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Computer-Mediated Communication. Introduction to Collective Action and Public Goods. Today. Preparing for Assn2: Project research! Short wrap-up of reputation discussion Introduction to collective action and public goods. Another side of reputation…. “.
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Computer-Mediated Communication Introduction to Collective Action and Public Goods
Today • Preparing for Assn2: Project research! • Short wrap-up of reputation discussion • Introduction to collective action and public goods Computer-Mediated Communication
Another side of reputation… “ Internet markets also have significant advantages in establishing reputations … any information that is gleaned can be near costlessly tallied on a continuing basis … [and] that information can be near costlessly transmitted to millions of potential customers. — Resnick et al. 2006, p. 80 ” Computer-Mediated Communication
The CMC and ‘Offline’ Reputation Link: Emergent Reputation Systems and Identity Computer-Mediated Communication
As designers, what can we learn from all of this? • What kind of community do you have (or are you trying to foster)? • When and Why to use Pos/Neg/Mixed/Hybrid Reputation Systems? • What behavior(s) do you want to encourage, reward, punish? • Consider the “unintended consequences” of implicit information • Just because you build a system to be interpreted a certain way doesn’t mean that the user will agree… Computer-Mediated Communication
Core Concepts Collective Action Public Goods Free-Rider Problem Computer-Mediated Communication
Collective Action Computer-Mediated Communication
Collective Action Computer-Mediated Communication
Key Characteristics of Public Goods Non-Excludability Non-Rival Goods (Jointness of Supply) Computer-Mediated Communication
The Tragedy of the “Commons” Computer-Mediated Communication
Cornucopia of the Commons? (Bricklin 2001) Computer-Mediated Communication
“Public Good” Computer-Mediated Communication
The Free-Rider Problem Individual interests tend to make non-contribution tempting, especially if other people will do the work. In collective action, we can view this as an n-person prisoner’s dilemma …but more on that later Computer-Mediated Communication
Privileged Groups as Solution Computer-Mediated Communication
Selective Incentives as Solution Computer-Mediated Communication
Free-Riding and the Logic of Collective Action “If all individuals refrained from doing A, every individual as a member of the community would derive a certain advantage. But now if all individuals less one continue refraining from doing A, the community loss is very slight, whereas the one individual doing A makes a personal gain far greater than the loss that he incurs as a member of the community.” (Pareto 1935, vol. 3, sect. 1496, pp. 946-7) Computer-Mediated Communication
“I guess I will never vote again…unless of course no one else is voting.” – Deepti Chittamuru (2007) Computer-Mediated Communication
Life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1651) Computer-Mediated Communication
“The Leviathan” Computer-Mediated Communication
But is Self-Interest Always Negative? Computer-Mediated Communication
Collective Action and the Hobbesian “War of All Against All” Under what conditions will cooperation emerge in a world of egoists without central authority? Computer-Mediated Communication
Collective Action and Group Size Smaller groups tend to have a better chance of producing a public good (Olson 1965) Why? • More benefits for each person • Larger impact of any single contribution • Generally, lower costs of organization Computer-Mediated Communication
But what about REALLY big groups? Analyzing and Visualizing the Semantic Coverage of Wikipedia and Its Authors (Holloway, Bozicevic and Borner 2005) http://arxiv.org/abs/cs/0512085 Computer-Mediated Communication
Self-Interest in Small versus Large Groups Computer-Mediated Communication
Considering the “Free-Rider Problem” in Online Systems of Collective Action Communality and Discretionary Databases “Second-Order” Communality Computer-Mediated Communication