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Storage of sensitive data in a Java enabled cell phone. MSc Thesis Tommy Egeberg June 2006. Agenda. Introduction Problem Methods Results Conclusion Further Work. -Introduction. Introduction. Cell phones → small computers Stores a lot of sensitive information
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Storage of sensitive data in a Java enabled cell phone MSc Thesis Tommy Egeberg June 2006
Agenda • Introduction • Problem • Methods • Results • Conclusion • Further Work
-Introduction Introduction • Cell phones → small computers • Stores a lot of sensitive information • RMS, email, SMS, calendar … • Able to run Java applications • Mobile SSO solution • Store passwords
-Problem Main problem Will a Java MIDlet on a cellular phone be a secure location to store sensitive information?
-Problem Research Questions • What is already known about security in Java enabled cell phones? • Will information stored on a cellular phone be easy to extract? • How can we secure the stored sensitive information even if the cellular phone is lost or stolen? • What kind of threats will the cell phone be vulnerable to? • What kind of countermeasures can be used to reduce or eliminate the threats?
-Methods Methods • Literature study • J2ME specifications • Communication link; cell phone ↔ server • Prototype • Try to break into the prototype • Security analysis • Identify threats and vulnerabilities
-Methods Digital safe • Master password • PIN • Pass-faces • Stored as a SHA1 hash digest • The sensitive information • AES encrypted with a 128 bit key • Key derived from master password, username and a iteration count of 20, like described in PKCS5v2 [1]
-Methods Remote deletion • SMS sent to the phone with the digital safe installed • Defined port number • The AMS starts the digital safe • SHA1 value of password • Deletes the stored information
-Methods Stealing MIDlet • Upgrade a previously installed MIDlet • The RMS will not be erased • Read the stored information • Identical values in the JAD file • Can be used to inject Trojan code
-Results Results • Encryption and decryption • Bouncy Castle Crypto API [2] • AES, SHA1, … • Remote deletion is a poor functionality • Can easily be deactivated • Data stored in the RMS can easily be extracted
-Results Data extraction • Forensic methods [3] • Desoldering techniques, boundary-scan (JTAG) • Native applications • Windows Mobile, Symbian OS • Stealing MIDlet • Phone Managers • Backup of MIDlet’s RMS
-Results Stealing MIDlet • Overwrite the installed MIDlet • MIDlet-Name and MIDlet-Vendor • Source code • Add Trojan code • A signed MIDlet can not be upgraded with an unsigned MIDlet!
-Results Phone Managers • Oxygen Phone Manager II [4] • Backup Java MIDlets • Backup MIDlet's RMS • MOBILedit! [5] • Forensic edition available
-Results RMS backup
-Results Threats & Vulnerabilities • Information extracted • Trojan code • Keyboard sniffer, send information to hacker, … • Phone is stolen • Brute-force attacks • Remote deletion disabled • MIDlet installation request
-Results Countermeasures • Reflash cell phone OS • Check MIDlet size and functionality • Sign the MIDlet • Prevent Stealing MIDlets • Strong master password and encryption • Frequently update the login credentials
-Conclusion Conclusion • A strong master password must be chosen • The key in the encryption process, access to the application • Data easily extracted • Encryption extremely important • The MIDlet should be signed • Prevent installation of Stealing MIDlets, trusted source
-Further work Further Work • SATSA (The Security and Trust Service API) • Biometric authentication • Speech recognition (Java Speech API) • Proactive password checking • Synchronization service • Update the stored login credentials if the phone is lost
References [1] RSA-Laboratories. March 1999. Pkcs5v2.0: Password-based cryptography standard. [2] Bouncy Castle. Bouncy Castle Crypto Package. Light-weight API, release 1.33. [3] Willassen, S. Y. Spring 2003. Forensics and the GSM mobile telephone system. International Journal of Digital Evidence, 2, 10–11. [4] Oxygen-Software. Oxygen phone manager for Nokia phones (forensic edition) http://www.opm-2.com [5] Compelson laboratories. MOBILedit! Forensic http://www.mobiledit.com