or rehabilitation efforts.

23. “Radicalization” Afghan Prisons U.S. Detention Afghan Criminals Radical Islamists UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO

24. The Role of Different Actors • #6. Some measure of control should be maintained over the inmates’ communication, both within and outside the prison. • #7. Rehabilitation Programs should incorporate a broad range of cross-disciplinary experts, with close coordination among the relevant departments and personnel involved. • #8. Psychologists can play a key role in the rehabilitation process and should be fully integrated into these programs.

25. Just One Cell Phone Call Away . . . Serena Hotel Attack Pol-i-Charki Wing 3 Take Down CPD Action Insurgent Retaliation The Next Attack Bombs CPD Headquarters Bombing Assassinations Kidnappings

26. #9. As the personnel in most frequent contact with the inmates, it is important that prison officers understand and are carefully attuned to the rehabilitation process, even if they are not directly responsible for its delivery. • #10. When appropriate, States should integrate religious scholars into the rehabilitation process. • #11. Law enforcement officers who are interviewing inmates during the rehabilitation process should receive specialized training and should coordinate these activities closely with the rehabilitation professionals.

27. #12. Victims and victim’s advocates can be powerful voices and States should consider including them in rehabilitation programs, where appropriate. • #13. Former violent extremists can be influential with those going through the rehabilitation process and should be included where possible and appropriate. • #14. Charismatic members of the community can also help inspire change and should be included in rehabilitation programs where possible and appropriate.

28. Reintegration Components • #15. Rehabilitation efforts should include behavioral and cognitive skills programs. • #16. Rehabilitation programs should include basic education courses where possible and appropriate. • #17. Rehabilitation programs should include vocational skills training and employment assistance where possible and appropriate.

29. #18. States should consider finding ways to recognize the achievement of inmates who have completed the rehabilitation program. • #19. States should consider whether inmates should be eligible for sentence reduction or other more lenient treatment based on the completion of rehabilitation courses. • #20. States should consider whether additional financial support can be provided to inmates and their families who have completed the rehabilitation courses.

30. #21. States should consider developing aftercare programs to enable the treatment to continue after the inmate has left the prison setting. • #22. Consideration for protective measures should be given when there is evidence that a reformed terrorist may face threats to his or her life, or the lives of family members, upon release from custody. • #23. Formal or informal, parole-like monitoring post release can be an effective method to prevent recidivism.

31. # 24. Families should be integrated where possible and appropriate into rehabilitation programs. • #25. Fostering a welcoming community environment for the inmate post-release is critical to long-term success.

32. Other Relevant Fields. #26. As States design rehabilitation programs, they should look, as appropriate, to other relevant fields beyond terrorism for lessons learned.

33. Success Dependencies UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO

34. UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Dahuk Bashur Dahuk Tigris R. Arbil Mosul Tall Afar Irbil 1 Sulaymaniyah 2 Ninawa Kirkuk IRAN Dayr az Zawr At Tamim As Sulaymaniyah FLB JOSHUA Hamadan FLB SYCAMORE OBJ CHARLIE Salah ad Din SYRIA BATTLEFIELD of the MIND Euphrates R. 5 Samarra 12 AlQaim Diyala LSA ANACONDA Baqubah Ar Ramadi Baghdad Ar Rutbah 1 Fallujah 10 Wasit Babil Al Hillah Karbala AlKut Dezful Al Anbar Karbala Al Kufa AlAmarah H3 H4 AnNajaf Ad Diwaniyah Al Qadisiyah 22 JORDAN Maysan AsSamawah Dhi Qar PL BRAVO Ahvaz 6 FLB CEDAR AnNasiriyah Tallil Al Basrah An Najaf 1 Ar’ar Az Zubayr 9 Al Basrah PL ALPHA Safwan Umm Qasr Al Muthanna’ Rafha KuwaitCity SAUDI ARABIA 4 KUWAIT UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY