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SeGW Certificate Revocation

S40-20090119-002. 3GPP2 TSG-S WG4. SeGW Certificate Revocation. Source: QUALCOMM Incorporated Contact(s) Anand Palanigounder ( apg@qualcomm.com ) Recommendation: Discuss and adopt. FAP/SeGW certificate revocation. FAP device certificate is not needed

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SeGW Certificate Revocation

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  1. S40-20090119-002 3GPP2 TSG-S WG4 SeGW Certificate Revocation Source: QUALCOMM Incorporated Contact(s) Anand Palanigounder (apg@qualcomm.com) Recommendation: Discuss and adopt

  2. FAP/SeGW certificate revocation • FAP device certificate is not needed • FAP authentication and authorization used • E.g., based on FEID, the Femto AAA authorize service during device authentication • SeGW server certificate support is noted as FFS • if SeGW server cert is compromised, how does the FAP know about it? • E.g. private key of the server cert compromised, etc

  3. Options • CRLs (Certificate Revocation List) • Can become quite large • Requires more processing at the femto • OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) • Simple Request/Response protocol to a server (OCSP) server • See RFC 2560

  4. OCSP Architecture • OCSP can be either from FAP manufacturer or a 3rd party CA provider • Depends on who owns the CA used for signing FAP certificates

  5. Conclusion/Proposal • It is proposed that OCSP is used to verify the status of SeGW server certificate

  6. IKEv2 profile for FAP/SeGW • Current profile for IKEv2: • Confidentiality: AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode; • Pseudo-Random Function: AES-XCBC-PRF-128; • Integrity: AES-XCBC-MAC-96; • Diffie -Hellman group 2048-bit MODP; • Editor’s Note: Whether we mandate support for 2048-bit MODP (or) 1028-bit MODP and integrity functions (AES-XCBC-MAC-96 or HMAC-SHA1-96) needs to be confirmed. • Proposed resolution for Editor’s note: • keep AES based transforms for PRF and integrity • Replace “Diffie-Hellman group 2048-bit MODP” with “Diffie-Hellman group 2 (1024-bit MODP)” • Rationale: • Diffie-Hellman group 2 mandatory for support according to IKEv2 RFC 4306 • Alignment with the non-legacy cryptographic suite in WLAN interworking (TS 33.234)

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