Supporting Emergency-Response by Retasking Network Infrastructures

1. Supporting Emergency-Response by Retasking Network Infrastructures Presented by: Michael LeMay Carl A. Gunter

2. Outline • Introduction • Emergencies and Hazards to Networks • Networking Requirements During Emergencies • Traditional Emergency-Response • Network Topology and Application Trends • Emergency-Response with Retaskable Networks • Discussion

3. Introduction • Networks face various hazards during emergencies, and may cease to function as a result • Additional networking requirements may also arise during emergencies • Network availability during emergencies could be improved by allowing users to route communications over robust network infrastructures that managed to survive

4. Emergencies and Hazards to Networks • Katrina: Only significant operational network in downtown was wireless mesh for surveillance cameras • Hazards: Flooding, high winds • 9/11: Disrupted many networks routed through WTC • Hazards: Terrorist bombing • Kobe earthquake: ERNs could have helped prevent misdirection of recovery resources

5. Special Network Requirements During Emergencies • Distress signaling from victims to rescuers • Messaging (text, voice, or perhaps video) between and among victims and rescuers • Command and control for rescuers

6. Traditional Emergency Response • Dedicated ERNs: Often government-funded • Limited in scope according to budget • Ad-hoc mobile nodes deployed on an as-needed basis • May not penetrate to central parts of hazardous disaster zones • Manual retasking of existing networks (e.g. Katrina surveillance camera mesh) • Only utilizes a small portion of infrastructure elements, may not support necessary ERN application-level protocols

7. Network Topology and Application Trends • Self-healing mesh networks being used in increasingly-practical applications: • Advanced electric meters • Building and home automation systems • Parking garage monitoring • Surveillance cameras • Municipal wireless • May not be necessary for their original intended purpose when disaster occurs, so could support recovery efforts instead

8. Emergency-Response with Retaskable Networks • Proposal: Retask robust networks that survive a disaster to be used for emergency-response applications • Three primary challenges: • Emergency detection mechanisms and policies • Platform support • Topological readiness planning and assessment

9. Emergency Detection Mechanisms and Policies • Mechanisms: • Emergency declarations from central authorities • Sensor inputs (e.g. power outage detection on meters) • Human inputs (e.g. panic button on programmable communicating thermostat [PCT]) • Reasonable policy: • Digitally-signed indications from central authorities trusted absolutely • Sensor and human inputs weighted and compared to a threshold value

10. Hardware Platform Support • Network compatibility: All communicating devices must use compatible network protocols, or appropriate gateways/bridges must be available • Not yet widely available for all interesting protocols • Network availability: A sufficient subset of network devices and linkages must be operational to support ERN services • Device availability: Devices must be adequately protected against prevalent hazards in the deployment zone, and equipped with sufficient power reserves

11. Platform Support Examples GSM Gateway ZigBee Meters Wired networks GSM Mobile Phone ZigBee Gateway Rescuer Communicator w/ ZigBee Interface ZigBee Programmable Communicating Thermostat with ERN Enhancements

12. Software Platform Support • Software support must be provided for all desired ERN services • Potential approaches: • Software extensibility: Make network elements reconfigurable, so they can load any software components required for ERN services dynamically • Protocol standardization: Standardize simple protocols for ERN services that will have longevity due to their simplicity

13. Security Challenges • ERN functionality of retaskable networks must not negatively affect the network during normal operating conditions • Malicious users must not be able to trick network into falsely believing an emergency has occurred, to steal service • Network should provide best QoS to those who are at the highest risk in the emergency and those best equipped to assist them

14. ERN Topology Planning • Challenge: Varying capabilities of different types of networks (bandwidth, etc.), and unpredictable mobile nodes • Current topology optimization algorithms can potentially be adapted to ERN planning problems • We investigate the non-uniform buy-at-bulk approximation algorithm proposed by C. Chekuri, et. al. and adapt it to ERN planning

15. Adaptation of ERN Planning Algorithm • Rather than optimizing strictly for financial cost of resulting network, use artificial cost that prefers network links that are: • Robust against the particular hazards prevalent in the area under consideration • Financially inexpensive; particularly favorable for existing, retaskable infrastructure • Low latency • Provisional links that might be installed are included.

16. Example Topology Every node requires 50kbps bw. to every other node except the central ZigBee routers and A Every node requires 100kbps bw. to gateway A 100Mbps 250kbps 11Mbps

17. Future Research • Application-level protocols suitable for emergency-response • Security and QoS protocols for ERNs • Routing on dynamic networks with redundancy

18. Concluding Remarks • Robust networks are being deployed in practical applications • By retasking such networks after a disaster, emergency-response can be aided • There are significant problems to be overcome in: • Emergency detection • Hardware platform support for emergency-response • Software platform support for emergency-response

19. Questions? • Michael LeMay: mdlemay2@cs.uiuc.edu • Carl A. Gunter: cgunter@cs.uiuc.edu • Parent project page: http://seclab.uiuc.edu/attested-meter