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Explore the Supreme Court decision in the Dillon v. Legg case, involving negligent infliction of emotional distress. Analysis of plaintiff assertion, defendant argument, issues, rules, reasoning, and conclusion.
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Supreme Court of California, In Bank. Margery M. DILLON et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. David Luther LEGG, Defendant and Respondent.
11 Content Plaintiff assertion Procedure history Facts 1 3 2 3 g g e e a a Defendant argument Issues Rules t t 6 5 4 n n 6 i i U U Reasoning Conclusion Q&A Section 9 7 8
11 Facts
11 Facts 01 Facts • on or about September 27, 1964, defendant drove his automobile in a southerly direction on Bluegrass Road near its intersection with Clover Lane in the County of Sacramento, and at that time plaintiff's infant daughter, Erin Lee Dillon, lawfully crossed Bluegrass Road. The complaint further alleged that defendant's negligent operation of his vehicle caused it to ‘collide with the deceased Erin Lee Dillon resulting in injuries to decedent which proximately resulted in her death.’ (Complaint, p. 3.) Plaintiff, as the mother of the decedent, brought an action for compensation for the loss.
11 Procedural History
11 Procedure History 02 • The Superior Court, Sacramento County, Robert W. Cole, J., granted defendant motorist a summary judgment on the mother's cause of action for emotional shock and physical injury to herself • the mother appealed. • The Supreme Court of California reversed • Action by plaintiff for wrongful death of child, for damages to the plaintiff because of emotional shock and physical injury and for damages on behalf of deceased's infant sister who witnessed fatal accident allegedly caused by negligence of defendant motorist.
11 Plaintiff Assertion
11 Plaintiff Assertion 03 The plaintiff alleged • defendant's negligent operation of his vehicle caused it to collide with the deceased Erin Lee Dillon resulting in injuries to decedent which proximately resulted in her death.’ Plaintiff, as the mother of the decedent, brought an action for compensation for the loss. • because of the negligence of defendants * * * and as a proximate cause thereof plaintiff * * * sustained great emotional disturbance and shock and injury to her nervous system’ which caused her great physical and mental pain and suffering. • Cheryl Dillon, another infant daughter, was ‘in close proximity to the * * * collision and personally witnessed said collision.’ Because of the negligence, Cheryl Dillon ‘sustained great emotional disturbance and shock and injury to her nervous system,’ which caused her great physical and mental pain and suffering. 01 02 03
11 Defendant Argument 04 Defendant Arguments ‘No cause of action is stated in that allegation that plaintiff sustained emotional distress, fright or shock induced by apprehension of negligently caused ***75**915 danger or injury or the witnessing of negligently caused injury to a third person. *732 Even where a child, sister or spouse is the object of the plaintiff's apprehension no cause of action is stated, Unless the complaint alleges that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress, fright or shock as a result of fear for his own safety.
11 Issues
11 Issues 05 • Whether the possibility of the increase of the number of suits and foment possible fraudulent claims could justify the denial of the recovery? • How can we define the extent of liability?
11 Rules
11 Rules 06 1、The impact rule It is a common law requirement that physical contact must occur to allow damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2、The zone-of-danger rule It is a remedy in tort law that provides for recovery of damages for emotional distress inflicted by a party’s negligent action. This rule provides for claiming damages if the claimant was located in dangerous area created by the negligent party and claimant was frightened by the fear of one’s own safety may result physical injury.
11 Reasoning
11 Reasoning 08 For the first issue: Whether the possibility of the increase of the number of suits and foment possible fraudulent claims could justify the denial of the recovery? ——The answer is no. • Courts are responsible for dealing with cases on their merits, whether there be few suits or many, and the existence of a multitude of claims merely shows society's pressing need for legal redress. • The possibility that fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in isolated cases does not justify a wholesale rejection of the entire class of claims in which that potentiality arises. • Such fallibility, inherent in the judicial process, offers no reason for substituting for the case-by-case resolution of causes an artificial and indefensible barrier.
11 Reasoning 08 For the first issue: Whether the possibility of the increase of the number of suits and foment possible fraudulent claims could justify the denial of the recovery? ——The answer is no. • In some cases which are in the areas of tort law in which the right to recover damages is well established in California, the danger of plaintiffs' fraudulent collection of damages for nonexistent injury is at least as great in these examples as in the instant case. • The rule that plaintiff's fear for his own safety is compensable also presents a strong argument for the same rule as to fear for others; otherwise, some plaintiffs will falsely claim to have feared for themselves, and the honest parties unwilling to do so will be penalized.
11 Reasoning 08 • In order to limit the otherwise potential infinite liability which would follow every negligent act, the law of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others which to defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable. For the second issue: How can we define the extent of liability?
11 Reasoning 08 • Then here comes an issue that how can we define the foreseeability of the defendant. We cannot now predetermine defendant's obligation in every situation by a fixed category; no immutable rule can establish the extent of that obligation for every circumstance of the future. We can, however, define guidelines which will aid in the resolution of such an issue as the instant one. For the second issue: How can we define the extent of liability?
11 Reasoning 08 • Then here comes an issue that how can we define the foreseeability of the defendant. In determining, in such a case, whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to plaintiff, or, in other terminology, whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty of due care, the courts will take into account such factors as the following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship. For the second issue: How can we define the extent of liability?
11 Reasoning 08 • Then here comes an issue that how can we define the foreseeability of the defendant. In the instant case, obviously, defendant is more likely to foresee that a mother who observes an accident affecting her child will suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger witness will do so. Similarly, the degree of foreseeability of the third person's injury is far greater in the case of his contemporaneous observance of the accident than that in which he subsequently learns of it. The defendant is more likely to foresee that shock to the nearby, witnessing mother will cause physical harm than to anticipate that someone distant from the accident will suffer more than a temporary emotional reaction. For the second issue: How can we define the extent of liability?
11 Conclusion
11 Conclusion 01 Conclusion • The possibility of the increase of the number of suits and foment possible fraudulent claims cannot justify the denial of the recovery. • We should decide the extent of the liability according to the foreseeability of the defendant. • The defendant has foreseeability of the mother’s injury caused by the emotional trauma.
11 Conclusion 01 Conclusion To deny recovery would be to chain this state to an outmoded rule of the 19th century which can claim no current credence. No good reason compels our captivity to an indefensible orthodoxy. ——The judgment is reversed.
11 Q&A Section
