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Why Control System Cyber-Security Sucks… Me waiting for a change of paradigm. Attackers’ advantage: There is no 100% security They choose time, place, method Defenders’ dilemma: Need to protect against all Lack of money/resources/networks ( Int’l ) Law always a step behind.
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WhyControl System Cyber-SecuritySucks… Me waiting for a change of paradigm.
Attackers’ advantage: • There is no 100% security • They choose time, place, method • Defenders’ dilemma: • Need to protect against all • Lack of money/resources/networks • (Int’l) Law always a step behind Attack vs. Defense
Industrial control systems and the role of corporate ITDr. Stefan.Lueders@cern.ch Cyber Defence Summit, March 4th-5th 2013, Muscat (OMAN) (R)Evolution of Control Systems
PC-Level: • Infiltration of plant • Infection of PC • Reconnaissance for target • PLC-Level: • Manipulation of communication • Fingerprinting of PLC • Reconfiguration of PLC • Obscuring communication • Process-Level: • Sabotage of process Stuxnet (2010)
Safety! • Needs heavy compliancetesting (vendor & utility) • Potential loss of guarantees& certification (e.g. SIL) • Availability: • Rare maintenance windows • Legacy: • Old or embedded devices • Integrity: • S/W development live-cycles • Thorough regression testing • Nightly builds • Full configuration management • Availability: • Redundancy & virtualization • Legacy: • (rare) The Problem of Patching
Safety! • Access must always be guaranteed • Shared accounts • Encryption too “heavy” • Legacy: • Default passwords • Undocumented backdoors • Impossible IdM integration • No ACLs, iptables, etc. • Security: • Split of AuthN & AuthZ • SSO, LDAP & AD • Kerberos, x509 & 2-factor AuthN • Legacy: • (rare) The Problem of Access Control
Robustness: • Use-cases, not abuse-cases • Not always compliant to standards • No certification (yet?) • Security: • Not integral part……or through obscurity • Low priority, low knowledge • Unwillingness to share incidents… • Robustness: • (“Externally sponsored”)penetration testing &vulnerability scanning • Security: • Decades ofexperience & knowledge • CSIRT: Protection,detection & response • Responsible disclosure The Problem of Robustness
Do you have followed appropriate training incl. on security paradigms? employed a version control system for your software and configuration? considered standard IT technologies offered by your IT department (e.g. DBs, web servers)? populated an inventory of all devices, accounts, applications, … as well as a list of their dependencies (e.g. NTP)? deployed an independent test system you can tamper with? conducted a penetration test to see whether your equipment is sufficiently robust? changed all defaults (passwords!) and removed unnecessary functionality? established procedures for applying timely software updates? agreed on a contingency plan in case your system fails? 10 Questionsto YOU
PCS are (still) not designed to be secure.They fulfil use-cases and also abuse cases. Defence-in-Depth is the key.Make security part as functionality, usability,availability, maintainability, performance! Align Control System Cyber-Security with IT security!Patch procedures, access protection, robustness,certification & documentation need significant improvement. Hack the box! Buy any PCS on eBay and throw your favourite pen suite at it.Push vendors & start responsible disclosure …and please do not use this presentation as an excuse to do nothing !!! Summary