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The Egalitarian Ape: Welfare State Games and the Preference for Equality. Sebastian Lotz University of Cologne Detlef Fetchenhauer University of Cologne, University of Groningen. The typical welfare state.
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The Egalitarian Ape: Welfare State Games and the Preference for Equality Sebastian Lotz University of Cologne Detlef Fetchenhauer University of Cologne, University of Groningen
The typicalwelfarestate • Economies & societiescreatewealthwhichmostofthemdecidetopartlyredistribute • Individual memberspossess different inputfactors (labor, capital, knowledge) andcreate a different amountsofwealth • Redistribution throughsocialsecurity, taxes, donations • Usually: Costof Redistribution
MotivationalFactors • Maximizationof individual payoff • Maximizationofgrouppayoff (overallwealth) • Maximizationofequality (due toinequalityaversion) • WOLF IN SHEEP‘S CLOTHING; Maximizing individual payoffcanbejustifiedbyotherarguments
Welfarestategame Maximization of Equality
Welfarestategame Maximization of Overall Payoff Maximization of Equality
Welfarestategame Maximization of Individual Payoff Maximization of Overall Payoff Maximization of Equality
Welfarestategame Maximization of Individual Payoff Maximization of Overall Payoff Maximization of Equality
Welfarestategame Maximization of Individual Payoff Maximization of Overall Payoff Maximization of Equality
Whatothersfound… • As a socialgood, distributive justiceismoreattractive than overallwealth (efficiency)(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2002) • Half ofthepeopleprefertheequaldistribution in thegame, themajorityofthemhoweverismotivatedby pure self-interest (Biniossek & Fetchenhauer, 2007)
Welfarestategame Benevolent Dictator (Equality or Wealth?)
Experimental Design • N = 216 studentsatthe University of Cologne • Betweensubjects design • Random drawdecidedwho‘sdecision will beenforced in thegroup • Accountability: Studentsweretowrite down theirargumentationwhich was distributedamongthegroupmembers usedfor qualitative analysis • 3 ECU = 1 Euro actualpayoff, All benevolentdictatorsparticipated in a lotterybeingabletowin, 200, 150, or 100 ECU • Additional questionnaire
Reasoningbehindtheresults • SocialIntuitist Model • Fast andautomaticintuitionsaretheprimarysourceofmoralevaluations (Haidt, 2001) • „Do noharm“ – heuristics (intention) • People hesitatetoharmsmallgroupsof a societyevenif a (large) majoritybenefits • Inequalityaversion (outcome) • People disregarddistributionswhichunjustifiablyputsomepeoplebetterof than others (evenifthiswouldyield a Pareto improvement)
Implications • Intuitive fairness/moraljudgmentismaindeterminantoftheacceptanceofsocioeconomicpolicy (Haferkamp et al, 2007) • Efficiency almostseems irrelevant tothepeople • Decisionsbased on morality do not alwaysseemeconomicallyright (repetitionofthegame, substantial lossesofwealth)
Summary • Distributionsare not onlyselected due tomaximizationof individual payoff • Accountabilitymightreduceegoism, self-interest • Generally „fair“ distributionsarepreferredevenifthismeanstoleavemoney on thetable. • Ambiguityoffairnessis not seen • In realitythe fair solutionis not asobvious, becausewealthhastobecompiled, individualsareunequallytalented, etc.