NIWG Topics

1. NIWG Topics 20 August 2014

2. NIWG Topics • The NAC has created 4 NexGen Implementation Working Groups to cover near-term implementation activities • Data Comm is one of the four groups DCL (S1P1) and En-Route (S1P2) • Tackling some of the issues we’ve identified but struggled with in DCIT (e.g. Data Recording Rule) • Good compliment to DCIT: high-level direction rather than technical work • NIWG topics to brief-out today • Use of non-VDL-2 sub-networks in en-route airspace (e.g. POA) • FANS-1/A+ • En-Route Risk Mitigation (trials, test plan, etc.) • B737 airway/airway status

3. NIWG and POA (non-VDL-2 use in en-route) • NIWG recommendations • NIWG recommends that the FAA allow operators to use FANS 1/A over media other than VDL-2, including POA, in domestic US en route airspace. • If any media other than VDL-2 is used, the operator would be responsible for contracting with an air-ground communications provider and complying with any corresponding communications performance requirements. • In order to assess their ability to fulfill this responsibility, operators need the underlying performance requirements • Harris, Chris Collings, will provide a performance requirements briefing at DCIT-36, covering non-VDL-2 media

4. NIWG FANS-1/A+ • FANS-1/A+ Description • FANS-1/A+ is a mitigation means for messages which are delayed in the air/ground data communications network, and then delivered to the flight deck leading to the potential for a superseded clearance being acted on by the aircrew. FANS-1/A+ refers to a function which either discards the message with a rejection notice to the ground, or annunciates the late time of delivery to the aircrew so that they do not act on the message without contacting air traffic control. •  NIWG Recommendation • The FAA does not require FANS-1/A+ for Tower Services. The FAA does require FANS-1/A+ for en-route services, in order to mitigate the latent message hazard. • However, some aircraft are unable to install FANS-1/A+, at least not without such a high cost that the business case for equipping that aircraft no longer closes. • For these aircraft, FAA Flight Standards has advised the NIWG that they will consider alternate mitigation means for the latent message hazard for those operators that have identified an alternate mitigation means and that apply to utilize that mitigation means. • Next Steps • As with POA, in order to assess their ability to find an alternate mitigation means, operators need the underlying requirements that they need to meet. • Operators have requested these requirements from the FAA Program

5. NIWG Recommendations(En-Route Risk Mitigation) • Historical context • The DCL (S1P1) Phase of the FAA’s Data Comm Program has benefited from a comprehensive in-service trials program. This trials program, conducted for multiple years at Memphis and Newark airports and supported by FedEx, UPS, and United Airlines, along with the Air Traffic Control facilities serving those airports, has resulted in extensive changes to the original designs for DCL Services. Observations and changes arising from these trials have been significant enough that it is widely accepted among participants, and the DCIT that guided the implementation, conduct, and lesson captures from these trials that the operational system would have failed upon introduction without them. •  En-route recommendations • Industry and the FAA collectively believe that, while such trials would benefit the En-Route (S1P2) Phase of the FAA’s Data Comm Program, they are not required for the successful deployment of En-Route Services. En-route trials of a similar fidelity to surface trials are not practical and there are alternative risk mitigations. • The NIWG recommends that as long as the collaborative and consultative requirements capture and issue resolution methodology is carried forward into en-route systems and procedure development, comprehensive trials are not necessary for en-route (S1P2). On establishment of S1P2 baseline NIWG recommends that the S1P2 test program, including potential flight evaluations and capabilities such as the Lockheed Martin S1P2 Prototype, be brought into DCIT for consultative review in order to allow gaps to be identified and resolved. • DCIT has established actions to begin receiving and reviewing this material at DCIT-36 in October 2014. DCIT will use this material to conduct a risk assessment that can be used to assess the test program and identify such gaps. Potential mitigation means the DCIT will explore during this exercise include pre-release operational testing, and will cover the period from the current developmental activities up to the final operational tests prior to S1P2 IOC.

