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SENTENCING FOR CRIME CONTROL

SENTENCING FOR CRIME CONTROL. Mark Kleiman National Association of Sentencing Commissions Chicago August 7, 2012. COMPARATIVE INCARCERATION RATES. HOW PUNISHMENT CONTROLS CRIME. Deterrence Incapacitation Rehabilitation Norm reinforcement. THE COSTS OF PUNISHMENT. Expenditure

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SENTENCING FOR CRIME CONTROL

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  1. SENTENCING FOR CRIME CONTROL Mark Kleiman National Association of Sentencing Commissions Chicago August 7, 2012

  2. COMPARATIVE INCARCERATION RATES

  3. HOW PUNISHMENT CONTROLS CRIME • Deterrence • Incapacitation • Rehabilitation • Norm reinforcement

  4. THE COSTS OF PUNISHMENT • Expenditure • Suffering • Prisoners • Family and friends • Neighborhood effects • Punishment is a cost, not a benefit • Benefit is public safety • Looking for the minimum effective dose

  5. DETERMINANTS OF DETERRENT EFFECTIVENESS • Swiftness • Certainty • Severity

  6. WHAT MATTERS MOST? Expected value: Increasing severity is just as good as increasing certainty (Becker) Swiftness and certainty matter most (Beccaria)/(Kahnemann and Tversky) Fairness, goodwill, and predictability Procedural justice (Tyler) Reinforcing internal locus of control

  7. POSITIVE FEEDBACK AND TIPPING • With limited punishment capacity, each offender’s risk depends on other offenders’ behavior • High violation rates as a social trap • “The perfect threat is the one you never have to carry out.”

  8. WHY ARE DRUG CRIMES DIFFERENT? • Market replacement • Negative feedback • Supply control or violence reduction?

  9. INSTITUTIONAL CORRECTIONSV. COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS • Populations • Budgets • The case for justice reinvestment

  10. ENFORCING CONDITIONS OFCOMMUNITY CORRECTION • Randomized draconianism (current system) • Swift/certain/proportionate sanctions (HOPE)

  11. RISK AND SUPERVISION • “Supervising low-risk offenders increases recidivism” • Under what conditions is that claim true? • What could make it false?

  12. HOPE PROCESS Warning to probationers in open court. Required abstinence from illicit drugs. Randomized drug testing with “hot line.” Short jail stays as sanctions. Prompt and reliable sanctions delivery. Formal treatment only on request or after multiple failures(behavioral triage). Phase-down of supervision as reward.

  13. HOPE OUTCOMES(Compared to routine probation) • 85% reduction in drug use • 50% reduction in new arrests • 50% reduction in days-behind-bars • No more jail days • Fewer revocations • Fewer sentences on new charges 80% successful (free and drug-free) at one year

  14. EXPANDING HOPE • Parole • Pretrial release • Juveniles • Fresh prison releasees • Current prisoners

  15. ADDING TO HOPE • Alcohol monitoring (Sobriety 24/7) • GPS position monitoring • Curfew as sanction Outpatient incarceration: the virtual prison cell

  16. TRANSFORMING THE SYSTEM • Mass de-carceration (80%?) • All felony probation and post-prison supervision starts with tight monitoring and HOPE-style sanctioning • Misdemeanor supervision: “HOPE Lite” • HOPE as the first sanction for probation and parole violations • Prison only for the violent, the incorrigible, and the absconders

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