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THIS PAPER IS UNCLASSIFIED

Project MacDuff: Network Disruption. Frank C. Mahncke Chief Analyst Joint Warfare Analysis Center Dahlgren, Virginia 540-653-1872 Mahncke@aol.com. 19th ISMOR: Oxford, UK 27-30 August 2002. THIS PAPER IS UNCLASSIFIED. Project MacDuff Overview. UNCLASSIFIED. Objective:

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THIS PAPER IS UNCLASSIFIED

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  1. Project MacDuff: Network Disruption Frank C. Mahncke Chief Analyst Joint Warfare Analysis Center Dahlgren, Virginia 540-653-1872 Mahncke@aol.com 19th ISMOR: Oxford, UK 27-30 August 2002 THIS PAPER IS UNCLASSIFIED

  2. Project MacDuff Overview UNCLASSIFIED • Objective: • Identify network vulnerabilities and concepts for potential operations against them • Apply organizational science concepts to the disruption of opponent networks • Process: Workshops with Academics and Military • Enablers of Emergence • Case Studies • Network Models and Simulations • Vulnerabilities and “Rules of Thumb” for Operations UNCLASSIFIED

  3. Academia & Consultants UNC – Chapel Hill U of Arizona Boston College Carnegie-Mellon Clemson Emory University U of Nevada U of Pittsburgh U of Texas Alidade Aptima Morgan Chase NYMX Orgnet SAIC Government JWAC OSD Net Assessment OSD SOLIC MCWL Project Participants UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

  4. Enablers of Emergence UNCLASSIFIED • Search Agents (different models, diversity) • Search Process (protected) • Connections (external, internal) • Selection Mechanism • Time & Resources Desert Storm v. Somalia UNCLASSIFIED

  5. Case Studies: European Terrorists UNCLASSIFIED • Three Generations • Charismatic • Professional • National Servicemen • Characteristics • high loss tolerance • autonomous cell structure • ingenious • Failure • erosion of the “cause” • failure to regenerate and recruit UNCLASSIFIED

  6. Social Network Example Highest Centrality Highest Cognitive Load Emergent Leader UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

  7. Leadership Removal: Cellular Networks Removal v. Time The Most Central Agents The Cognitive Leaders Remove 15 at time 15 Remove 15, 1 each time period UNCLASSIFIED Leadership RemovalCentral v. Cognitive Remove 20 people out of 100 at time 15 • Implication: • remove cognitive leadership first • steady removal over time UNCLASSIFIED

  8. Centrality and Betweeness UNCLASSIFIED centrality betweeness

  9. Network activities can be mutually supportive, or in conflict Unexpected loads in high stress situations can cause network breakdown Activity Networks Community Service Special Events Customer Service Stocking Physical Maint. Administration Merchandising Intelligence Vendors & DSD Regulation Managing People UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

  10. UNCLASSIFIED Notional Terrorist Activity Network Most Disruptive Disrupt Simultaneously UNCLASSIFIED

  11. UNCLASSIFIED A Few Rules of ThumbforDisrupting Networks UNCLASSIFIED

  12. Scouting Networks UNCLASSIFIED • Some indications that full knowledge of the net is not needed to begin action • Watch, stimulate “high betweeness” players • activation of activity network leads to communication • no damage to the network • no reformation or adaptation of the network UNCLASSIFIED

  13. Disrupting Cellular Networks UNCLASSIFIED • most disruption: cognitive leaders across network • some disruption: central leaders across network • small or random removals have small effect • cellular networks are robust ! UNCLASSIFIED

  14. Time Pacing Disruption UNCLASSIFIED • Disruption requires multiple and sustained attacks • Takes time to show impact • Networks recover by: • reorganization • new agents • Covert networks: slower recovery UNCLASSIFIED

  15. Disrupting at the Seams UNCLASSIFIED • Seams: where the organization interacts with: • major internal sub-organizations • the outside world • Disrupt at: • functional seams • organizational seams • boundaries • recruiting sources • outside support structure UNCLASSIFIED

  16. Notional Terrorist Network Seams UNCLASSIFIED

  17. Disrupting Social Capital UNCLASSIFIED • Trust is critical to terrorist groups • Disruptions of trust: • deny leadership ability to create new links/reinforce old ones • inject elements of distrust in a paranoid organization • plant people and organizations to sew distrust • capitalize on less-violent sub-networks UNCLASSIFIED

  18. Disrupting Network Adaptivity UNCLASSIFIED • Deny • search • connections • time & resources • Attack innovative parts of the network • Attack cohesion within network • break links between it and other organizations • Attack redundancy UNCLASSIFIED

  19. Disrupting Activity Networks UNCLASSIFIED • Simultaneous attacks on the security, operations, recruiting, operations funding, and logistic support foci appear promising • Attacks on public relations, strategic alliances, institutional funding, and community relations have little effect UNCLASSIFIED

  20. Network Vulnerabilities (pro-tem) UNCLASSIFIED • Leadership • Seams • Social Capital • Adaptivity • Activity Links and Nodes UNCLASSIFIED

  21. Potential Future Research UNCLASSIFIED • Activity Links and Nodes • Leadership Dimensions • Network Seams • Social Capital Disruption • Adaptivity Denial • Intelligence Depth Required • Covert Network Characteristics UNCLASSIFIED

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