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Authentication 11 Dec 2001

Authentication 11 Dec 2001. David Kelsey CLRC/RAL, UK d.p.kelsey@rl.ac.uk. Meetings. WP6 Certificate Authorities Group Defining procedures for Authentication/Trust Dec 2000, March, June, August and Dec 2001 Agenda 6/7 Dec 2001 – CERN New CA’s (USA and Germany) Acceptance Matrix GGF CP/CPS

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Authentication 11 Dec 2001

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  1. Authentication11 Dec 2001 David KelseyCLRC/RAL, UKd.p.kelsey@rl.ac.uk D.P.Kelsey, Authentication

  2. Meetings • WP6 Certificate Authorities Group • Defining procedures for Authentication/Trust • Dec 2000, March, June, August and Dec 2001 • Agenda 6/7 Dec 2001 – CERN • New CA’s (USA and Germany) • Acceptance Matrix • GGF CP/CPS • Naming issues • Scaling problems • Next meeting Paris EDG Conference – March 2002 D.P.Kelsey, Authentication

  3. EDG CA’s • Already in TB1 • CERN, Czech Rep, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Nordic, Portugal, Russia, Spain, UK • In process of joining • USA (LBL/ESnet DOE Science Grid) • Karlsruhe (Germany, CrossGrid) D.P.Kelsey, Authentication

  4. Acceptance Matrix • Defined Minimum requirements for EDG CA • Don’t accept Globus certs • N * N matrix to show status of “acceptance” • Matrix rather sparse right now! • Every CA checks that it is “happy” with all others • Aim to complete this by 15 Feb 2002 D.P.Kelsey, Authentication

  5. Some issues • Host certificates • Need to find a CA prepared to issue them • Privacy of Private key • Scaling • Resources • Global trust • GGF CP • Authorisation vs Authentication • Naming D.P.Kelsey, Authentication

  6. Privacy of private key • Private key must be secret or else … • CP violation • Violation of Use Guidelines • Compromised keys should be revoked by CA • Service/Host certificates must relate to a single network entity • This will be enforced D.P.Kelsey, Authentication

  7. Scaling issues • Number of CA’s growing quickly • Number of certs per CA growing too fast • CERN users should apply to their national CA • Didn’t discuss the problem much • Resources required are large • To run a CA • To check trust with all others • Possible solutions • GGF CP work • Make Authentication lightweight • Bind name string to public key, but no meaning of name D.P.Kelsey, Authentication

  8. GGF CP/CPS • Discussed draft CP document • GGF hopes to agree this in Toronto (Feb 02) • 4 levels of assurance or just 2 levels? • Do we need proof of possession of private key? • Need to remove references to US Federal agencies • Central GGF repository • Plus audit • More scaling problems! D.P.Kelsey, Authentication

  9. Authentication vs Authorisation • Where do we put most effort checking identity? • Answer • As close to the resources as possible • Authorisation scheme will need to do most checking • Don’t duplicate the effort! • Authentication cert could bind random string to public key D.P.Kelsey, Authentication

  10. Naming • Flat namespace vs hierarchy? • What does the name mean anyway? • examples • /dc=doesciencegrid /dc=org /cn=John Smith 2654 • /c=uk /o=ESgrid /ou= GridPP/L=Manchester/ cn= John Smith • Main reason to keep flat • Remove all Authorisation information • Decided not to standardise • CA can do what they like D.P.Kelsey, Authentication

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