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SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation draft-ietf-savi-send-04

SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation draft-ietf-savi-send-04 . Marcelo Bagnulo, Alberto García-Martínez IETF 79, Nov 2011. Changes from version -03. Considered just SEND-only deployment scenario All SAVI devices being SEND, all hosts being SEND

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SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation draft-ietf-savi-send-04

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  1. SEND-based Source-Address Validation Implementation draft-ietf-savi-send-04 Marcelo Bagnulo, Alberto García-Martínez IETF 79, Nov 2011

  2. Changes from version -03 • Considered just SEND-only deployment scenario • All SAVI devices being SEND, all hosts being SEND • Considered case in which a legitimate address collision occurs (2 hosts configuring at the same time an address) • Move candidate port to establish binding to the one through which the last DAD_NSOL was received • Added TESTING_VP’ state. • DAD_NSOL or data has been received from VP’ while a forwarding state existed for port VP. • If timer expires, VP = VP’, state changes to VALID • Difference with TESTING_VP: in this case, when timer expires, state changes to NO_BIND

  3. Changes from version -03 • Clarified security considerations regarding to replay attacks • Binding is created just as a result of • Validated DAD_NSOL received from VP, if no NADV or NSOL is being received for some time • Validated NUD_NADV received from VP, sent in response to NUD_NSOL issued by SEND SAVI device • NUD_NSOL/NUD_NADV: cannot be used for replay attacks (SEND SAVI always checks for nonce, which is not repeated – as ‘nonce’ suggest) • DAD_NSOL are only propagated to ports through which a binding still exists • Replaying other packets (either secured or not) does not affect SEND SAVI state

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