Unit 10: Party Systems Sociological and Institutional Explanations

1. Unit 10: Party SystemsSociological and Institutional Explanations Readings: Ware CH 6, Lipset and Rokkan, Duverger, Cox

2. Guiding Questions • Which factors do sociological approaches emphasize? • What is a cleavage? • How are they translated into party systems? • What do theorists mean when they say party systems are “frozen”? • Which factors do institutional approaches emphasize? • What is Duverger’s Law?

3. Sociological Accounts • Lipset and Rokkan 1967 • What shapes party systems?: • Social cleavages. • Cleavages: social divisions separating a given society. • Research question: • Why do we see two party systems in Anglo-American systems and multiparty systems in Europe? • Answer: • Resolution of historical conflicts (cleavage patterns) explain differences.

4. Early Cleavage Dimensions • Lipset and Rokkan 1967 • Cleavages can be represented in a two dimensional space. • Territorial dimension: • Local opposition to encroachment by the center vs. conflict amongst political elites over control of the center (center-periphery) • Functional dimension: • Interest specific oppositions vs. ideological oppositions. • Territorial cleavages exist before functional ones appear. • Bottom line: • State building activates center-periphery. • As state solidifies, functional cleavages become salient.

5. Role of Political Parties • Lipset and Rokkan 1967 • Societal conflict gives rise to political parties. • Parties: • act as agents of mobilization and integration. • allow citizens to differentiate between office-holders and system of government. • serve both expressive and representative functions • But not all cleavages result in political oppositions. • And not all oppositions result in parties.

6. Translating Cleavages into Parties • Lipset and Rokkan 1967 • How are cleavages translated into political parties? • State characteristics matter. • A series of thresholds exist in the translation of cleavages to movements to political parties. • Thresholds include: • 1) Legitimation • 2) Incorporation • 3) Representation • 4) Majority Power

7. Explaining European Party Systems: Critical Junctures and Critical Cleavages • Lipset and Rokkan 1967 • How do we get from cleavages, to parties, to party systems? • Exogenous shocks to the system (critical junctures) make certain cleavages salient. • Parties form in response • The timing of societal conflict coupled with which side “wins” shapes political parties. • These cleavage patterns in turn, shape party systems (i.e. which types of parties exist within a system). • Variation in cleavage patterns explains differences across systems. • Identifies four major cleavages which shape European party systems. • Shaped by national revolutions and industrialization. • First three cleavages shape the center and the right; the last cleavage shapes the left.

8. Critical Junctures: National Revolutions CENTER-PERIPHERY STATE-CHURCH • Protestant Reformation • Control by the center vs. control by the localities. • Centralized state vs. ethnic, religious, linguistic communities in the periphery. • Shapes: conservatives, separatists, (liberals) • National Revolutions • Post 1789-French Revol. • State control of education vs. Church control. • Shapes: Christian Democratic parties

9. Critical Junctures: Industrial Revolution LAND-INDUSTRY OWNER-WORKER • Industrial Revolution • 19th century. • Primary vs. secondary economy • Agriculture vs. manufacturing • Tariffs vs. free enterprise? • Shapes: agrarians, (liberals). • Russian Revolution • Post 1917 • Integrate workers vs. repressing labor. • Allow access to system. • Join an international movement? • Shapes: socialists and communists.

10. OWNER LABOR DIVIDED SOCIALISTS OPPRESSED COMM-Y WORKER LABOR UNITED SOCIALISTS INTEGRATED COMM-N OWNER WORKER LABOR UNIFIED SOCIALISTS INTEGRATED COMM-N OWNER WORKER LABOR DIVIDED SOCIALISTS OPPRESSED COMM-Y OWNER WORKER LABOR UNIFIED SOCIALISTS INTEGRATED COMM-N

11. Freezing of Party Systems • Lipset and Rokkan 1967 • Analysis stops in the 1920’s. • Modern party systems of reflect the same patterns of cleavage structure observed in the 1920’s. • After universal suffrage, no further expansion of the electorate. • Cleavage patterns and their resulting party systems are “frozen” • Has fostered a great deal of debate

12. Evaluating Lipset and Rokkan STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES • Shows the importance of societal context in party formation. • Explains why we see certain types of parties in some systems but not in others. • Rise of post materialist parties (Greens) challenges the freezing hypothesis. • Suggests that institutions really do not matter. • But then why do politicians tweak them? • No predictive ability. • How do we know when a “critical juncture” will occur?

13. Electoral Systems: Overview SMD/FPTP/PLURALITY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION/PR • Referred to as single member district (SMD) or “first past the post” • A single candidate is elected in each electoral district (district magnitude =1). • Whoever receives the most votes, wins. • Generally manufactures a majority for the largest parties. • Gerrymandering can reduce electoral turnover. • Denies representation to smaller parties to provide stability in coalition creation. • Various types of PR exist. • Candidates are elected by party list in multi-member districts (district magnitude >1). • Parties receive a number of seats proportional to their percentage of the vote. • Electoral threshold determines which parties gain access to the legislature. • Allows for more proportionate outcomes, but makes coalition formation more difficult.

14. Institutional Accounts • Duverger 1954 • Two party systems are preferable to multiparty systems. • Two party systems are “natural” as a “duality of tendencies” exist on any issue. • Center is an artificial construct which does not truly exist. • Always split by moderates of the left and right (i.e. superimposed dualisms). • Two party systems reflect natural dualism of political issues. • Preferable to multipartism

15. Dualism and the Two Party System • Duverger 1954 • Not all “dualisms” are created equal. • Certain dualisms can threaten democracy. • Technical dualism: • Differences between parties revolve around issues. • Legitimacy of system and institutions accepted by both parties. • Metaphysical dualism: • Differences between parties revolve around fundamentals of the regime (i.e. institutions, etc). • Threatens stability.

16. Electoral Institutions and Party Systems • Duverger 1954 • Duvergers' Law: “simple majority single ballot systems favours the two-party system” • Mechanical effects. • Psychological effects. • Multiparty systems promoted by proportional representation. • PR systems lack the mechanical and psychological effects to reduce the number of parties. • All parties possess internal divisions of opinion (factions). • In systems with permissive electoral laws factionalization can result in the creation of center parties.

17. Overlapping Dualisms and Multipartyism • Multiparty systems can arise from: • 1) party factions • 2) overlapping dualisms. • Overlapping dualisms exist where several issues are salient, but duality of opinions on these issues do not overlap. • Example: French Fourth Republic • Three Dualisms • 1) Clerical-Anticlerical • 2) East-West • 3) Freedom-Planning

18. Evaluating Duverger STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES • PRO • FPTP does reduce the number of parties. • Although concentrated support can make a third party viable. • Runoff systems using FPTP result in multiparty systems. • Admits that while two party systems are “natural” electoral manipulation to reduce the number of parties may not always be wise. • Example: Italian First Republic., Israel. • CON • Dualist” countries use FPTP • Suggests that the selection of certain institutions may be based on societal attributes. • Supportive of sociological explanations. • The types of parties contesting elections “matter” • Supportive of competition models.

19. Conclusions: Evaluating Explanations • Both overlook the ability of party leaders to shape cleavage patterns. • Party leaders can exploit cleavages for electoral success. • Cox 1997 • Both cleavages and institutions matter; a “symbiotic relationship” exists between the two. • Systems without multiple cleavages would not have multiple parties. • Electoral system provides an upper limit (or upper bound) on the number of political parties within a system.

20. Next Unit • Theme: Party Systems-Electoral Volatility • Readings • Ware CH 7 • Reserves: Pedersen, Mair