Superiority

1. Superiority Gary Comstock Professor of Philosophy, NC State University 2007-08 ASC Fellow, National Humanities Center 30 June 8July 2008 Environmental Ethics in Teaching Social Sciences and Humanities, Moscow AUTONOMY | SINGULARITY | CREATIVITY

2. Overview 1. Two kinds of superiority2. The principle of inclusiveness3. The “sanctity of life” ethic4. The challenge of the cognitively impaired 5. Two defenses of the sanctity of life 6. Two responses: Singer’s utilitarianism Regan’s animal rights

3. Superiority = The quality or condition of being higher or above. • 1. Natural • Physically closer to the head • (elbow -> wrist). • 2. Earned • More accomplished in merit • (abbot -> monk).

4. God Angels Humans Birds Fish Animals Plants MineralsDevil Natural superiorityRhetorica ChristianaDidacus Valades1579

5. The principle of inclusiveness The satisfaction of several interests is better than the defeat of either because it adds more value to the world, all other things being equal.Interests = Objects of desires possessed by an individual Andrey -> wants -> tea. Values = Goods produced when interests are satisfied Tea -> energizes Andrey. Ralph Barton Perry, p. 655.

6. Conflicts of interests Individual AIndividual B Trivial Trivial Significant Significant Basic Basic If A is superior to B (Andrey, mosquito), then conflicts between them must be decided according to the principle of superiority: ALL of A’s interests trump ALL of B’s interests. If A and B are equals (Andrey, Anna), then decisions in conflict cases must be made according to some other principle (e.g., justice).

7. The sanctity of human life ethic All humans are superior to all animals. Therefore, the principle of superiority applies to all cases in which human / animal conflicts.E.g., my interest in curing cancer trumps the research mouse’s interest in avoiding death; my interest in eating quivering flesh trumps the fish’s interest in a painless death.

8. Sanctity of life Allhumans have intrinsic value. -> A human’s lack of intelligence or education or capacity for learning is not a reason for treating them as means. -> Cognitively impaired humans are humans and therefore meet the threshold requirement for intrinsic value. -> We must treat the cognitively impaired equally with the cognitively unimpaired.

9. Children with Down Syndrome Encyclopedia of Children's Health www.healthofchildren.com/images/gech_0001_0002_0_img0096.jpg

10. Sanctity of life Only humans have intrinsic value. -> Animals and machines have merely instrumental value. -> We may treat machines as appliances. -> We may treat animals as meat.

11. Confinement stalls No nest building, rooting, scratching, socializing, running Inability to establish distance between eating and defecation areas Average stereotypies per day: 18

12. The challenge of the severely congenitally cognitively impaired (SCIs) to the sanctity of life ethic.What characteristic do SCIs possess, and animals lack, that entitles SCIs, and not animals, to rights? 1. Biological answers Human DNA, membership in the species homo sapiens, 46 chromosomes, human parents. Problem: Biology is not morally relevant. A nonhuman like us (ET) has intrinsic value.

13. 2. Capacity answers e.g., SCI are persons, or have souls, are rational, use language, tools, have a sense of justice. STRENGTH: Not question begging. WEAKNESS: Not a satisfactory answer. a. Some SCIs do not have the capacity. b. Some animals do.

14. Review A defense of the principle of inclusiveness: Peter Singer’s utilitarianism1. The concept of equality Equality is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact. When we say that "all humans are equal," we do not assert that they are in fact equal in intelligence, etc. Rather, we assert that each deserves equal consideration of their interests. “An interest is an interest, whoever’s interest it may be.”2. The principle of equal consideration of interestsGive equal weight in moral deliberations to the like interests of all those affected by our actions.

15. Preference-utilitarianism1. The good a. Pleasure b. Preference-satisfaction2. The rightThe right action is always the action that leads to the best consequences: the greatest balance of pleasures over pains, and preferences-satisfied over preferences-unsatisfied.

16. An extension of the sanctity of (human) life ethic: Tom Regan’s animal rights1. To be a conscious creature with an individual welfare that matters to us, to possess memories, desires, interests, emotions, life plans, self-consciousness, etc. is to be an experiencing subject-of-a-life with moral rights.2. Animals are conscious creatures with individual welfares that matter to them.. . .8. Therefore, all such animals have moral rights.

17. Singer and ReganPractical implications: 1. Vegetarianism (veganism)2. No (little) use of animals in scientific research3. No circuses, rodeos4. No hunting

18. Critics: Ray FreyAnimals lack the psychological capacities necessary for rights. To have ___________ requires _________. rights interests interests desires desires beliefs beliefs concepts concepts language language liesQuestion: Why should desires require beliefs? Review

19. Critics: Carl Cohen Animals are not of the right kind.Question: What kind is humankind?The kind that is: able to claim or exercise one’s moral rights; be a member of the moral community; formulate moral principles for the direction of our conduct; be self-legislative, morally autonomous; confront conflicts between what is in our own interest and what is just. Review

20. Animals are not of the right kind.1. If the kind is biological, Membership in the species homo sapiens, 46 chromosomes, human parents then why isn’t this answer question-begging?2. If the kind is a psychological capacity, personhood, having a soul, rational, language, sense of justice, being able to reciprocate then why aren’t SCIs excluded?

