Banco Central e Democracia

1. Banco Central e Democracia Aula 5 Ciencia Politica CGAE EAESP-FGV Kurt von Mettenheim

2. Estrutura da aula • Introdução: banco central e democracia • “Statecrafting Monetary Authority” no Brasil vs ortodoxia • Momentos políticos e oportunidades de evitar crises financeiras em mercados emergentes. • “de uma economia da política para uma ciência política da construção da autoridade monetária” Duas anomalias brasileiras: * BACEN avança depois da estabilidade de preços * Bancos públicos lideram processo financeiro... 5) Resultados: a) “depois das tempestades” financeiras Brasil sai bem b) Brasil no topo da lista (do IIF, Institute for International Finance) de relacionamento com o mercado e transparência de informação

3. Introdução “You cannot in a democratic society have an institution which is either fully or partially disassociated from the electoral process, and which has the powers that central banks inherently have. (Alan Greenspan) Chapter 6, “On Monetary Authority” Laurence Whitehead, Democratization. Oxford University Press, 2002

4. Pesquisas  Publicação Unidade Temática FAPESP: A Construção de Autoridade Monetária no Brasil numa Epóca de Globalização Chapter 10 : From the Economics of Politics to the Politics of Monetary Policy Kurt von Mettenheim

5. The Political Dynamics of Financial Crises in‘Emerging Market’ DemocraciesLaurence Whitehead

6. Eight Stage Tree: Political Opportunities to Avert Crisis Political Response Time Line (election=0) ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Binding I Pre-commitment + 1 to 10 years ⁄ \ Yes No II Negotiated Pre-insurance + 3 to 12 months / \ Yes No III Campaign Pact + 1 to 4 months / \ Yes No IV Market-Friendly 0 Election / \ Yes No V Post Electoral Discipline - 1 to 4 weeks / \ Yes No VI Capitulate to Market - 1 to 12 weeks Demands / \ Yes No VII International Rescue - 1 to 4 months / \ Yes No VIII Financial Crisis Overshoot Anytime -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7. Crafting Economic Stabilization: Political Discretion and Technical Innovation in the Implementation of the Real PlanLourdes Sola & Eduardo Kugelmas

10. Wall Street and Emerging Democracies: Financial Markets and the Brazilian Presidential Elections, Javier Santiso

11. > 2000 bps EMBI Risk and Default

12. View from Wall Street(April 2003)

13. View from Wall Street(December 2003)

19. From an Economics of Politics tothe Politics of Monetary Policy in Brazil 2 anomalies 1 = causal direction between price stability and independent central banking (assumed by economists and neo-liberal theory) reversed: advances in central banking in Brazil occurred after heterodox policies ended inertial inflation during 1993-1994. 2 = after a decade of price stability and financial liberalisation, the three largest banks in Brazil remain government owned and run financial institutions.

20. Fuga de capital, 2001-2002

21. Mas o Brasil evita dolarizar...

22. Então têm espaço para:Políticas Financeiras PROER, Programa de Reestruturação e Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro (1996); FGC, Fundo Garantidor de Créditos (1996) A ampliação do poder de intervenção do Banco Central (Lei 9.447. de 14.3.1997); PROES, Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade Bancária (1996); PROEF, Programa de Fortalecimento das Instituições Financeiras Federais (1999);

23. FGC acalmou clientes bancários

24. PROER liquidou bancos quebrados BankInterventionsBuyer ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Banco Econômico Excel e Caixa EconômicaFederal* Banco Nacional Unibanco Banco Mercantil de Pernb. Rural Banco Banorte Bandeirantes Banco Bamerindus HSBC. Caixa** Banco do Brasil (BB) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Departamento de Operações Bancárias (1) Julho/1994 a maio/1997 (2) Apenas a carteira imobiliária.

25. E evitou custo maior de crise bancária

26. “Recentralização”= PROES: O Programa de Incentivo à Redução do Setor Público Estadual na Atividade Bancária (Proes). Medida Provisória 1.514. de 7.8.1996. Banacre, Banco do Estado do Acre S.A. Banap, Banco do Estado do Amapá S.A. Bandern, Banco do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte S.A. BDRN, Banco de Desenvolvimento do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte S.A. Bemat, Banco do Estado do Mato Grosso S.A Beron, Banco do Estado de Rondônia S.A. Minascaixa, Caixa Econômica do Estado de Minas Gerais Produban, Banco do Estado de Alagoas S.A. Baner Banco do Estado de Roraima S.A. (liquidated) Bandepe, Banco do Estado de Pernambuco S.A. Baneb, Bancoc do Estado de Bahia S.A. Banerj, Banco do Estado de Rio de Janeiro S.A. Banestado, Banco do Estado de Paraná S.A. Bemge, Banco do Estado de Minas Gerais, S.A. Credireal Banco de Crédito Real de Minas Gerais S.A. Paraiban Banco do Estado da Paraíba S.A Banespa, Banco do Estado de São Paulo S.A. BEA, Banco do Estado de Amazonas S.A. BEC, Banco do Estado de Ceará S.A. BEG, Banco do Estado de Goiás S.A. BEM, Banco do Estado de Maranhão S.A. BEP, Banco do Estado de Piaui S.A. BESC, Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina S.A.

