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Iraq Reconstruction CPI 13 Sept 05

Building Under Fire ….. One Year Later. Iraq Reconstruction CPI 13 Sept 05. The True Story. Source: Coalition Provisional Authority Factory workers celebrate June 28 th , 2004, the handover of power to Iraqis two days early. The Perfect Challenge.

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Iraq Reconstruction CPI 13 Sept 05

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  1. Building Under Fire ….. One Year Later Iraq Reconstruction CPI 13 Sept 05

  2. The True Story Source: Coalition Provisional AuthorityFactory workers celebrate June 28th, 2004, the handover of power to Iraqis two days early

  3. The Perfect Challenge Rebuild a country’s infrastructure . . . • Using U.S. taxpayers’ money • Under wartime conditions • In a country 7000 miles away with a struggling economy • During an election year in the USA

  4. 4 Hurdles • Size and Complexity of task at hand • Terrorism • Resources • Media

  5. USA: $18.44 out of the $56.1 billion The United Nations and World Bank estimated in 2003 that the cost to repair the infrastructure of Iraq after 30 years of neglect under Saddam, sanctions since 1991, and looting during the war, would be $56.1 billion. The United States is contributing $18.44 billion to this effort – the country’s largest donation ever to a reconstruction effort The remaining gap in funding required will come from donor nations and revenue generated by Iraq. Source: United Nations/World Bank Joint Iraq Needs Assessment, Oct 03

  6. Three Basic Goals • To improve the infrastructure in Iraq 2) To boost Iraqi employment 3) To build capacity

  7. IRRF II: Program begins

  8. It’s not all construction • It’s not all construction • 1/3 for goods, services and capacity building • $1.8 billion for capacity building • $4 billion for goods, training and services • 2/3 for construction in several sectors Revised in August and October 2004

  9. The Story July, 2004: Iraqi troops in formation at dedication of Al-Kasik military base which could house 6,000 troops (part of US-led reconstruction funding)

  10. What went right? • Saddam is gone (history will reveal the horrific stories) • Infrastructure priorities are in order • Working with Iraqis • Capacity building in Ministries • Sovereignty on time • Successful elections on time • Over $9.6 billion in projects complete or equipment or assistance delivered!

  11. Size and Complexity • 2800 projects going simultaneously • Thousands of non- construction line items (requirements, procurement and issue) • Started with only scopes of projects • Peacetime cost contracting • Integration with other donors efforts

  12. The Model - Leverage • Private Sector – Owner’s cadre • World class Program Management • Transparency • Full and open competition • Fast start and rapid execution using many execution agents

  13. Political Aspects • Washington interplay • Iraqi involvement • Coalition partners • Donors • Sovereignty

  14. Environment • Security – from benign to hostile • Logistics – constraints • Shifting objectives • Reconstruction to jobs to security

  15. Oversight • Two full-time auditor groups • Many in the wings • Results good to date • Someday accountability will be more important than “expenditures”

  16. One year later • Construction Projects over one-half completed • Significant Iraqi involvement in decisions and construction • Program transitioning to USACE for completion • Significant non-construction items delivered

  17. One year later (continued) • Commissioning problems appearing • Program has shifted from construction to non-construction • Private sector revitalization recognized as important • We are no better prepared to conduct a program like this in the future than we were in 2003

  18. Results – Progress as of SEP 2005 Much accomplished in spite of challenges! Benchmark this to the Marshall Plan!

  19. Future Considerations • Planning in advance • Organizational Design: clear chain of command • Adequate, timely resources (people, money) • Unified program management mechanism • Clearly defined metrics • Continuity in management • Realistic expectations • Effective stakeholder communications • Integrated military, political, civilian action • Agility, but stay the course

  20. Iraq – Opportunity or Morass? • Abundant Resources • Highly educated population • Growing economy • Democracy • Business friendly • Historic challenges and advantages • Geographic advantage ____________________________ Bottom line – Truly a bright future

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