Researching Disengagement & De-Radicalization

1. Researching Disengagement& De-Radicalization Professor John Horgan Director, Center for Terrorism & Security Studies School of Criminology and Justice Studies University of Massachusetts at Lowell John_Horgan@uml.edu Society for Terorism Research 2013, London

2. Question asked yesterday by Gilbert Ramsay • “What do you think has been the biggest change [in terrorism] over the past decade or so?”

3. IMHO The most significant change surrounds what it means to be ‘involved in terrorism’ Used to be easy to answer this, but not now! We struggle with basic questions around “motivation”, “intent”

5. Stagnant? • Hardly, but we need to ask where we are going and how we will get there • Involves thinking about why we continue to ask certain questions • Why do we study “radicalization” for example? What does each of us expect in terms of progress in that area?

6. LOL srsly?

7. Andrew Silkefrom yesterday • “We didn’t talk about ‘radicalization’ in the past…We talked about becoming a terrorist” • So why should we now? • What has changed?

8. A long time ago in a University far far away………

9. 2003

10. What I then called what is now “de-radicalization”

12. A New Hope?

15. The usual story in our field…

16. “On the whole, no attempt is made to deradicalise the most committed extremists, particularly those…who were involved in serious plots, successful or otherwise” Jason Bourke, Guardian, 9 June 2013

17. Evidence would suggest otherwise

18. “Around 2009 to 2010, this was very fashionable. It really looked like the answer. Now it is looking like a bit of a fad” Professor Peter Neumann International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation King's College, London

19. First, the basics • # of programs appears to be increasing • These programs contain multiple objectives, with broad remit • They are misleadingly defined as “de-radicalization” • When ‘de-rad’ is even an element, it is only one small part of overall reintegration and risk-reduction

20. Real World Applicability • Provides an exit pathway from terrorism • Re-socialize ex-members • Building civil society capacity and cooperation • Helps reduce # of active terrorists • Sow dissent and doubt within t groups • Acquire intelligence, evidence • Reduce dependency on repressive CT • Reduce economic & social costs of involuntary detention/imprisonment • Fostering ex-terrorists as potent CVE influence Revised from Bjorgo and Horgan, 2009

21. Important • Target group for such programs goes far beyond detainees • Terrorists at large • Prospective recruits • Imprisoned terrorists • Leaders and ideologues • Sympathizers • Parents, family members, community activists Adapted from Bjorgo and Horgan, 2009

22. At the heart of these programs (whatever we call them) is the need to better understand the disengagement process

23. Our current project • Pathways, Processes, Roles, and Factors for Terrorist Disengagement, Re-engagement and Recidivism

24. Components • Literature review • Autobiographical analysis • Semi-structured interviews • Translation and dissemination of findings

25. Literature types • Disengagement from terrorism • Criminal and gang desistance and recidivism • Disaffiliation from new religious movements • Turnover and commitment in conventional work organizations • Role exit and commitment in sociology and social psychology

29. Challenges Much of what is written about these programs isn’t based on reality Lingering conceptual confusion Sparse data => Insufficient momentum

30. Just the facts… • De-radicalization was never proposed as “the answer” • Critical questions have been asked since early 2008

31. Questions for Researchersi.e. are you interested in doing a PhD or Postdoc work with us? 

32. Most obvious, lingering question: Effective evaluation • Do such programs achieve their claims? • If so, how? • In particular, do individuals have to be “de-radicalized?” to reduce their risk of re-engagement

33. Effectiveness cannot be just about recidivism+Evaluation involves far more than just assessing outcomes

34. The question of behavioral sequencing

35. whatever radicalization model we embrace, involvement process is not linear • At least four broad ‘accounts’ readily found in literature • Become radicalized + do not become involved in terrorism • Become radicalized, then get involved in terrorism • Become involved in terrorism, then get radicalized • Become involved in terrorism without any radicalization • Horgan (in press) The Psychology of Terrorism 2nd Edition

36. Precise nature of the relationship between push and pull factors

38. Is ease of disengagement & de-radicalization role-dependent?

39. How can a disillusioned terrorist learn about exit pathways?

40. For example • What would an online, self-help resource for terrorists look like? • How can I find ways to get out of terrorism? • What can I expect? • Are there others who have gone through this?

41. How can we exert influence earlier in the process? i.e. “early” disengagement?

42. How can repentant former terrorists be used to counter violent extremism?* * And I don’t mean via celebrity ex-terrorists

44. Indonesia creative, targeted approaches

45. May be far more accurate to think of this not as “early disengagement” but displacement of problematic behaviors

46. How are individual & collective disengagement related?

47. Systematic Measures of De-Radicalization

48. Systematic Effects of De-Radicalization

49. Can we discover implicit measures of de-radicalization?*in development with Michael Williams, ONR

50. What are the greatest risk factors for recidivism and re-engagement?