David Evans http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans

1. Lecture 18: Money David Evans http://www.cs.virginia.edu/evans http://www.fun-with-money.com CS588: Cryptography University of Virginia Computer Science

2. Artist: Levente Jakab University of Virginia CS 588

3. Title 18, Section 474: Whoever prints, photographs, or in any other manner makes or executes any engraving, photograph, print, or impression in the likeness of any such obligation or other security, or any part thereof, or sells any such engraving, photograph, print, or impression, except to the United States, or brings into the United States, any such engraving, photograph, print, or impression, except by direction of some proper officer of the United States - is guilty of a class B felony. First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. University of Virginia CS 588

4. Properties of Physical Cash • Universally recognized as valuable • Easy to transfer • Anonymous • Works even when the banks are closed • Big and Heavy • Average bank robbery takes $4552 • 500 US bills / pound • Bill Gates net worth would be ~200 tons in $100 bills • Moderately difficult to counterfeit small quantities • Extremely difficult to get away with counterfeiting large quantities (unless you are Iran or Syria) University of Virginia CS 588

5. M EKRTB[H(M)] M = “The Trusty Bank owes the holder of this message $100.” Bank IOU Protocol Trusty Bank Alice {KUA, KRA} {KUTB, KRTB} University of Virginia CS 588

6. M EKRTB[H(M)] Bank IOU Protocol Trusty Bank M EKRTB[H(M)] Alice {KUTB, KRTB} {KUA, KRA} Bob’s secret curry recipe EKUA[Bob’s secret curry recipe] Bob University of Virginia CS 588

7. M M EKRTB[H(M)] EKRTB[H(M)] Bank IOU Protocol M EKRTB[H(M)] Trusty Bank Bob University of Virginia CS 588

8. Bank IOU Protocol • Universally recognized as valuable • Easy to transfer • Anonymous • Heavy • Moderately difficult to counterfeit in small quantities • Extremely difficult to get away with counterfeiting large quantities University of Virginia CS 588

9. Bank Identifiers • Bank adds a unique tag to each IOU it generates • When someone cashes an IOU, bank checks that that IOU has not already been cashed • Can’t tell if it was Alice or Bob who cheated • Alice loses her anonymity – the bank can tell where she spends her money University of Virginia CS 588

10. Digital Cash, Protocol #1 • Alice prepares 100 money orders for $1000 each. • Puts each one in a different sealed envelope, with a piece of carbon paper. • Gives envelopes to bank. • Bank opens 99 envelopes and checks they contain money order for $1000. • Bank signs the remaining envelope without opening it (signature goes through carbon paper). University of Virginia CS 588

11. Digital Cash, Protocol #1 cont. • Bank returns envelope to Alice and deducts $1000 from her account. • Alice opens envelope, and spends the money order. • Merchant checks the Bank’s signature. • Merchant deposits money order. • Bank verifies its signature and credits Merchant’s account. University of Virginia CS 588

12. Digital Cash, Protocol #1 • Is it anonymous? • Can Alice cheat? • Make one of the money orders for $100000, 1% chance of picking right bill, 99% chance bank detects attempted fraud. • Better make the penalty for this high (e.g., jail) • Copy the signed money order and re-spend it. • Can Merchant cheat? • Copy the signed money order and re-deposit it. University of Virginia CS 588

13. Digital Cash, Protocol #2 • Idea: prevent double-spending by giving each money order a unique ID. • Problem: how do we provide unique IDs without losing anonymity? • Solution: let Alice generate the unique IDs, and keep them secret from bank. University of Virginia CS 588

14. Digital Cash, Protocol #2 • Alice prepares 100 money orders for $1000 each, adds a long, unique random ID to each note. • Puts each one in a different sealed envelope, with a piece of carbon paper. • Gives envelopes to bank. • Bank opens 99 envelopes and checks they contain money order for $1000. • Bank signs the remaining envelope without opening it. University of Virginia CS 588

15. Digital Cash, Protocol #2 cont. • Bank returns envelope to Alice and deducts $1000 from her account. • Alice opens envelope, and spends the money order. • Merchant checks the Bank’s signature. • Merchant deposits money order. • Bank verifies its signature, checks that the unique random ID has not already been spent, credits Merchant’s account, and records the unique random ID. University of Virginia CS 588

16. Digital Cash, Protocol #2 • Is it anonymous? • Can Alice cheat? • Can Merchant cheat? • Can bank catch cheaters? University of Virginia CS 588

17. Mimicking Carbon Paper • How does bank sign the envelope without knowing what it contains? • Normal signatures Alice sends bank M Bank sends Alice, SM = EKRBank (M) Alice shows SM to Bob who decrypts with banks public key. University of Virginia CS 588

