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Ryan Paulsen Chris Lafferty Nilesh Nipane. TJX Breach. What happened?. Intruders gained access to credit card information between 2005-2007 ~50 million credit card and debit card numbers stolen ½ million driver’s license and SSN stolen Largest theft to date
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Ryan Paulsen Chris Lafferty NileshNipane TJX Breach
What happened? • Intruders gained access to credit card information between 2005-2007 • ~50 million credit card and debit card numbers stolen • ½ million driver’s license and SSN stolen • Largest theft to date • Previous was 1.5 million credit card numbers
What happened? • WEP key crack at St. Paul Marshalls store • Hackers monitor and gather network traffic • Gather data and crack encryption key for traffic destined for central database • Gathered usernames and password from decrypted traffic • Created accounts in TJX systems
What happened? • Create accounts on central database systems in Framingham, MA • Gathered historical data from storage systems • Used by TJX to track returns • Install specially made blablasniffer tool gathering credit card numbers before they were encrypted • Hackers then logged into the systems and transferred data files off of the system • Used in Wal-Mart gift card scam ($1 Million)
Impact • Monetary Cost/Loss for nearly all involved • Customers may lose money/time or other resources directly • Banks lose customers or reputation points • TJX loses substantial amounts of money • Approximately $1.5 billion to fees, settlements, and new security measures mandated by FTC • More than $195 million in new security equipment and training
Impact • Reputation/Business costs • Customer confidence • Federal Trade Commission’s response • Ethical and Policy Implications/Movements • Ethical concerns of information protection, misuse of resources, privacy, etc.
Impact • Impacts still being felt and analyzed… • Legal Issues / Legislation insufficiencies • The full extent of these attacks and just how many systems were attacked by the same people (still finding out of new cases today) • The actions and lack of actions being taken in response by other companies
Why did this attack succeed? • 2004 audit found failure of 9/12 criterion for credit card merchants • Misconfigured wireless networks • Poor antivirus protected • Weak intrusion detection • Easily crackable usernames and passwords • Poor log maintenance • Failed to install data encryption software
Why did this attack succeed? • Initial Breach • Due to deficiencies in the wireless network and WEP encryption scheme • WEP is known to be broken since 2001. (FMS attack) • Collected data transmitted by handheld devices used to communicate price markdowns and to manage inventory • Used that data to crack the encryption code.
Why did this attack succeed? • Other Vulnerabilities • Kiosks, equipped with USB drives, were located in many of TJX's retail stores • Allowed direct access to the company's network and were not protected by firewall
Aftermath: Criminal • Feds tracked down and arrested 11 coconspirators • Discovered credit theft ring known as “Operation Get Rich or Die Trying” • Led by Albert Gonzalez • Ring responsible for most major credit card thefts in US • Including Homestead breach which is now the largest of its kind
Aftermath: Legal • Class Action Lawsuits • TJX reluctant to disclose data on the breach • Failed to detect for 7 months, took another month to disclose • Prosecutors hope to show negligence • Watershed Case • Companies now must be more open and transparent about how they protect customer data
Making Systems Less Vulnerable • PCI Security Standards Council Data Security Standard (DSS) • Special recommendations published July 2009 for wireless networks • Covers best practices in relation to processing credit card information around wireless networks
Making Systems Less Vulnerable • Wireless Intrusion Detection/Prevention System (IDS/IPS) • Investigate and classify wireless networks and their access to customer data • Create automatic alerts of rouge wireless connections • Response plans to remove rouge connections
Making Systems Less Vulnerable • Filter wireless networks that do not need access to customer data with firewall • Do NOT use VLANseparation • Monitor rulesevery 6 months From Information Supplement: PCI DSS Wireless Guideline
Making Systems Less Vulnerable • Protect wireless networks that transmit card holder data • Physical protection • Secure access points so no one can reset to factory defaults • Make sure access points aren’t stolen • Don’t store PSKs in obvious locations
Making Systems Less Vulnerable • Protect wireless networks that transmit card holder data • Change default configuration • Use enterprise mode when possible • Do not advertise company name in SSID • Only use SNMPv3 • Disable unnecessary ports and protocols
Making Systems Less Vulnerable • Protect wireless networks that transmit card holder data • Logging and Monitoring • Store event logs for 90 days • Maintain updates to network topology • Security • Use AES when possible • Use enterprise security when possible • 13 character PSK
Making Systems Less Vulnerable • Protect wireless networks that transmit card holder data • Encryption • Use SSLv3 with 256 bit encryption • Treat wireless networks as outside network From Information Supplement: PCI DSS Wireless Guideline
Book Chapters • Chapter 6 – Database Security • Chapter 7 – Security in Computing • Chapter 9 – Economics of Cybersecurity • Chapter 10 – Privacy • Chapter 11 – Cryptography Explained
Sources • http://news.cnet.com/2100-7348_3-6169450.html • https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/PCI_DSS_Wireless_Guidelines.pdf • http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/08/11-charged-in-m/ • http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/pci/ • http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/10/tjx-failed-to-n/ • http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1249421,00.html • http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1245727,00.html • http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1239711,00.html • http://hardware.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/05/05/1812254 • http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=AW4H134JQ43VXQE1GHOSKHWATMY32JVN?articleID=201400171 • http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/06/watt/ • http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/08/tjx-hacker-charged-with-heartland/