Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories

1. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories Dr. Jonathan Harrington Associate Professor of International Relations Troy University

2. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories Talking Points: • I. Japan: An Introduction • II. Evolution of Japan’s US-centered Pacifist Security Regime • III. Japan’s “Soft Power” Strategy • IV. Post Cold War Period: Japan Moves Towards ‘Normalcy’ • V. Japan at a Crossroads: Future Security Options

3. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories I. Japan: An Introduction *Despite China’s rise, Japan remains the preeminent economic and naval power in Asia. Population: 128,000,000 Population gr. % -.05 Area: 145,894 sq. mi. Life Expectancy: 85 (F) 78 (M) GDP: 4.7 trillion USD GNI: $39,000 Trade balance: +96 bln USD Political system: Const. monarchy Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda Sources: World Bank, Economist (2006)

4. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories Japanese Military: Selected Statistics (2006) • Major Naval Vessels • Class Number (vessels) Standard Displacement (1,000 tons) • Destroyer 53 205 • Submarine 16 42 • Mine warfare ship 31 27 • Patrol combat craft 9 1 • Amphibious ship 13 29 • Auxiliary ship 29 123 • Total 151 428 • Combat Aircraft Number • F-15 J/DJ 203 • F-4 EJ 91 • F-1 7 • F-2 A/B 68 • Total 369 •  Military budget: Approx imately50 bln. USD Source: Japan Defense Ministry (2006)

5. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories II. Evolution of Japan’s US-centered Pacifist Security Regime • Since the end of WWII, relations with the US have dominated Japanese foreign policy. • Article 9 of Japan’s US-imposed constitution (1947) states that the ‘Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of the use of force as a means for settling international disputes.’ • It also states that ‘land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of the belligerency of the state will not be recognized.’ (English –Japanese translations allowed flexibility in interpretation) • Japan officially created its own ‘Self Defense Force’ in 1954. • Japan’s 1957 ‘Basic Principles for National Defense’ further define the military’s limited role in Japanese foreign policy (defense and peacekeeping). • These changes have had the following practical effects on Japan’s security posture: • Japan’s military spending has been limited to 1% of GDP and its armed forces number around 250,000. • Japan has traditionally been prohibited from having offensive weapons.

6. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • Japan is also restrained in its ability to export arms to other countries. • It embraces the NPT’s three nuclear principles which prohibit production, import or storage of nuclear weapons. • Japan became dependent on the US for most military procurement needs. • The lack of a large military kept a strong military-industrial complex from developing. • Most Japanese supported Article 9. Pacifism has traditionally been politically important in Japan. • The ruling LDP largely complied with Constitutional limitations. • Historical memories of the scars of WWI I and organized political groups helped to maintain this pacifism (Japan Communist Party, Japan Socialist Party, SokaGakkai New Komeito Party).

7. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • Until relatively recently, the United States also favored limited development of Japanese offensive capabilities. • The US occupied Japan from 1945-52 and Okinawa until 1972. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the Japanese Constitution solidified Japan’s relationship with the US and its military limitations. • This relationship was reinforced by the 1978 Guiding Principles of Japanese-American Defense Cooperation which states that Japan should provide conditions favorable to fostering US military operations aimed at defending Japan.

8. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories III. Japan’s ‘soft power’ strategy. • The US-Japan defense relationship allowed Japan to focus on economic development (Yoshida Doctrine). • During the Cold War, Japan expanded its ‘soft power’ in the Region. • ODA was increased. • Japanese multinationals dominated SE Asian trade and investment. • Poorer East Asian states became resource and manufacturing bases for Japanese corporations. • Japan became the main source for high tech products and knowhow in the Region.

9. Japan used its economic might to attempt to ‘buy’ friends in the Region. • Since the early 1970s, Japan has provided tens of billions of USD in ODA and investment to China. • Until recently, Japan was S. Korea’s largest trading partner. • However, while trade and aid have increased along with economic interdependence, most Asian states remain worried about Japan’s intentions and historical legacy. .

10. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories

11. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • Japan also supported multilateral institutions. • Japan became the second biggest contributor to the UN operating budget. • Japan funded the work of major UN agencies including UNDP, UNEP, WHO, UNU, UNICEF etc. • Japan promoted participation in regional multilateral organizations including: ASEAN+ 3, ARF, APEC etc. and later the Six Party Nuclear Talks

12. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories IV. Post Cold War Period: Japan Moves Towards Normalcy • During the Cold War, Japan’s place in US containment policy ensured that the US would come to its aid in the event of an attack. • The end of the Cold War created a more uncertain atmosphere. PM Nakasone addressed this new reality by stating that while Japan should not aspire to be a major military power, it should amend its Constitution to allow it to share the burdens of maintaining collective security in the world. • Having armed forces allows peaceful countries to defend peace and help deter aggression. • He also stated that since the Constitution was imposed from outside, the Japanese people had a right and responsibility to change it to fit their own needs. There was much debate about this change in attitude about Article 9.

13. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • There were a number of other events that have influenced Japan’s move away from pacifism. • Gulf War I put pressure on Japan to increase its participation in UN mandated collective security activities. • This pressure led to passage of the Law on Cooperation with the UN Peacekeeping Forces in 1991. This law allowed deployment of forces for UN peacekeeping, but limited their activities to non-lethal support roles. • This opened opportunities for Japanese forces to monitor elections, provide humanitarian assistance, carry out evacuations and provide logistical support and reconstruction services in non-combat areas. • Japan has participated in peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Golan Heights, Rwanda and others.

14. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • The five principles that guided deployments included: • 1. an agreement must be reached between conflicting sides on a permanent cease fire or temporary halt to hostilities; • 2. the conflicting sides consented to the activity of UN forces and Japan’s participation; • 3. Neutrality was observed, which did not permit supporting of one of the conflicting sides; • 4. Japan retained the right to independently recall its contingent if any of these conditions were not implemented; • 5. and the use of weapons was kept to a minimum (59).

15. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • Another event that influenced relations was the signing of the Japanese-American Joint Security Declaration in 1996. • This agreement reinforced the significance of the US-Japan Security Treaty. It also states that responsibilities of signatories should be symmetrical and operations should include areas in and around Japan not just the Japanese mainland. • Another agreement, the New Guiding Principles, more clearly defined this relationship in 1997 and is more specific about coordination, cooperation and joint action. • Japan passed another new law, the Law on Self-Defense Forces to allow for operations ‘around Japan’ and participation in rear support activities related to offensive operations. • At the time, PM Hashimoto also made it clear that the agreement extended to Taiwan. • These changes were partly made possible by the accelerated decline of leftist elements in both the LDP and the Socialist and Communist Parties. The LDP formed a number of special committees to study Constitutional reform. Constitutional change requires a 2/3 vote in the Diet and a national referendum.

16. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • Emerging perceived external threats also drove this process. • The DPRK’s launch of a satellite/missile in 1998 revealed defensive vulnerabilities. • Relations with China have deteriorated, partly because of Japan’s unwillingness to apologize for past Japanese actions in WWII. • China’s military buildup is also a concern. • China continues to threaten military retaliation if Taiwan declares independence, which could pull Japan towards war if the US assists Taiwan. • Territorial disputes (Senkaku, Takeshima, Kuril) remain unresolved.

17. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • US pressure also pushed Japan to step up its support for AWOT. • The War on Terror is seen as a direct threat to Japanese security. • In 2001, Japan enacted legislation that allowed it to support American military actions in Afghanistan. • This law, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, was sold as a temporary measure, but its renewal has become routine.

18. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • However, the LDP was careful to not totally break with Article 9, by limiting the scope of support operations. • It states that Japan must not constitute the threat of use of force, shall be implemented on the high seas or on the territory of a foreign state only in cases where consent from countries has been obtained, it is controlled by the Prime Minister and is carried out in cooperation with other relevant government agencies. • It also requires the PM to report any support activities to the Diet. It also allows the SDF to guard American troops from threats from terrorist attacks. • Both the SDJ and JCP believed that these changes openly violated Article 9. However, they did not have the votes necessary to change the legislation. • The legislation was adopted by a largely party line vote, which shows that there is still a lack of consensus about Japan’s progress towards becoming a more normal country. • Opposition groups believe that the new policies are contrary to the Yoshida Doctrine (1956).

19. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • For his part, PM Koizumi was careful to acknowledge the letter, if not the spirit of Article 9. • Other amendments to the Law on Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping Forces have also expanded the role of the military. The new amendments allow Japanese forces to monitor truces, deploy in buffer zones, interdict ships etc. • Japan’s participation in the Iraq conflict was driven by Koizumi’s belief that participation was necessary to maintain the Japanese-American alliance. • Public opinion was not supportive of this action, but the weakness of opposition groups allowed the LDP to move ahead with the deployments. • In 2003, the Law on Special Measures to Support the Restoration of Iraq was passed. It states that this is consistent with UN Security Council Resolutions calling for cooperation in restoring Iraq. • It allows Japanese forces to ‘actively maintain security’ by providing rear support to US offensive forces. It has a time limit of 4 years.

20. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • Renewal of the legislation supporting the US led coalition was scheduled for November 2007. • Recent elections placed the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto), in a position to block passage of the legislation. • It is unclear whether Japan’s new Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, will be able to force passage of the bill. As of 12/07, the legislation had not been renewed.

21. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • The DPJ asserts that: • 1) the DPJ’s opposition to the deployment had been a consistent party position since the legislation was first proposed to the Diet in 2003, • 2) the DPJ and Minshuto President Ozawa are firm believers in the importance of the Japan-US alliance • 3) Japan’s military operations overseas are currently restricted by the US-inspired Japanese Constitution, and • 4) the DPJ wishes to find ways to fulfill its international obligations without having to “override” the Constitution. • In short, the DPJ favors a more UN based diplomacy and opposes major changes to Article 9. This is consistent with Japanese public opinion.

22. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories V. Japan at a Crossroads: Future Security Options • Up to now, Japan has been moving away from single country pacifism. Continued dominance of the LDP under Koizumi solidified this trend. • However, this trend is not set in stone. New political actors have entered the scene. • The Japanese public is beginning to turn away from rightist extremist groups. • Some future security options for Japan include: • Develop ‘normal status’ and become an active ally of the US regionally and globally (ex. UK). • Develop ‘normal status’ as a strong independent actor and move away from US influence, possibly develop an independent nuclear deterrent and military-industrial complex. • Develop a UN centered security approach largely independent of US influence, expand offensive capabilities and military participation in robust peacekeeping activities (ex. Sweden). • Reinforce pacifist tendencies, move away from US influence, do not develop offensive military capabilities, focus on soft power and conflict prevention. • Others?

23. Japan’s Security Dilemma: Future Trajectories • For More Information: • Denny, Roy. 2004. “Disapproving Dragon: Japan‘s Growing Security Activity and Sino-Japan Relations.” Asian Affairs: An American Review. 31: 2, 101+. • Fukushima, Akiko. 1999. Japanese Foreign Policy: The Emerging Logic of Multilateralism. London: St. Martin’s Press. • Global Security. “Japanese Military Backgrounder.” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm. • Japan Ministry of Defense website : http://www.mod.go.jp/e/index.html. • Katzenstein and Okawara. “Japan and Asian-Pacific Security.” In Suh, J.J., Peter Katzenstein and Allen Carson (eds.) (2004). Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. • Senatorov, Alexei. 2004. “Japan: From Single-Country Pacifism to a Normal Country?” Far Eastern Affairs. 32:1, 55+. • Tamamoto, Masaru. 2005. “How Japan Imagines China and Sees Itself.” World Policy Journal. 22: 4, 55+.