6. B737 Airway-to-Airway

7. U11 Status • The minimum B737 FMC version for the FAA Program, including DCL, is U11 • U11 is scheduled for a May 2015 Service Bulletin • B737 operators can achieve activation, approval, and training for operations out of applicable DCL sites

8. 1. Airway-Airway intersections on B737 • There are 2 known issues with Airway/Airway intersections 1.The GE FMC does not allow Airway to Airway construct, without a published waypoint at the intersection: • SUZIE.J80.J196.BCE • This feature is not specific to datalink, it is core to the FMC’s route processing • B737 operators know how to work with it • Changing this processing would be a new and complex feature which will take time to introduce

9. 2. Airway-Airway Intersections • The GE FMC does not insert a DISCON on route review pages where the uplinked airways should appear • this makes it possible for the crew to overlook the fact that data is missing, even though “partial clearance loaded” is displayed • See pictures on following slide • This is something which can and should be fixed quickly

10. Back-up

11. No DISCON displayed (80) : Cleared [routeclr] orig airport(): KEWR dest airport(): KSFO arrprocname(): ARR,MOD4,OAL route info(): 6 (pub): GYNTS (pub): SUZIE (airway): J80 (airway): J100 (pub): BCE (pub): OAL Intersection point “SAKES” is not uplinked J80 and J100 do not load. NO DISCONS displayed

12. What we’re trying to achieve in DCIT • Data Comm PM understands and supports the utility of trials • To date there’s been no clear business case for the trials • NAC NIWG requested DCIT input on the business case • Fielded the work at 6 August ERWG • Previous DCIT material not specific enough to justify trials • Consolidated specific risk items from our previous material into a table • ERWG to review for finalization between now and DCIT-35 • Risk areas • Means of reducing risk (trials and alternate means) • Key need: at least one risk area that • Is sufficient to drive the business case • Can be significantly reduced through trials completed in 2015 • Implemented, flown, and results consolidated by end-cy2015

13. DCIT Path • 8/8/14: brief NIWG on status • 8/15/14: ERWG members provide input to Table • Action: Rob to update table based on inputs • Review any available trials format material that can be provided • Potential Airspace type(s) involved • Potential aircraft and aircrew involved • Potential services and messaging involved • We (ERWG) do not know where to go for this information, so we are operating on our current assumptions • 8/22/14: Discuss and finalize at DCIT-35, with recommendations to DCP PM and to NIWG • Primary goal: identify at least one risk area sufficient to drive the business case for limited trials in 2015 • No feedback has been received

14. DCIT ERWG inputs to NIWG, 8/8/14 • To evaluate risk reduction potential for trials, DCIT needs iterative and consultative dialogue on trials infrastructure and format (# a/c, airspace size, ATC operational context) • DCL-style trials may not be necessary to mitigate the risk areas • Descriptions so far would prevent DCL-style trials in any case • As trials format is not yet available, ERWG is assuming the following format • The trials will be implemented, flown, and results consolidated by end-cy2015. • The trials will be limited in airspace and operational hours. • The trials will be limited in aircrew, airline, and aircraft type participation. • The trials will be limited in terms of integration with daily ATC operations • DCIT recommended that NIWG review previous DCIT material • Especially a/c impact slide, but also back-up material from these slides • Quantification of the value of DCL trials, in terms of Requirements changes for production system • FAA or Harris would need to provide an update to the May 2013 DCIT presentation on this topic

15. Table Review (sample)

16. NIWG Recommendations • Historical context • The DCL (S1P1) Phase of the FAA’s Data Comm Program has benefited from a comprehensive in-service trials program. This trials program, conducted for multiple years at Memphis and Newark airports and supported by FedEx, UPS, and United Airlines, along with the Air Traffic Control facilities serving those airports, has resulted in extensive changes to the original designs for DCL Services. Observations and changes arising from these trials have been significant enough that it is widely accepted among participants, and the DCIT that guided the implementation, conduct, and lesson captures from these trials that the operational system would have failed upon introduction without them. •  En-route recommendations • Industry and the FAA collectively believe that, while such trials would benefit the En-Route (S1P2) Phase of the FAA’s Data Comm Program, they are not required for the successful deployment of En-Route Services. • En-route trials of a similar fidelity to surface trials are not practical and there are alternative risk mitigations. • The NIWG recommends that as long as the collaborative and consultative requirements capture and issue resolution methodology is carried forward into en-route systems and procedure development, comprehensive trials are not necessary for en-route (S1P2). • On establishment of S1P2 baseline NIWG recommends that the S1P2 test program, including potential flight evaluations, be brought into DCIT for consultative review in order to allow gaps to be identified and resolved. • DCIT is conducting a risk assessment that can be used to assess the test program and identify such gaps. • Is the table complete in our minds?

