1 / 8

Publication and Protection of Site Sensitive Information in the OSG

This publication discusses the collection and publishing of sensitive information in the Open Science Grid (OSG). It explores the information collection systems, types of information being gathered, methods of data protection, and security risks. The publication also provides suggestions for protecting site data and securing publication channels.

virginiaobrien
Download Presentation

Publication and Protection of Site Sensitive Information in the OSG

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Publication and Protection of Site Sensitive Information in the OSG Shreyas Cholia <scholia@lbl.gov> NERSC Division, Lawrence Berkeley Lab Open Science Grid All-Hands Meeting RENCI, Chapel Hill, NC March 3rd, 2008

  2. Information Collection in OSG • To build a successful grid OSG must collect information from sites • OSG must publish collected information and make it available to interested parties • We want to analyze the vectors of information collection • Systems publishing/collecting information • Type of information being gathered • Methods of data protection applied to this information

  3. Information Collection Systems • GIP/CEMon • Gratia • Syslog-NG • RSV • site_verify • Monalisa • Others?

  4. Pulished Site Sensitive Information • Account Names, User DNs (VORS, Gratia) • Failure Modes, Security Related Details (Syslog-NG) • Historical System Availability (VORS) • System Load (MonALISA) • Application Names, Internal Paths (Gratia, CEMon) • Software Levels (CEMon)

  5. Security Risks • Gratia - public interface to Gratia DB • Track user activity on a site • Rival project can discover job information • In case of compromised cert/account, query DB for other sites with same account • Syslog-NG • Internal failure modes, other logging details available to non-site personnel • Security incident details no longer private • CEMon/VORS • List of valid user accounts, DNs made public • Software levels, Authn method public - possible “Google Hack” • Historical archive of system info (may be able to target recurring downtimes) • MonALISA • System Load Info - DoS attack during high load

  6. Data Protection (for Sites) • Turn down logging in Syslog-NG to minimal level • Start-stop times, User DN info • Use RSV instead of site_verify • Customize probes to meet site requirements • Modify GIP attributes • alter-attributes.txt, add attributes.txt • Customize Gratia probes to mask sensitive data • Use generic VO names instead of local account names in Gratia • osg-user-vo-map.txt • Site level collectors • Review and filter, before forwarding to OSG • Choose secure/encrypted publication channels

  7. Suggestions for OSG • Use encrypted SSL based communication for ALL information streams • https, GSI etc. • Authenticated access to web servers • Use GSI certs within browser to authenticate user • Limit access based on VO, or minimally based on OSG membership • Use “robots.txt” to prevent web caching • Consider authenticating clients using GSI hostcerts to match registered CE or equivalent.

  8. Conclusions • Not a replacement for hard security policies • Must fix and patch software regularly • Internally monitor systems • Sites should have more flexibility and control over published information • OSG should consider limiting public access to user/VO based access

More Related