Conclusions

1. Introduction What is epistemicity in language? Any aspect regarding truthfulness/probability of a linguistic content unit according to linguistic signals provided by the speaker Epistemic judgments can be placed on scales, e.g. going from “true” to false” (see Kronning, 2005) Coding by the speaker: Concerning the content: epistemic modality the force a speaker attributes to a content expressed in an utterance ("true", "probable", "necessarily true") Decoding by the hearer/reader: Concerning the interpretation of the speaker’s linguistic signals conveying his/her epistemic judgments – what did the speaker mean? What is going on in our brains, when we decode the speaker’s signals concerning epistemic modality? What is going on in our brains, when we try to decode utterances with literal and non-literal meanings? How do we avoid this? The epistemic continuum We think that a good way to modulate the epistemic ability is to include the literal/non literal distinction into the true/false dichotomy On the basis of theoretical work on epistemic modality, we elaborated an epistemic continuum Brain Mapping of Metaphor Processing (based on Bambini et al. 2006) Linguistic and Cognitive Modelling of Epistemicity (based on Kratschmer 2006) A possible modulation to study epistemic processing is offered by the Italian verb sembrare (engl. “to seem”) Sembrare contains the semantic aspect of epistemic quantification, i.e., the speaker’s judgment of the truth value (of the predication subordinate to sembrare) Consider the different values on a cognitive scale of truth assessment: a) Il computer sembrava rotto (“The computer seemed broken”); formalized by an epistemic factor ” ≤ true” b) Il computer sembrava senziente (reagiva come un essere umano) (“The computer seemed conscious” (it reacted like a human being)); formalized by an epistemic factor “< true” The two readings can be classified as: a) literal reading – categorization (with a reserve) b) non-literal reading - comparison Can we validate this cognitive postulate? Subjects: 10 graduate students (5 F) Stimuli: 40 sentence pairs; in each pair the target word appears once with a literal, once with a metaphorical meaning; 40 fillers Task: Semantic association: choosing between two adjectives presented AFTER the target sentences; metaphor comprehension is an implicit task (i.e., not metalinguistic) Experimental Design Task: Determining the epistemic degree of the literal reading of the target sentence in its context: true (T), true with a reserve (TR), true as a comparison (TC), false (F) Subjects: 11 students Stimuli: 43 groups of four sentences; in each group the target word appears once with one of the four meanings; words balanced for frequency and constant sentence structure to prevent confound effect; random order inside each group to prevent mechanical choices Did you hear the speech of that lawyer? He is an intern. Did you hear the speech of that lawyer? He seems a civil lawyer. Did you hear the speech of that lawyer? He seems an actor. Did you hear the speech of that lawyer? He is a shark. Results: Metaphors compared to literal sentences activated a distributed network of cerebral regions (disconfirming the clinical hypothesis on the selective involvement of the right hemisphere), including traditional language areas plus regions responsible for extra-linguistic higher order cognitive functions (memory, theory of mind, etc.) References Bambini,V., C. Gentili, E. Ricciardi, P. Pietrini. 2006. Neural Correlates of Metaphor Comprehension Assessed by fMRI. Human Brain Mapping. Kratschmer, A. 2006. Catégorisation vs comparaison : une question de quantification épistémique. Propos de modèle interprétatif semantico-pragmatique modulaire des constructions italiennes avec sembrare/parere. To appear in : Cahiers Chronos. Kronning, H. 2005. Polyfoni, modalitet och evidentialitet. Om epistemiska uttryck i franskan, särskilt epistemisk konditionalis. Arbejdspapirer 3, Sprogligt Polyfoninetværk. RUC. 71-99. Epistemic judgments in language Behavioural data and perspectives for neurological validation Alexandra Kratschmer - Valentina BambiniInstitut for Sprog, Litteratur og Kultur, Aarhus Universitet - Laboratorio di Linguistica, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa • Conclusions • Our behavioural test proved that naive speakers are able to operate subtle epistemic operations • We hypothesize that a complex cognitive system underlies this ability (a folk epistemology system?): language, theory of mind, attention... • We hypothesize that a widely distributed neural network supports such a system • Our hypothesis is supported by results on metaphor Behavioural study Cognitive components expected in the neural network for epistemic judgment Cognitive components in the neural network for metaphor comprehension • Aims of the study • Verifying the actual distinctability of the four readings in contextualized examples • Detecting stimuli designing problems • Isolating “well functioning” examples qualifying as stimuli in neurolinguistic tests • Strengthening of theoretical assumptions The study of mental processes underlying epistemological skills may support the hypothesis of a dedicated “folk epistemology” system. Over the last decades many cases of domain-specific cognitive systems with dedicated inferential resources have been identified in infants and higher primates. These include folk physics, folk biology, folk arithmetics, folk psychology, among others. Can the ability to judge truth and epistemic reliability be accounted for in terms of a folk epistemology system? (European Review of Philosophy 8 (2008), Heintz et al., 2008) • Results • The four categories lie on an epistemic continuum • V and F lie each on their own end of the scale: higher correct decoding% • VR and VP are adjacent: lower correct decoding % • Strengthening of theoretical assumptions • 10 of the proposed example groups sanctioned as “well functioning”; other example groups adjustable • High statistical correlation between intended and decoded readings (range: 94,71 - 98,23 %) • There is a context-related distinctability of the four readings Converging Perspectives Studying the Neural Basis of Epistemicity Acknowledgments This project is funded by the research priority area Cognition, Communication & Culture (CCC), Faculty of the Humanities, Aarhus University • The literal/non literal readings of sembrare resemble the literal/figurative readings of metaphorical expressions • We hypothesize that epistemic judgment is a complex cognitive operation, both linguistic and extra-linguistic, supported by a widely distributed neural network • Our aim is to identify such a neural network and the cognitive processes involved. Steps: • Behavioural studies • What are the epistemic modulations subjects are sensitive to? • What are the correct stimuli to modulate the epistemic ability in the brain? • fMRI study Contact Alexandra Kratschmer: romak@hum.au.dk Valentina Bambini: v.bambini@sns.it