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Intrusion Tolerant Server Infrastructure. Dick O’Brien DARPA PI Meeting July 18, 2000. Outline. Technical Objectives Technical Approach Metrics Expected Major Achievements Major Milestones Issues Transition Plans Policy. Technical Objective.
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Intrusion Tolerant Server Infrastructure Dick O’Brien DARPA PI Meeting July 18, 2000
Outline • Technical Objectives • Technical Approach • Metrics • Expected Major Achievements • Major Milestones • Issues • Transition Plans • Policy 7/18/2000
Technical Objective • Use independent network layer enforcement mechanisms to: • Reduce intrusions • Prevent propagation of intrusions that do occur • Provide automated load shifting when intrusions are detected • Support automated server recovery 7/18/2000
Technical Approach • Intrusion tolerant server components • Policy Enforcing Network Interface Cards (PENs) to provide network layer controls • Availability and Integrity Controller (AIC) to manage policy on the PENs and provide recovery and restoration functions 7/18/2000
Web Server 1 Netscape Solaris OS SPARC hw Web Server 2 IIS Windows 2K Intel hw AIC Intelligence Control PEN PEN PEN ITSI Architecture Network Client Client 7/18/2000
Policy Enforcing NICs • PENs are network interface cards that have been enhanced to provide additional controls • Packet Filtering • IPSEC support • Network layer audit • Dynamic response capability • Host independent • Centrally managed • PENs are being developed by SCC on other programs • DARPA funded: RDPF (IA) and ADF (AIA) • DOE funded: High Speed Firewall 7/18/2000
AIC Functions • PEN management • Packet filtering policies, IPSEC policies, redirection • Intrusion detection system interface • Anomaly logging and reporting • Load shifting • Response, recovery and restoration 7/18/2000
Operational Approach • Separate redundant servers into compartments • Detect intrusions into or faults within those compartments • Perform selective rerouting to ensure that benign users receive uninterrupted service • Identify corrupted data and restore it • Bring the server back on line and perform load balancing 7/18/2000
Metrics • Effectiveness of the approach • Metric: success rate in stopping/recovering from intrusions as measured by red team experiments • Metric: performance overhead as measured by application response time • Cost/Benefit analysis 7/18/2000
Expected Achievements • Technology that provides • strong network layering to protect against host compromises • compartmentalization of intrusions • dynamic prioritization of network traffic • semi-automated recovery techniques 7/18/2000
Major Milestones • 6 months: CONOPS, Architecture, Trade study • 12 months: Prototype system • 16 months: Experiments and Evaluation 7/18/2000
Issues • How much functionality/intelligence needs to be on the PEN? • How does the AIC determine what the best policy is to respond to an intrusion? • How does the AIC interface with ID/IR systems? • Can DoS attacks be stopped by the PEN? • Are COTS recovery products adequate? 7/18/2000
Transition Plans • Make results available to other researchers thru • Conference papers • Collaboration • Code sharing • Make results available to the DoD thru • Commercialization 7/18/2000
Policy • Policy appears in the ITSI in two ways: • PENs are policy enforcers • Packet filtering, packet redirection, load balancing, IPSEC, audit • The AIC defines and distributes policy dynamically 7/18/2000
