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Exchange and Email Anti-Virus. Teresa Downey SLAC. Email Server/Client in 2000. Pilot program for 5 months – no show-stoppers Exchange server replaced UW IMAP Server Converted ~1300 users from Eudora, etc. to Outlook 2000, etc. – more than just Windows Users
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Exchange and Email Anti-Virus Teresa Downey SLAC
Email Server/Client in 2000 • Pilot program for 5 months – no show-stoppers • Exchange server replaced UW IMAP Server • Converted ~1300 users from Eudora, etc. to Outlook 2000, etc. – more than just Windows Users • Most took about 1 hour, many took longer • Address books were sometimes difficult • Team of ~12+3 completed project in 7 months • 3 “experts” for “team” to ask for assistance • 3 “experts” did conversions also to ensure we met goal
Conversions (cont.) • Classes offered in Outlook 2000 Mail & Calendar • Good on-line help is essential for trouble-shooting • Recovery from “30-day dumpster” is time-saver for all • Public Folders have been widely used by some departments • Users hated giving up Eudora • Meeting scheduling has been a big win • Integrated mail/contacts/calendar is key to success
Email Server/Client 2000 (cont.) • Benefits of Exchange Server • Removed clear-text passwords from network • Replaced MeetingMaker calendar • Added Web email accessibility • Retained IMAP/POP protocol support • Added integrated Anti-Virus solution • Unix mail spool retained for Unix users – NFS only
Email Anti-Virus in 2000 • MTA – PMDF on Solaris • Strip some executables going in/out of site • Only a few. Examples: *.exe, *.bat, *.com • Strip files with macros in/out of site – intra-site OK • Stripped files retrieved for users upon request • Scanned first • Placed in Unix or NT file system for user • SPAM blocked aggressively for several years • Users are very happy about this
Email A/V in 2000 (cont.) • Email Server • Running CA on Exchange Server • Design allowed a user to open document before scanning • Failed often at manual scan – hung constantly • Unacceptable solution • Windows Clients • Perhaps 75% Windows desktops running Inoculan • Not enough to be installed, must confirm it is running by checking the date of the signature file
Email Server/Client in 2001 • 500MB “soft” limit on mailboxes • Store grew to over 80Gig for 1500 users • Tape restore time grew to 12 hours – log replay 100/hr • Moved database off Dell SAN in Aug. • Moved to SUN StorEdge T3 • Tape restore time reduced to 3 hours – log replay 400/hr • 25% of users [A-E] moved to new server in Sep. • Allows full restore in less than 2 hours/server • Users [F-Z] move to 3 more servers by early Dec. • Leaves only IMS and Internet scanner on current server
Email Server/Client 2001 (cont.) • SLAC Exchange has memory leak in store • Debugging with Microsoft all year • Switched to Premier support in Spring • Premium support was totally incapable for this bug • Last week Microsoft determined it is IMAP/POP/SSL causing leak – during SSL authentication • Exchange server has ~1500 users • ~100 IMAP • Unix NFS mail spool has ~1000 users • Web Access gets ~150 users/day
Email Anti-Virus in 2001 • MTA – PMDF on Solaris • All MS Level 1 “unsafe” (Q262631) stripped • Add more as necessary. Recently added *.eml • Macro stripping unchanged • Email Server • Sybari Real-time and Internet scanner installed • All attachments scanned BEFORE placing in mailbox • Same list of executables stripped here as MTA • Bug in Manual scanner – working with Sybari • Windows Clients • Increased to 92% desktops running Inoculan
Summary • What we did wrong • Put database on immature Dell SAN infrastructure • Problems with Dell SAN started in October, 2000 • Didn’t define service goals for “disaster recovery”, leading to the next bullet… • Let database grow too big before deciding to break into four parts
Summary (cont.) • What we did right • “Disaster Recovery” document written before we needed it • Building “recovery server” at least quarterly • Switched to Sybari from CA for email scanning • Spread database across multiple servers to allow “disaster recovery” within 2 hours • Stripping all Level 1 executables in MTA and Exchange server • Aggressive SPAM blocking probably limits our virus exposure