17. Back-ups to review

18. Top-level trials value (1) • Risk reduction for en-route operational deployment • Indispensible to an operationally viable en-route deployment • Simply put, initial DCL operations without the trials would have failed • Both operationally focused design process and flights contributing • Trials provide essential, operationally focused, real-world • Concept validation • System definition and validation with in-field systems and operational staff • Procedure definition and validation with line crews and controllers • Identification of airborne issues that need to be solved • Continuation of trials past requirements freeze is good • Does not imply direct roll-over of new findings to first operations • Identifies and resolves airborne, ground and procedural issues • Prevents start again/stop-again crew participation (reappearance of previously solved problems during operations)

19. Top-level trials value (2) • Validate end-to-end connectivity performance including human response time. • We already have a lot of data on this but brings in some pilot/controller workload assessments and pilot acceptability in a live environment • Allows for a first step to work out issues • Very useful to further incentivize airlines.  The further out airlines see the benefits, the longer it will take to equip. • DCIS only has money for 1900 aircraft.  It will stop there if not accepted • Benefits-oriented trials are viable and an invaluable bridge for aircraft equipage • Create, and maintain, Program from launch to IOC

20. Summary of by-Service Objectives • Route clearance construction • Route segments not covered by DCL • Intercept Arrivals/Transitions part way down • Altitudes or speed constraints in route clearance portion (e.g. for cruise altitude or higher)? • SIDs/Transitions? • Aircrew and/or AOC requests • Inclusion of Arrivals/Transitions along with Approaches/Transitions • TOC • Verify Monitoring Frequency • The SDA concept, a first in the world so high risk, with highest impact if the risk is realized • “CPDLC on/CPDLC off” use • CAL for descending and climbing aircraft?

21. 2012 PRs by Problem Area • System and procedures continue to be wrung out in advance of full operations • Lead-time available for system components to address issues • Operational momentum and experience maintained

22. Sample value captures we have seen in DCL • Arrival/Transition formatting issue • Regular failures would occur in operations, risking all of DCL ops. • Significant potential operational impact to aircraft operator flight planning • Still no complete and agreed solution • 24-bit address use • Persistent log-on problems would have occurred, with redesign impact • Unexpected closure of dialogues (SAS issue) • There is time for aircraft to work the problem before full operations • MD-11 Nav Display • There is time for aircraft to work the problem before operations • Duplicate message handling on the ground • Operational systems would have had redesign impact • What is the value to the program of these and other items?

23. Alternatives • In theory, these things could be handled through • Detailed joint systems design, using targeted operational environments for realistic operational scenarios • This is what we have done with DCL, and are now just launching with ER • In reality though, some of the highest value results come from targeted operational situations • Involvement of live situations, operational staff and systems, and operational data that give some of the most critical results • It is extremely hard to fill this hole with paper-mill meetings • Operational specifics get lost • Operational dynamics get lost • Lotsa smart people used to fixing the things that cause big problems • Has this approach ever succeeded with datalink? • Very simply: • Why did it take so long to realize that we should not use um73? • Trials moved op sched to the right due to the trials • Without the trials, op deployment probably would have simply failed • We avoided the farthest right movement (termination)

24. Cost of insufficient validation • Had we not done DCL trials, on the order of • 31% failed DCLs (B737) • 29% failed DCLs (B757/B767) • Various other aircraft, with corresponding fail rate • Expensive and time consuming rework to recover • Bottom line: without DCL-style trials, expect Program risk • 2019 projections from Harris