AIACC LA26: Buenos Aires, 24-27 August 2004

1. AIACC LA26: Buenos Aires, 24-27 August 2004 “Case studies of social and institutional vulnerability:La Boca Neighborhood and Avellaneda Municipality”Dra. Claudia E. Natenzon, Dra. Natalia Marlenko, Lic. Silvia G. González, Lic. Diego Ríos, Lic. Elvira Gentile, Lic. Julieta Barrenechea,Lic. Sebastián Ludueña & Ms. María Cecilia Boudín - PIRNA , FFyL , UBA - Second AIACC Regional Workshop for Latin America and the Caribbean

2. Outlook • Conceptual framework: social vulnerability • Study area: population and assets in scenarios • La Boca Neighborhood • Avellaneda Municipality • Some conclusions

3. Conceptual Framework: Social Vulnerability, Environmental Risk and Disasters The SV – Social Vulnerability is one of the four dimensions of the environmental risk. Other dimensions are hazard, exposition and uncertainty. It is defined by social, economical, cultural and institutional conditions of a society, previous of a disaster event, that put this society in conditions to suffer or avoid damages (of different kinds: economical, physiological, on health, etc.). SV will determine the levels of difficulties and capacities of each social group to recover by itself after the stress and the impacts.

4. SV: Issues Researched • Elaboration of a social vulnerability index (SVI) for the study area. • Identification of people (number) that could be affected in a direct way. • Analysis of land use and inventory of assets/infrastructure that could be directly affected. • Case studies: La Boca/ Avellaneda.

5. AIACC Project LA 26 Affected population by scenarios Population by census radius in the Municipalities of the study area (coastal municipalities between Tigre and Partido de la Costa) Dates. CNPyV 1991 and 2001 Three scenarios: 2004, 2030 and 2070 Six recurrences (1, 5, 10, 20, 50 and 100 years) Example: Scenario 2070, recurrence 100

6. Scenario 2070, recurrence 100: AMBA and Gran La Plata

7. Scenario 2070-100 Affected assets by scenarios. Study area (total) • Assets: • Administrative offices • Social security • Health centers (public, private) • Educational centers (public, private) • Security offices (police stations, etc) • Industries • Circulation and transport • Recreational areas (parks, clubs, etc) • Residential areas

8. Affected assets – Scenario 2070 Study area (total)

9. Case studies localization

10. Case studies localization

11. La Boca Neighborhood (1) • Some characteristics: • One of the oldest city’s neighborhood, it was born as harbor in a marshy area. • Since its beginnings, it has always been a marginal area, although the current urban renewal projects. • Total population (DGE, 2001): 39.396 inhabitants. • Area : 3,3 km2. (1,29% of CABA) • Density: 11.938 inhab/km2 (1,65% of CABA). • Main hazard: floods by “sudestadas” and intense rainfall.

12. La Boca Neighborhood (2) Source: INDEC, 1991; CNE 1994.

13. La Boca Neighborhood (3)

14. La Boca Neighborhood (4) In green: for La Boca only – In light blue: for CABA with La Boca component.

15. La Boca Neighborhood (5) • Some limitations of the disaster management: • A false feeling of security settles down from the building of defense engineering works (“hidden” risk). • There are communicational disadjustments among the involved institutions themselves, and between them and the population. • There are registered distrustfulness / rivalry attitudes among institutions. • Both, the urban and the floods management, are unarticulated. • In the projected works (coastal defense) the sea level rise hypothesis is not considered.

16. La Boca Neighborhood (6) • Positive aspects: • New non structural interventions are being developed. • There is a strong social participative tradition in the neighborhood, with a particular cultural profile. • There are recent institutional changes in the Municipal organigram: Urban Planning and Public Works are under the same office.

17. Avellaneda Municipality (1) Some characteristics: • One of the oldest population centers near the city of Buenos Aires, located on a flooding area. • It has an industrial profile from its beginning as a town (1840). • High levels of urbanization (> 90%, from 1940). • Total population (CNPHyV, 2001): 328.980 • Area: 55 km2. • Population density: 5.993 inhabitants/km2. • Main hazards: floods and contamination.

18. Avellaneda Municipality (2)

19. Avellaneda Municipality (3) SVI figure: 2 (low) Sub Index: - Demographic: 3 (high) - Conditions of life: 3 (high) - Productive: 1 (very low) Source: CNPyV 1991, Anuario Bonaerense 1993, CNE 1994

20. Avellaneda Municipality (4) The main institution in charge of disaster's management is the Civil Defense Municipality Board - Junta Municipal de Defensa Civil (JMDC), integrated by: • Mayor (as President); • Director of Civil Defense (as Secretary); • Government Secretaries –of Health, Social Action, etc.- (as vocals); • Voluntary Fire Brigade (as vocal); • Naval Prefecture of Dock Sud (as vocal); • Red Cross -Villa Domínico office- (as vocal); and • Social Entities’ Leaders, such as Boy Scouts (non permanent vocals).

21. Avellaneda Municipality (4) Limitations in the flood disasters management: • Lack of continuity in the Civil Defense policies. For example, the Director office, main coordinator of the JMDC, is political and is renewed with each government every four years, or less; • In reality, neither the vocals nor the other representantives of the civil society participate in the JMDC. The decisions on this subject are only in the Civil Defense Director’s hands; • There is no enough risk and disaster communication from Civil Defense to the inhabitants. • There are registered distrustfulness / rivalry attitudes among institutions.

22. Avellaneda Municipality (4) Positive aspects: • Since December 2003, the new Municipal Authorities have designed a new Civil Defense Director. He has a deeper knowledge on disaster management (Chairman of the Volunteer Firemen Federation of Buenos Aires Province); • There is a more intensive coordination by the emergency institutions (Volunteer Firemen, Red Cross and Navy Police) through periodical disaster simulations; • There is highly trained and experienced personnel in some of the institutions;

23. National Institutions DC : Defensa Civil (Civil Defense) SIFEM: Sistema Federal de Emergencia (Emergency Federal System)

24. 1996 (Menem) Defensa Civil

25. 1999/2001 (Menem/De La Rua) SIFEM Defensa Civil

26. Feb.2002 (Duhalde) SIFEM Defensa Civil

27. Jul.2002 (Duhalde) Defensa Civil SIFEM

28. Last weekend, 2004 (Kirchner) Defensa Civil SIFEM

29. Some conclusions • In the future, both the inhabitants quantity and the area that could be affected are important. • Floods are a problem nowadays. • There have been successful works as the coastal defenses in La Boca against the “sudestada”. Nevertheless, there are still some areas that continue being flooded.

30. Some conclusions • An important group of historic neighbors has developed some alternative daily strategies (cultural aspects) that reduce the social vulnerability: • existence of informal warning, self assistance and evacuation networks, among the neighbors; • choice of adequate building systems; • high sense of belonging and identification with their place; • experience on what to do in face of floods, etc.

31. Some conclusions • The public measures for “floods management" are apart from the global urban environmental policies. • This fragmentation of policies and measurements increases the social vulnerability and generates high degrees of uncertainty, that amplifies the damages of each disaster.

32. Some conclusions • There are formal obstacles among institutions: • lack of communication, coordination and articulation; • scarce planning; • the successful programs and projects have no continuity with each change of government. • Thus, the institutions and their policies are not sustainable in time.

33. Some conclusions • The institutions management style, typical of the national culture, is not adequate for long term processes. • Up to now, both the executed, in execution an projected mitigation plans, and the communication processes to the public do not consider the changes implied by the sea level rise.

34. Thank you!