21. B. Jeff McMahan’s approach: A Two-Tiered Account of the wrongness of killing 1. The harm of death Young adults, fetuses, the elderly ready-to-die, SCIs, animals 2. The wrongness of killing: The Two-Tiered Account Overview

22. 2. What kind of beings are we? a. A simple view: Incorporeal souls b. A simple view: Human organisms c. A complex view: Embodied minds We are essentially psychological beings.

23. Q. Why is it that an animal’s time-relative interest in continuing to live is typically much weaker than that of a person’s?

24. Q. Why is it that an animal’s time-relative interest in continuing to live is typically much weaker than that of a person’s? A. The animals’ p-relations and bases for egoistic concern are typically much weaker than those of a person.

25. Time-relative interest account of the wrongness of killingThe degree to which killing is wrong varies, other things being equal, with the strength of the victim’s time-relative interest in continuing to live.The strength of an individual’s time-relative interest in continuing to live, in turn, varies primarily with either or both of two things:(1) The net amount of good that the individual’s future would contain if she were to continue to live, and

26. The strength of an individual’s time-relative interest in continuing to live, in turn, varies with:(2) The extent to which the prudential unity relations would hold between the individual now and herself later when the goods of her future life would occur.Regarding (2), little variance exists among mature, cognitively normal human beings. Significant divergences only arise in the case of humans with substantially diminished psychological capacities: fetuses, infants, congenitally SCI, those with brain damage, dementia, and so on.

27. Tier One:The wrongness of killing non-self-conscious individuals. (fetuses, most animals—but not chimpanzees)The wrongness of killing these individuals varies with the net amount of good that the individual’s future would contain if she were to continue to live, and the strength of the individual’s prudential unity relations between the individual now and herself later when the future goods would occur.

28. If Tier 1 (the time-relative interest account of the wrongness of killing) applied to normal humans, then the wrongness of killing persons would vary. Consider these cases:Bright – a person with exceptionally high cognitive skillsDull – same age as Bright, but dim-witted and stolidCheerful – always manages to find the bright sideMelancholy – perpetually lugubrious and depressiveYoung – 20 years oldOld – 90 years old

29. If the Time-Relative Interest Account of the wrongness of killing applied to normal humans, then it would be less wrong, all other things being equal, to kill a dull, melancholy old person than a bright, cheerful, young person.But this result is deeply offensive. Why? It does not account for our intuition that all persons are equal.

30. Two-Tiered Account1. Killing of non-persons:Apply Time-Relative Interests Account (SCIs, animals)2. Killing of persons: Apply Equal Moral Worth Account (normal humans) All individuals above a certain threshold are equal (HOT? autobiograph?).

31. Implications of Two-Tiered Account: SCIs1. Consistent elitism (treat SCIs as we now do animals)2. Radical egalitarianism (treat animals as we now do SCIs)3. Convergent assimilation a. Raise animals considerably, change SCIs slightlySCIs —————————— Animals b. Demote SCIs considerably, change animals slightly SCIs —————————— Animals

32. McMahanPractical implications: 1. Vegetarianism2. Reduced use of animals in scientific research No commitment to Singer’s replaceability view. McMahan holds that non-self- conscious individuals (e.g., animals, infants, SCIs) have a time-relative interest in continuing to live. Singer denies this.4. Hunting?

33. Review • The human species is singular. • Singularity implies superiority. • Superiority does not justify exploitation. • Might there be beings superior to us?

34. The brain no longer needs the body. Dr. Miguel Nicolelis Duke UniversityFirst microchip implanted in monkey’s brain, 2003”Monkeys Consciously Control a Robot Arm Using Only Brain Signals; Appear to ‘Assimilate’ Arm As If it Were Their Own”

35. If singularity implies superiority, will future superior beings be justified in treating us as instruments to their ends? Brain-control Monkeys Baby robot learns

36. The curveKate HaylesLeftHand ofSingularityASCSept 06

37. We must genetically engineer ourselves or lose out to intelligent machines all over the world. - Stephen Hawking

38. The sanctity of human life ethic Humans should not: • Transcend limitations of the human body • Use technology to enhance human capacities • Achieve immortality Leon Kass, 2003 Chair President’s Council on Bioethics

39. Humanists against transhumanism Christians • CS Lewis, The Abolition of Man (1944) • Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae (1995) Environmentalists • Wendell Berry, What are People For? (1990) • Bill McKibben, Enough (2003) Disability rights community

40. Sanctity of life objections to transhumanism 1. Each human is a singular being, necessarily: • Biological • Emotional • Mortal • Borne by a mother and father who have • Recombined genes through • Sexual reproduction 2. To exist in a state not satisfying all of these conditions is unnatural and repugnant.

41. Concluding hypotheses • Are humans singular ? As individuals: Yes As a species: Yes • Why does it matter ? Because received attitudes and principles are inconsistent, recognizing rights to protect human interests but not to protect like animal interests.

42. Concluding hypotheses 3. Are we superior? Yes, but superiority entails weighing the interests of ‘inferior’ species equally to like interests of individuals of our species with mental states equivalent to or lesser than the animal’s mental states when there are no morally relevant differences between the two interests. To do otherwise is unjust. • Would future superior beings be justified in treating us as means to their ends? No, for them as for us to do otherwise would be unjust.