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Privacy Preserving analytics Private Set Intersection(PSI)

Privacy Preserving analytics Private Set Intersection(PSI). Mentor: Vladimir Kolesnikov (Bell Labs) Presenter: Ni Trieu (Oregon State University) Joint work with Ranjit Kumaresan & Mike Rosulek Supported by Office of Naval Research. PSI APP: Contact discovery. PSI APP: Online Advertising.

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Privacy Preserving analytics Private Set Intersection(PSI)

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  1. Privacy Preserving analytics Private Set Intersection(PSI) Mentor: Vladimir Kolesnikov (Bell Labs) Presenter: Ni Trieu (Oregon State University) Joint work with Ranjit Kumaresan & Mike Rosulek Supported by Office of Naval Research

  2. PSI APP:Contact discovery

  3. PSI APP: Online Advertising

  4. A naïve & Insecure PSI protocol Alice Bob X Y • Pro: Fast, and low communication • Con: Insecure, leak privacy of Bob's inputs Hash each elements of Y Hash each elements of X Bob sends H(Y) to Alice H(Y) H(X) Alice compares 2 sets of hash values, output the intersection X H(#)

  5. Current secure PSI protocol[PSZ14, pssz15]

  6. Current secure PSI protocol[PSZ14, pssz15]hashing to bins

  7. Current secure PSI protocol[PSZ14, pssz15]hashing to bins

  8. Current secure PSI protocol[PSZ14, pssz15] OT

  9. Current secure PSI protocol[PSZ14, pssz15] ? (λ-bit each) 0 OT

  10. OUR PSI Protocol SOT

  11. Comparison Results • Number of elements: 2^20 • Length of elements : 128 bits • Circuit-Based: +: general -: high run-time • Public-key-Based: +: good communication -: high run-time • OT-Based: +: best run-time +: best communication GMW'12 Yao'12 Opt. GMW OT+Hash'14 OT+Phasing'15 SOT DH'86 ï Na ve

  12. Our next Plan PSI for multi party: • Limited research: [FNP’04], [CJS’12] • Expensive crypto, Impractical.

  13. Thank you

  14. Reference • KKRT16. Vladimir Kolesnikov, Ranjit Kumaresan, Mike Rosulek, and Ni Trieu. Efficient batched oblivious PRF with applications to private set intersection. In ACM Computer and Communications Security (CCS’16), pages 818–829. ACM, 2016 • PSZ14. Benny Pinkas, Thomas Schneider, and Michael Zohner. Faster private set intersection based on OT extension. In USENIX Security Symposium’14, pages 797–812. USENIX, 2014. • PSSZ15. Benny Pinkas, Thomas Schneider, Gil Segev, and Michael Zohner. Phasing: Private set intersection using permutation-based hashing. In USENIX Security Symposium’15, pages 515–530. USENIX, 2015. • FNP04. Michael J. Freedman, Kobbi Nissim, and Benny Pinkas. Efficient private matching and set intersection. In Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT’04, volume 3027 of LNCS, pages 1–19. Springer, 2004 • CJS12 Jung Hee Cheon, Stanislaw Jarecki, and Jae Hong Seo. Multi-party privacy-preserving set intersection with quasi-linear complexity. IEICE Transactions, 95-A(8):1366–1378, 2012.

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