18. Blind Signatures • Alice picks random k between 1 and n. • Sends bank t = mke mod n. (e from Bank’s public key). • Bank signs t using private key d. Sends Alice: td = (mkemod n)d mod n = (mke)dmod n  mdkedmod n = (mke)dmod n  mdkedmod n What do we know about kedmod n? University of Virginia CS 588

19. Blind Signatures • Alice gets td mdkmod n • Alice divides by k to get sm mdk/ k  md mod n. • Hence: bank can sign money orders without opening them! University of Virginia CS 588

20. Digital Cash Protocol #2 • Instead of envelopes, Alice blinds each money order using a different randomly selected ki. • The bank asks for any 99 of the ki’s. The bank unblinds the messages (by dividing) and checks they are valid. • The bank signs the other money order. • Still haven’t solved the catching cheaters problem! University of Virginia CS 588

21. Anonymity for Non-Cheaters • Spend a bill once – maintain anonymity • Spend a bill twice – lose anonymity • Have we seen anything like this? University of Virginia CS 588

22. Digital Cash • Alice prepares n money orders each containing: Amount Uniqueness String: X Identity Strings: I1 = (h(I1L), h(I1R)) ... In = (h(InL), h(InR)) Each In pair reveals Alice’s identity (name, address, etc.). I = IiL IiR. h is a secure, one-way hash function. University of Virginia CS 588

23. Digital Cash, cont. • Alice blinds (multiplies by random k) all n money orders and sends them to bank. • Bank asks for any n-1 of the random kis and all its corresponding identity strings. • Bank checks money orders. If okay, signs the remaining blinded money order, and deducts amount from Alice’s account. University of Virginia CS 588

24. Digital Cash, cont. • Alice unblinds the signed note, and spends it with a Merchant. • Merchant asks Alice to randomly reveal either IiL or IiR for each i. (Merchant chooses n-bit selector string.) • Alice sends Merchant corresponding IiL’s or IiR’s. • Merchant uses h to confirm Alice didn’t cheat. University of Virginia CS 588

25. Digital Cash, cont. • Merchant takes money order and identity string halves to bank. • Bank verifies its signature, and checks uniqueness string. If it has not been previously deposited, bank credits Merchant and records uniqueness string and identity string halves. University of Virginia CS 588

26. Digital Cash, cont. • If it has been previously deposited, bank looks up previous identity string halves. Finds one where both L and R halves are known, and calculates I. Arrests Alice. • If there are no i’s, where different halves are known, arrest Merchant. University of Virginia CS 588

27. Digital Cash Protocol • Universally recognized as valuable • Easy to transfer • Anonymous • Heavy • Moderately difficult to counterfeit in small quantities • Extremely difficult to get away with counterfeiting large quantities University of Virginia CS 588

28. Digital Cash Summary • Preserves anonymity of non-cheating spenders (assuming large bank and standard denominations) • Doesn’t preserve anonymity of Merchants • Requires a trusted off-line bank • Expensive – lots of computation for one transaction • Other schemes (Peppercoin, Millicent, CyberCoin, NetBill, etc.) proposed for smaller transactions University of Virginia CS 588

29. Printing more valuable paper than cash? University of Virginia CS 588

30. University of Virginia CS 588

31. Germany 2006 Tickets • Tickets will include RFID • Encodes name, birthdate and passport number of purchaser University of Virginia CS 588

32. RFID Tags • Passive devices • Uses RF signals from reader for power • Range: a few meters • Little memory: ~128 bits • Little computation: no real cryptography • Transmit number in response to request from reader University of Virginia CS 588

33. 0 1 ? 00 01 10 11 000 010 111 101 001 011 100 110 RFID Reader • To avoid conflicts RFID reader queries bit-by-bit Graph from Ari Juels slide University of Virginia CS 588

34. “Just in case you want to know, she’s got 700 Euro and 20 World Cup tickets…” RFID Applications More Efficient Mugging From Ari Juels USENIX Security 2004 talk: RFID: Security and Privacy for Five-Cent Computers http://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/slides/juels.htm University of Virginia CS 588

35. 0 1 ? 00 01 10 11 000 010 111 101 001 011 100 110 Blocking RFID [Juels, Rivest, & Szydlo CCS ‘03] • Recall RFID Reader: Graph from Ari Juels slide University of Virginia CS 588

36. RFID Blocker • Is there a tag that starts with 0? • Is there a tag that stats with 1? • Always respond yes, represent all possible tags University of Virginia CS 588

37. Picture from Ari Juels talk University of Virginia CS 588

38. Charge • Cryptographers can make infinite amounts of money (but can’t make it heavy) • CS150 Plug: Fall 2005 Course • Computer Science: from Ada & Euclid to Quantum Computing and the World Wide Web • Open to all University students • No computing background expected • But…covers material that will be new to most 4th year CS students • Recruit your friends (especially from the College) to take it University of Virginia CS 588