27. Anomalia: BACEN avança depois da estabilidade de preços, 1994+ BCB antes de 1994 =atender a demandas para acompanhar o cumprimento das medidas estabelecidas pelos diversos planos econômicos (Plano Cruzado. Plano Bresser. Plano Verão. Plano Collor Ie Plano Collor II). • deficiências na estrutura operacional. • decorrentes da falta de equipamentos de informática. • de equipes devidamente treinadas

28. BACEN medidas Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision, setembro de 1997. • Regras de prudência bancária • Limites mínimos de capital para a constituição de instituições financeiras. • Limites adicionais de acordo com o grau de risco da estrutura dos ativos • Índice de Basileia, 8, BCB 1999 = 11

29. BACEN medidas cont. • Inspeção Global Consolidada (IGC). • A Central de Risco de Crédito. 22.5.1997. = banco de dados com base em informações prestadas pelas instituições financeiras sobre obrigações • E de seus clientes de valores atualmente superiores a R$ 5.000.00. • Rating Resolução 2.12.1999. cada instituição financeira passou a informar a classificação de cada operação de crédito. numa lista de 9 níveis de risco. que vai de AA (melhor classificação) até H (pior classificação). • SBP = 2002 online realtime balance supervision

30. Multas aplicadas a bancos pelo Banco Central do Brasil Consultas de bancos ao Centro de Risco do Banco Central do Brasil

31. Estrutura do Banco Central

32. Nomes... • Decad, Departamento de Cadastro e Informações • Decif, Departamento de Combate Ilícitos Cambiais e Financeiros • Defin Departamento de Gestão de Informações do Sistema Financeiro • Defis Departamento de Fiscalização • Depad Departamento de Controle de Processos • Desin Departamento de Supervisão Indireta • Desup Departamento de Supervisão Direta • Difis Diretoria de Fiscalização

33. Longo caminho...Credit to Private Sector (% GDP) 1 Simple average of country data. 2 Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 3 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Moving average of current and previous year private credit levels to current year GDP.

34. After the Financial Storms: BOVESPA Interest Rate Futures Market, 1996-2007 Russia  Asia  Brazil  Lula 9-11

35. Progress in Brazil 2004-2007 Inflation Expectations & 1) Credit % GDP 2) Average Loan Term (days)

36. Bank Spreads Very High but Falling Consumer Corporate

37. “Cohabitation” Bank Credit and Stock Market Growth: IPOs 2000-2006

38. Resultados, II

40. IIF Investor Relations Ranking

42. Data Dissemination Practices 1) Central Government Operations (CGO). Timeliness: 1 month after the end of the reference period, Periodicity: Monthly MGFS 1986: Identifies countries that use classification of fiscal statistics according to the IMF's A Manual of Government Finance Statistic 1986 (MGFS 1986) MGFS 2001: Identifies if government accounting follows the definicion and classification of the IMF's Government Finance Statistics Manual, 2001 (MGFS 2001). 2) Central Government Debt (CGD). Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly 3) Amortization Schedule for CGD. Preferably, dissemination of government debt service presented at least annually for a period of at least five years from the effective date of the debt data. It is desirable that the annual data should be supplemented with quarterly data at least for the year immediately ahead. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference periodPeriodicity: Quarterly 4) External Debt. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly 5) Amortization Schedule for External Debt. It is important that data cover both public and private sector debt. Preferably, amortization payments presented at least annually for a period of at least five years from the effective date of the debt data. It is desirable that the annual data should be supplemented with quarterly data at least for the year immediately ahead. Timeliness: 1 quarter after the end of the reference period Periodicity: Quarterly

43. March 8, 2007 IIF Report on Central Bank of Brazil The investor relations office, Gerin, at the Central Bank of Brazil has enhanced the content of its website to make information important to investors more easily accessible. With these improvements, Gerin has become the first individual office to score 38 out of 38 in prioritized terms. Brazil has been a market leader in investor relations practices for many years. In 2006, Brazil became the first sovereign to score 38 out of 38 in prioritized terms. Brazil operates two investor relations programs. Gerin is operated by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) and a second National Treasury Investor Relations Unit (IRU) is operated by the Debt Management Office at the National Treasury. The existence of the two offices has evolved out of organizational changes. BEST = Brazil: Excellence in Securities Transactions (BEST Brazil) activities. The BEST Brazil initiative is aimed at promoting the Brazilian capital markets to the international investor community involving various official agencies including, in addition to the Treasury and the BCB, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil. With the inclusion of links to regulatory information, archives, and information regarding roadshows, Gerin now satisfies three additional criteria for a total of 20. The prioritized score moved from a total of 34 to a score of 38. Gerin has surpassed global leaders Korea, Mexico, and the Philippines.

44. Financial Roads to Social EconomiesPublic Banking, Monetary Authority and Social Inclusion Kurt Mettenheim Maria Fernanda Freire de Lima Paper to be presented to the Society for the Advancement of Social Economics 23rd Meeting, Transformations of Contemporary Capitalism: Actors, Institutions, Processes. Research Network N, “Finance and Society” Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 24 June 2011

45. Arguments Recent developments in central banking and public banking  possible to radically increase the pace of financial and social inclusion. Financial liberalization and bank modernization have led to the realization of competitive advantages by large public banks. Citizenship (ATM) cards = innovation to alleviate poverty, promote social inclusion and increase access to banking. Basic income policies / Conceptions of citizenship & social justice = alternative model to microfinance via “entrepreneurship, financial markets and private banks.” New policies for inclusion of bankless vast majorities in large emerging countries suggest that views of fiscal dominance, structural constraints to change and zero-sum relations between central banking, politics and social inclusion need revision.

46. From the Macroeconomics of Populismto the Microeconomics of Social Inclusion “Most economists would agree that, at least in the short run, monetary policy can significantly influence the course of the real economy” Bernanke & Gertler “Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission.” p. 27 We ask: Can it accelerate social inclusion? (yes) Past Keynesian and Development New Microeconomic Banking Policies Increase Aggregate Demand. Policies Increase Aggregate Supply

47. LifetimeAsset Curve IF >IR + Inequality

48. Can we wait for financial inclusionuntil 2030?

49. 4 scenarios for banking the bankless

50. Core Principles for Alternative Banking and Social Inclusion